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I. Introduction
Imagine two different cases over which the California courts
might wish to assert personal jurisdiction. Case one is brought
against Walmart by a California plaintiff who was injured by a
defective Walmart product he bought in Ellsworth, Maine, while
on a vacation to Acadia National Park. Although he was injured in
Maine, the plaintiff now wishes to sue Walmart in his home state
of California where Walmart has 303 retail outlets, fourteen
distribution centers, 89,736 employees, and to which it pays $492.8
million in taxes.1 Case two is brought by a California plaintiff
against an individual defendant who lives in Maine. The claim
arose in Maine and has no connection to the state of California, but
the defendant was served with process while on a three-day
business trip to California. In each case the defendant moves to
dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction in
California.
It might surprise you to learn that, under current Supreme
Court case law, the California court would have to rule that the
California suit would violate Walmart’s due process rights because
the claim did not arise in California and because Walmart is
neither incorporated in California nor has its principal place of
business in California.2 On the other hand, current Supreme Court
precedent would permit the suit against the individual defendant
1. Location Facts, WALMART, INC., https://corporate.walmart.com/ourstory/locations/united-states/california#/united-states/california (last visited Jan.
9, 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
2. See BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1559 (2017) (holding that
“in-state business . . . does not suffice to permit the assertion of general
jurisdiction over claims . . . that are unrelated to any activity occurring in [that
state]”); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017)
(rejecting the California Supreme Court’s sliding scale approach for specific
jurisdiction); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 136 (2014) (“Even if we were
to assume that [Daimler’s subsidiary, MBUSA,] is at home in California, and
further to assume MBUSA's contacts are imputable to Daimler, there would still
be no basis to subject Daimler to general jurisdiction in California . . . .”);
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) (“A
court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign . . . corporations to hear any
and all claims against them when their affiliations with the State are so
‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum
State.”); see also infra Part III (analyzing four recent Supreme Court cases on
personal jurisdiction and discussing mistaken assumptions based off of them).
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notwithstanding the difficulties in defending against a suit so far
from home on a matter unconnected with the state of California.3
How is it that a lawsuit that would be easy for a huge corporation
like Walmart to defend, in a state where it has such massive
continuous contact, would violate Walmart’s due process rights,
while a lawsuit that would be arduous for an individual to defend,
in a state where his only contact was an unrelated three-day
business trip, would not violate the individual’s due process rights?
This Article posits that two significant problems in the
Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction case law have led to
incoherent and irreconcilable results in cases involving individual
and corporate defendants. First, the Court has imposed
substantive due process limitations on a state’s assertion of
personal jurisdiction without ever explaining why such limitations
are constitutionally required. Beginning with Pennoyer v. Neff,4
the Court has ruled that the Due Process Clause of the 14th
Amendment requires some kind of contact between a defendant
and the forum state. Although the kinds of contact that would
permit personal jurisdiction have both expanded and contracted
since then,5 the requirement for some kind of contact has
remained, regardless of how convenient it might be for the
defendant to litigate the case. This contacts requirement is the sole
remaining branch of 19th Century substantive due process law.6
The absence of a theoretical explanation for why there should be
any substantive due process limitation on personal jurisdiction has
impoverished the Court’s personal jurisdiction jurisprudence and
3. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 628 (1990) (“[T]he Due
Process Clause does not prohibit the California courts from exercising jurisdiction
over petitioner based on the fact of in-state service of process . . . .”); see also infra
Part II.C (examining the consequences of the Court’s failure to identify the
rationale for the substantive due process contacts requirement).
4. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
5. See infra Part II (discussing the Court’s failure to provide a convincing
theoretical justification for imposing substantive due process limitations on
personal jurisdiction).
6. See Wendy Collins Perdue, Sin, Scandal and Substantive Due Process:
Personal Jurisdiction and Pennoyer Reconsidered, 62 WASH. L. REV. 479, 518
(1987) (noting that “the Court has continued to emphasize that a purposeful
‘contact’ with the forum is still required, even if that contact need not be
physical”).
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confused lower courts when they have tried to apply Supreme
Court case law.
Moreover, because the Supreme Court initially imposed only
substantive due process limitations on personal jurisdiction, the
procedural due process issues have received short shrift and rarely
determine the scope of personal jurisdiction. Only in 1945 did the
Court hint that procedural due process issues, such as the burden
on a defendant, might have a role to play in personal jurisdiction
analysis,7 and it was not until 1987 that the Court decided a
personal jurisdiction case based upon a procedural due process
analysis.8 By not placing the procedural due process analysis first,
the Court has exacerbated the substantive due process issues that
have confused lower courts and the academic commentators.
Second, in the absence of clearly enunciated principles of
substantive due process, the Supreme Court has relied on poorly
defined categories of the types of contacts that would satisfy the
substantive due process requirement. After Pennoyer, the
categories included service on the defendant in the forum state,
seizure of the defendant’s property in the forum state, and
citizenship or domicile of the defendant in the forum state. In
addition, because a defendant could waive its 14th Amendment
rights, consent to suit in the forum state was an adequate basis of
personal jurisdiction. These traditional bases of jurisdiction all
allowed personal jurisdiction regardless of where the claim arose,
a category of jurisdiction that later became known as general
jurisdiction.9

7. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945) (“To require
the corporation in such circumstances to defend the suit away from its home or
other jurisdiction where it carries on more substantial activities has been thought
to lay too great and unreasonable a burden on the corporation to comport with
due process.”).
8. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 115
(1987) (explaining the need “for a court to consider the procedural and substantive
policies of other nations whose interests are affected by the assertion of
jurisdiction by the California court”).
9. See Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to
Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136–44 (1966)
(detailing the nuances of general jurisdiction).

660

76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 655 (2019)

In International Shoe Co. v. Washington,10 the Court held, in
part because it was so difficult to determine whether a corporation
was “present” in a state when served with process, that it was only
necessary that a defendant have certain “minimum contacts” with
the forum state to satisfy the requirements of the Due Process
Clause.11 If the defendant’s contacts gave rise to the claim, a state
might exercise “specific jurisdiction” even if the contacts were
isolated and sporadic.12 Alternatively, if a corporation’s contacts
with a state were sufficiently “continuous and systematic,” a state
could exercise personal jurisdiction without regard to where the
claim arose, a subcategory that also came to be known as “general
jurisdiction.”13
These rigid and inflexible categories gave rise to two types of
problems. First, the Court has tended to discuss the rules
applicable to a particular category without reference to the rules
that applied to other categories, which has created the kinds of
anomalous results hypothesized above. For example, in Burnham
v. Superior Court,14 the Court upheld the continuing validity of
service on an individual within the forum state as a basis of
personal jurisdiction, with one opinion (written by Justice Scalia
on behalf of four members of the Court) stating that it was not
necessary to harmonize this category with the Court’s modern
specific and general jurisdiction cases15 and another opinion
(written by Justice Brennan for four members of the Court) stating
that it was necessary to harmonize the category, but then utterly
failing to apply the tests that the Court had developed for specific

10. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
11. See id. at 316 (“[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a
defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of
the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it . . . .”).
12. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 478–82 (1985)
(discussing the contacts requirement in a breach of contract case); Calder v.
Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789–90 (1984) (discussing the contacts requirement in an
intentional tort case).
13. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414–16
(1985).
14. 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
15. See id. at 618 (“Due process does not necessarily require the States to
adhere to the unbending territorial limits on jurisdiction set forth in Pennoyer.”).
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and general jurisdiction.16
Second, the rigidity of the categories is exacerbated by the
ambiguity of the labeling. The term “general jurisdiction” gives the
courts and commentators the most problems because it refers to
two different jurisdictional concepts. It can refer to all
jurisdictional categories that are dispute-blind, that is, they allow
jurisdiction without regard to where the claim arose. For example,
all of the traditional bases of jurisdiction are dispute-blind.17
Alternatively, general jurisdiction can refer to the subcategory of
“minimum contacts” based jurisdiction that arose after
International Shoe in which dispute-blind jurisdiction was allowed
based upon a corporation’s continuous and systematic contacts
with the forum state. For the sake of clarity, this Article will refer
to that category as corporate-activities-based jurisdiction.
The problem caused by this linguistic ambiguity is nowhere
more apparent than in four recent Supreme Court cases where the
plaintiffs
asserted
personal
jurisdiction
based
upon
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction.18 Over those cases, Justice
16. See id. at 631–33 (“[Many] have interpreted International Shoe and
Shaffer to mean that every assertion of state-court jurisdiction . . . must comport
with contemporary notions of due process. Notwithstanding the nimble
gymnastics of Justice SCALIA’s opinion today, it is not faithful to our decision in
Shaffer.”) (Brennan, J., concurring).
17. See Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV.
610, 622 (1988) (“Because service on an individual physically present in the forum
gave the state jurisdiction over any transitory cause of action, regardless of its
relationship to the defendant's forum activities, these courts held that corporate
‘presence’ based on ‘doing business’ in the state created equally broad
jurisdiction.”).
18. See BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1559 (2017) (holding that
“in-state business . . . does not suffice to permit the assertion of general
jurisdiction over claims like [defendants’] that are unrelated to any activity
occurring in [the forum state]”); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137
S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017) (stating that “only a limited set of affiliations with a
forum will render a defendant amenable to” general jurisdiction in that State”);
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 136 (2014) (“The Ninth Circuit’s agency
theory thus appears to subject foreign corporations to general jurisdiction
whenever they have an in-state subsidiary or affiliate, an outcome that would
sweep beyond even the ‘sprawling view of general jurisdiction’ we rejected in
Goodyear.”); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 920
(2011)
Some of the tires made abroad by Goodyear’s foreign
subsidiaries . . . had reached North Carolina through “the stream of
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Ginsburg essentially eliminated corporate-activities-based
jurisdiction (and with it, hundreds of lower court cases basing
jurisdiction on that standard) by limiting it to cases in which a
corporation is “at home,” by which she meant, the state of
incorporation and principal place of business.19 As we will see
below, the problem is that, in discussing corporate-activities-based
jurisdiction, Justice Ginsburg, used the term “general
jurisdiction”20 and relied on commentary discussing the term
“general jurisdiction” in the larger sense of all-purpose
jurisdiction. She then limited corporate-activities-based
jurisdiction to the kinds of contacts required for the traditional
basis of citizenship or domicile jurisdiction, which is a different
subcategory of all-purpose jurisdiction.21 In so doing, Justice
Ginsburg left nothing in the formerly well-established separate
category of corporate-activities-based jurisdiction.22
This is not simply a theoretical problem. It is a problem that
affects plaintiffs, like the California plaintiff in the first
hypothesized case above, who are injured by a corporate defendant
outside of their home state and wish to sue on their home turf
rather than incur the burden of litigating where the claim arose.
The plaintiff’s home state clearly has an interest in allowing their
citizen to sue, and, if the corporation has substantial ongoing
contacts with the plaintiff’s home state, it is hard to see why such
a suit would violate the corporation’s due process rights.

commerce”; that connection, the Court of Appeals believed, gave North
Carolina courts the handle needed for the exercise of general
jurisdiction over the foreign corporations. A connection so limited
between the forum and the foreign corporation, we hold, is an
inadequate basis for the exercise of general jurisdiction.
19. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919 (“A court may assert general jurisdiction over
foreign . . . corporations to hear any and all claims against them when their
affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them
essentially at home in the forum State.”).
20. Id.
21. See id. at 924 (“As a rule in these cases, this Court has inquired whether
there was ‘some act by which the defendant purposefully avail[ed] itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the
benefits and protections of its laws’”).
22. See
infra
Part
III.B
(examining
the
disappearance
of
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction through the Daimler holding).
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This Article addresses these problems in five Parts. In Part I,
the Article discusses the history of the Court’s substantive due
process limitations on personal jurisdiction and, in particular, the
standards for corporate-activities-based jurisdiction before the
Court’s recent cases on that issue. Part II discusses the Court’s
failure to provide a convincing theoretical justification for
imposing substantive due process limitations on personal
jurisdiction. It also discusses the consequences of that failure in
three doctrinal areas of personal jurisdiction law, the traditional
basis of service on an individual in the forum state, specific
jurisdiction and corporate-activities-based jurisdiction. Part III
then analyzes in detail the four recent Supreme Court cases on
personal jurisdiction, and discusses the mistaken assumptions
underlying those decisions. Part IV explains how the Court’s
personal jurisdiction rules, as a whole, suffer from theoretical
bareness, the ambiguity of the substantive due process categories
of jurisdiction, and the rigidity of the Court’s substantive due
process analysis. Finally, in Part V, the Article offers some ideas
for how the Court could begin to remedy the many problems with
personal jurisdiction law.
II. The Substantive Due Process Limitations on Personal
Jurisdiction
The Supreme Court first addressed personal jurisdiction at
the beginning of the 19th Century in order to decide whether to
enforce judgments under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the
Constitution.23 The Court needed to create common law rules of
personal jurisdiction in order to decide whether judgments were
valid and therefore enforceable.24 Because these decisions were
23. See Roger H. Trangsrud, The Federal Common Law of Personal
Jurisdiction, 57 GEO. WASH L. REV. 849, 850–84 (1989) (detailing the origins of
personal jurisdiction and how the establishment of the Constitution necessitated
it); James Weinstein, The Early American Origins of Territoriality in Judicial
Jurisdiction, 37 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1, 7–42 (1992) (examining the history of judicial
jurisdiction and the role territoriality played in that history).
24. See Transgurd, supra note 23, at 867 (“The most plausible explanation
then is that the first Congress intended that the Supreme Court would develop
federal common law rules of jurisdiction to measure the scope of state court
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based upon the common law, they could, of course, be overruled by
an act of Congress.
That situation changed in 1877 when the Court decided
Pennoyer v. Neff.25 Writing for the Court, Justice Steven Field
concluded that a state court could exercise jurisdiction over a
defendant only if that person were served with process within the
state, or if that person owned property within the state (and that
property was attached at the beginning of the litigation) or if that
person was a citizen of the state, or if that person consented to the
jurisdiction of the state court.26 Justice Field stated that these
rules were not simply a matter of federal common law, they were
also mandated by the Due Process Clause of the 14th
Amendment.27 After Pennoyer v. Neff, a court could not render a
binding judgment on a defendant without satisfying the due
process principles set forth by Justice Field, regardless of how easy
or convenient it was for the defendant to appear and litigate the
case.28 Although Justice Field never explained why these
principles were required by the Due Process Clause, it seems fairly
clear that these rules are a matter of substantive, rather than
procedural, due process.29

jurisdiction over noncitizens.”); see generally D’Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. (11
How.) 165 (1850); Mils v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481 (1813).
25. 95 U.S. 714 (1877), overruled by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1997).
26. Id. at 722. This part of the Court’s decision was dictum because the 14th
Amendment did not come into effect until 1868, two years after the 1866 judgment
was rendered in the case under consideration in Pennoyer v. Neff.
27. See id. at 733 (“[T]he validity of such judgments may be directly
questioned . . . on the ground that proceedings in a court of justice to deter mine
the personal rights and obligations of parties over whom that court has no
jurisdiction do not constitute due process of law.”).
28. See Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional Law of Personal
Jurisdiction: From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
19, 38–51 (1990) (arguing the Court was not clear on whether the Due Process
Clause actually provided the content of personal jurisdiction rules); John B.
Oakley, The Pitfalls of “Hint and Run” History: A Critique of Professor Borchers’s
“Limited View” of Pennoyer v. Neff, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 591, 595–97 (1995)
(disagreeing with parts of Borcher’s analysis, but agreeing that the due process
basis for the rule was implicitly recognized in Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills
v. Menefee, in which the Court treated the issue as a well-established rule).
29. Perdue, supra note 6, at 508.

CATEGORICAL CONFUSION

665

The four traditional bases of jurisdiction that were allowed
after Pennoyer, territorial service, seizure of defendants’ property
in the forum, citizenship, and consent, were all examples of
dispute-blind jurisdiction—that is to say, general jurisdiction in
the larger sense of any basis of jurisdiction that exists without
regard to whether the claim arose in the forum state and would
allow jurisdiction for any claim wherever it arose.30 Thus, for
example, as long as a defendant was served in the forum state, it
was permissible for the forum to take jurisdiction over any claim
wherever it arose.31 The same was true for the other three
categories within the traditional bases of jurisdiction.32
By the early 20th century, however, the four traditional bases
of jurisdiction proved to be too restrictive for a society that was on
the move and growing economically.33 First, increasing numbers of
drivers were heading to other states where they became involved
in accidents and then quickly returning to their home state before
they could be served with process in the state where the accident
took place.34 States responded to this circumstance by creating
statutes that required drivers on their roads either to expressly
consent to personal jurisdiction in cases arising out of their use of
the state’s roads, or that simply asserted drivers had impliedly
consented to the state’s jurisdiction by driving on their roads.35
30. See Twitchell, supra note 17, at 622 (“[T]he contours of general
jurisdiction initially expanded as states developed rules permitting jurisdiction
over corporate defendants based on theories of ‘consent,’ ‘doing business,’ or
‘presence’ in the state.”).
31. See id. (“[S]ervice on an individual physically present in the forum gave
the state jurisdiction over any transitory cause of action, regardless of its
relationship to the defendant's forum activities . . . .”).
32. See id. at 625 (“General jurisdiction would serve as a secondary basis for
jurisdiction, important primarily when the cause of action did not arise from
defendant's forum activities.”).
33. See id. at 623 (“[I]t was only in the early twentieth century that American
courts and commentators incorporated this concept of limited, dispute-specific
jurisdiction into their core jurisdiction theory.”).
34. See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 354 (1927) (explaining that a
nonresident accused of negligently causing an accident would not be held
accountable to an injured resident if not for Massachusetts law creating implied
consent for drivers).
35. See, e.g., id. at 356–57 (“[T]he State may declare that the use of the
highway by the non-resident is the equivalent of the appointment of the registrar
as agent on whom process may be served.”); Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160,
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Even though the idea of implied consent was clearly a legal fiction,
the Supreme Court chose to expand the jurisdictional parameters
of Pennoyer by stretching the meaning of consent to include the
new implied consent statutes because of the state’s interests in
providing a forum for accidents arising out the inherent dangers of
motor vehicles used on the state’s roads.36
The second difficulty with the Court’s personal jurisdiction
jurisprudence involved the increasingly multi-state nature of
corporate activity in the United States.37 It was easy to apply the
traditional basis of service within the forum state to individuals,
whose physical presence within a state could easily be tracked.38 It
was much more difficult, however, to apply the territorial presence
concept to corporations.39 Originally, because a corporation is a
fictitious entity whose existence is established solely through the
laws of the state where it is incorporated, the Supreme Court ruled
that corporations could only be sued in that state.40 After Pennoyer,
however, the courts first began to apply the traditional basis of
consent to justify personal jurisdiction over corporations, but, as

164 (1916) (explaining that the law provides “that a nonresident owner shall
appoint the Secretary of State his attorney upon whom process may be served ‘in
any action or legal proceeding caused by the operation of his registered motor
vehicle, within this State, against such owner’”).
36. See Hess, 274 U.S. at 356 (“In the public interest the state may make and
enforce regulations reasonabl[y] calculated to promote care on the part of all,
residents and non-residents alike, who use its highways.”).
37. See Twitchell, supra note 17, at 669–70 (“[A] strong argument can be
made that the automatic exercise of "pure" general jurisdiction over a domestic
corporation is inappropriate when so many corporations lack any other significant
ties with their state of incorporation.”).
38. See id. at 633–34 (“As was true before International Shoe, substantial
activities outside the state that affect forum residents are less likely to result in
general jurisdiction than is physical activity within the state's borders . . . .”).
39. See Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930)
(“[F]or it is as hard to judge what dealings make it just to subject a foreign
corporation to local suit, as to say when it is ‘present,’ but at least it puts the real
question . . . .”).
40. See Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519, 588–89 (1839) (“[A]
corporation can have no legal existence out of the boundaries of the sovereignty
which it is created. It exists only in contemplation of law, and by force of the law;
and where that law ceases to operate, and is no longer obligatory the corporation
can have no existence.”).
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the Supreme Court later noted in Schaffer v. Heitner,41 the theory
that a forum corporation consented to personal jurisdiction in a
state in which it was doing business “was later supplemented by
the doctrine that a corporation doing business in a State could be
deemed ‘present’ in the State, and so subject to service of process
under the rule of Pennoyer.”42
The concept of service on corporations within the forum state
was based on the idea that corporations were present in any state
where they were “doing business.”43 In some of these cases, the
claims arose out of the business the corporations performed in the
forum state.44 In other cases, however, the corporations’ presence
in the forum state permitted the state to exercise personal
jurisdiction even over claims that did not arise the forum state.45
In these cases jurisdiction was justified based on the traditional
basis of service on the corporate defendant while the defendant
41. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
42. Id. at 202. (citing Int’l Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914);
Phila. & Reading Ry. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264 (1917)).
43. See St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218, 226–27 (1913) (“[I]n
order to render a corporation amenable to service of process in a foreign
jurisdiction it must appear that the corporation is transacting business in that
district to such an extent as to subject it to the jurisdiction and laws thereof.”).
44. See, e.g., Int’l Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579, 585–86 (1914)
(“The agents not only solicited such orders in Kentucky, but might there receive
payment in money, cheeks or drafts . . . [t]his course of conduct of authorized
agents within the State, in our judgment, constituted a doing of business . . . .”);
Commercial Mut. Accident Co. v. Davis, 213 U.S. 245, 254 (1909) (“When the
company sent such an agent into Missouri, by force of the statute he is presumed
to represent the company for the purpose of service . . . .”); Conn. Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Spratley, 172 U.S. 602, 611 (1899) (“[I]t cannot be said to cease doing
business therein when it ceases to obtain or ask for new risks or to issue new
policies, while at the same time its old policies continue in force and the premiums
thereon are continuously paid by the policyholders to an agent residing in another
State . . . .”); Pa. Lumberman’s Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Meyer, 197 U.S. 407, 415
(1899) (“We think it would be somewhat difficult for the defendant to describe
what it was doing in New York, if it was not doing business therein, when sending
its agents into that State to perform various acts of adjustment provided for by
its contracts . . . .”).
45. See, e.g., Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry. Co. v. Reynolds, 255 U.S. 565 (1921) (per
curiam) (affirming costs based on the precedent of St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co. v.
Alexander); Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 115 N.E. 915 (N.Y. 1917) (“The
defendant was doing business within the state of New York within the meaning
of section 1780, subdivision 4, of the Code of Civil Procedure . . . and the cause of
action is presumed to have arisen within the state . . . .”).
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was present in the forum state by virtue of the business conducted
in the forum state.46 As one well-known treatise described the
theory:
The presence doctrine rested on the proposition that a forum
corporation should be amenable to process absent consent only
if it conducted enough business within the State to justify the
inference that it was present there. Although the presence of a
natural person in a State which would permit internal “tagging”
to support in personam jurisdiction, could be fleeting at best,
corporate presence had to be evidenced by continuous dealings
in the State . . . . If the corporation was found to be present,
jurisdiction could be sustained on claims unrelated to its local
business dealings . . . .47

The problem with using the traditional basis of territorial
service with respect to corporations, however, was that the
explanations for what constituted sufficient business done within
the forum state became increasingly technical and formalistic,
without regard for any principles upon which the substantive due
process requirement of contact between the corporate defendant
and the forum state might be based. This led astute observers like
Judge Learned Hand to note that “presence” in the form of “doing
business,” was simply a conclusory term which did “no more than
put the question to be answered.”48 Nonetheless, it was wellestablished that some level of business conducted in the forum
state was sufficient to establish dispute-blind jurisdiction over
claims regardless of where the claim arose.49
In 1945, however, the Supreme Court finally acknowledged
that it no longer made sense to rest jurisdiction over forum
corporations on the criterion that they were “doing business”
within the forum state.50 In International Shoe Co. v.
46. See Twitchell, supra note 17, at 621–22 (“Some courts . . . held that a
foreign corporation ‘doing business’ in a state was ‘present’ there.”).
47. JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL
PROCEDURE 111 (3d ed. 2009) (footnotes omitted).
48. Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930)
(Hand, J.).
49. See Twitchell, supra note 17, at 672 (“The question, then, is what sort of
local presence gives a nonresident defendant a sufficiently strong relationship
with the forum to trigger dispute-blind jurisdiction.”).
50. See id. at 623–24 (“[I]n 1945, the Court used the opportunity to sweep
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Washington,51 the court addressed whether the State of
Washington had personal jurisdiction over a corporation in an
action filed to collect taxes arising out of the business activity
conducted within the forum state.52 Instead of focusing on whether
the corporation was “doing business” in this forum state, the court
stated:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant
to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the
territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with
it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.53

Chief Justice Stone wrote that the demands of due process can
be met “by such contacts of the corporation with the state of the
forum as make it reasonable . . . to require the corporation to
defend a particular suit which is brought there.”54 The contacts
that would be an acceptable basis for personal jurisdiction fell into
two categories.55 First, the plaintiff’s claim could arise out of the
defendant’s contact with the forum state.56 In those cases the
forum could assert what came to be known as specific jurisdiction,
even if the defendant’s contact with the forum state was “some
single or occasional acts . . . .”57 Conversely, “there have been
instances in which the continuous corporate operations within a
state were thought so substantial and of such a nature as to justify
aside the ‘presence’ test as a meaningful determinant of corporate jurisdiction.”).
51. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
52. See id. at 311 (questioning “whether, within the limitations of the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, appellant, a Delaware corporation,
has by its activities in the State of Washington rendered itself amendable to
proceedings in the courts of that state to recover unpaid contributions to the state
unemployment compensation fund . . . .”).
53. Id. at 316 (internal quotation marks omitted).
54. Id. at 317.
55. See id. at 317–19 (explaining casual contact with the forum state related
to the claim and “continuous corporate operations” within the forum, even if
unrelated to the claim may create personal jurisdiction).
56. See id. at 317 (“[C]asual presence of the corporate agent or even his
conduct of single or isolated items of activities in a state in the corporation’s behalf
are not enough to subject it to suit on causes of action unconnected with activities
there.”).
57. Id. at 318.
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suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely
distinct from those activities.”58 Although the Court’s phrasing was
somewhat ambiguous, the cases cited by the Supreme Court in
support of its suggestion that “continuous corporate operations
within a state” could justify personal jurisdiction on claims that
were “entirely distinct from those activities” support the conclusion
that the Supreme Court was referring to a category of
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction that was separate and apart
from the all purpose jurisdiction in the state where a corporation
has its place of business or is incorporated.59 As Professor Twitchell
noted,
The standard, then, is “continuous” operations within the state
that are “so substantial and of such a nature” to justify
dispute-blind jurisdiction. The Court offers no further gloss on
this vague and open-ended description, but the cases it cites for
this point involve defendants who were operating an office
within the forum, staffed with their own employees.60

For example, in Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co.,61 the Court
of Appeals of New York State, in an opinion by Judge Cardozo
upheld jurisdiction over a Pennsylvania Corporation that had its
principal place of business in Philadelphia with respect to a claim
that arose on a claim that had no connection with defendant’s
contacts with the forum state.62 Instead, Judge Cardozo based
jurisdiction on the facts that defendant had a branch office in New
York State in which nine employees served as a permanent sales
force in addition to other support staff.63 Judge Cardozo
emphasized that the defendant’s New York office “systematically
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Mary Twitchell, Why We Keep Doing Business with Doing-Business
Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 171, 183 (2001).
61. 115 N.E. 915 (N.Y. 1917).
62. See id. at 916–17 (“The defendant’s coal yards are in Pennsylvania, and
from there its shipments are made. They are made in response to orders
transmitted from customers in New York.”).
63. See id. at 917 (“[T]he defendant maintains an office in this state under
the direction of a sales agent, with eight salesmen, and with clerical assistants,
and through these agencies systematically and regularly solicits and obtains
orders which result in continuous shipments from Pennsylvania to New York”).
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and regularly solicits and obtains orders which result in
continuous shipments from Pennsylvania to New York.”64 Judge
Cardozo’s use of the terms “continuously” and “systematically” is
significant because those are the terms used by the Supreme Court
in its subsequent decision in Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated
Mining Co.,65 to support corporate-activities-based jurisdiction as
a category distinct from a corporation citizenship or domicile (state
of incorporation or principal place of business).66 Judge Cardozo
specifically held that “the defendant corporation is engaged in
business within this state. We hold, further, that the jurisdiction
does not fail because the cause of action sued upon has no relation
in its origin to the business here transacted.”67
Similarly, in Missouri, Kansas and Texas Railway Co. v.
Reynolds,68 the Supreme Court of the United States summarily
affirmed a decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts in which the Court exercised jurisdiction over a
forum corporation whose principal place of business was outside
the forum state based on the continuous corporate activities
conducted by the defendant within Massachusetts.69 The
Alexander case, involved the issue whether a Texas corporation,
that had its principal place of business in Texas was subject to
personal jurisdiction in New York state based on the activities of
its employees there.70 The Court stated that “in order to render a
corporation amenable to service of process in a forum jurisdiction
it must appear that the corporation is transacting business in that
64. Id. at 917.
65. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
66. See id. at 445–46 (“[C]ontinuous and systematic corporate
activities . . . are enough to make it fair and reasonable to subject that corporation
to proceedings in personam in that state . . . to enforce causes of action relating to
those very activities or to other activities of the corporation within the state.”).
67. Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 115 N.E. 915, 918 (N.Y. 1917).
68. 255 U.S. 565 (1920).
69. See id. at 565 (affirming the decision of the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court “upon the authority St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co. v. Alexander, 227 U.S.
218”).
70. See St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218, 228 (1913)
(explaining how a freight agent in the New York office corresponded with a
negotiated with the plaintiff and was therefore acting as an authorized agent of
the company making them subject to service in that state).
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district to such an extent that it is subject to the jurisdiction and
laws thereof.”71
In addition to this contacts requirement, the Court hinted that
there is also a procedural due process component to the test for
personal jurisdiction: “an estimate of the inconveniences which
would result to the corporation from trial away from its home or
principal place of business is relevant in this connection.”72 The
Court ultimately expanded this procedural component into a
five-factor test to determine whether personal jurisdiction over a
defendant would be reasonable.73
In the years after International Shoe, courts applying the new
minimum contacts standard developed two distinct categories of
contacts-based personal jurisdiction.74 Cases in which the claim
arose out of the defendant’s contact with the forum state were
identified as specific jurisdiction cases.75 In those cases, the
Supreme Court required plaintiffs to establish three elements.
First, the claim must arise out of the defendant’s contact with the
forum state.76 The Supreme Court has recently made it clear that
it is not enough that the claim simply be related to a defendant’s
contact with the forum state or that the claim should be identical
to other claims that arose directly from the defendant’s contact
71. Id. at 226.
72. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
73. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)
(stating factors include: the “burden on the defendant,” a “forum State’s interest
in adjudicating the dispute,” the plaintiff receiving “convenient and effective
relief,” “the most efficient resolution of controversies,” and finally “furthering
fundamental substantive social policies”); see also Kulko v. Superior Court, 436
U.S. 84, 92 (1978) (“[T]he interests of the forum State and of the plaintiff in
proceeding with the cause in the plaintiff’s forum of choice are, of course to be
considered . . . .”).
74. See BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1558 (2017) (“[W]e have
distinguished between specific or case-linked jurisdiction and general or
all-purpose jurisdiction.”).
75. Id. at 1559 (“[T]he business BNSF does in Montana is sufficient to
subject the railroad to specific personal jurisdiction in that State on claims related
to the business it does in Montana.”).
76. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780
(2017) (“In order for a state court to exercise specific jurisdiction, ‘the suit’ must
‘aris[e] out of or relat[e] to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.’”).
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with the forum state.77 Second, the defendant’s contacts with the
forum state must be in some sense purposeful and not merely
inadvertent or beyond the defendant’s control.78 These purposeful
contacts may, in the context of an intentional tort case, be wrongful
conduct that is directed at individuals in the forum state,79 or the
intentional receipt of some significant benefit from the defendant’s
contacts with the forum state.80 Third, the plaintiff must show that
the lawsuit is procedurally fair by balancing the burden on the
defendant against the forum state’s interest in the case, the
interest of the plaintiff in litigating in the forum state, the shared
interest of the interstate system of justice in adjudicating the case
in a forum where witnesses and evidence will be easily available,
and the potential impact on substantive law resulting from the
court’s assumption of jurisdiction in a particular case.81
The second line of cases established what the courts
eventually called general jurisdiction, but which we will refer to as
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction in order to distinguish it
from the larger category of all-purpose dispute-blind jurisdiction,
which, as previously noted, is also frequently referred to as general

77. See id. at 1780–81 (“The mere fact that other plaintiffs were prescribed,
obtained, and ingested Plavix in California—and allegedly sustained the same
injuries as did the nonresidents—does not allow the State to assert specific
jurisdiction over the nonresidents’ claims.”).
78. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (explaining how it is
required that the defendant “purposefully avails itself” in order to establish
jurisdiction).
79. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 791 (1984) (holding specific
jurisdiction was allowed over a liable claim against a writer who had no other
contact with the forum state other than writing an article that the writer knew
would harm the plaintiff in the forum state).
80. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 487 (1985) (holding
specific jurisdiction was allowed based on benefits received from the forum state
arising out of a contract that had a significant connection to the forum state).
81. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292 (stating the five factors the
Court considers relevant in determining whether it is “reasonable” for the
defendant to litigate in that forum); Kulko, 436 U.S. at 92 (“Like any standard
that requires a determination of ‘reasonableness,’ the ‘minimum contacts’ test of
International Shoe is not susceptible of mechanical application; rather, the facts
of each case must be weighed . . . .”).
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jurisdiction.82 In Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.,83 the
Supreme Court upheld general jurisdiction over a corporation that
had its temporary corporate operations in the forum state.84 As
described by the Supreme Court, the corporation was carrying on
in Ohio a “continuous and systematic, but limited, part of its
general business” but “[t]he cause of action sued upon did not arise
in Ohio and does not relate to the corporation’s activities there.”85
The court accepted the Ohio Supreme Court’s ruling that the
defendant was “to be treated as a foreign corporation.”86 Thus,
none of the traditional bases of jurisdiction, including citizenship
or domicile, were applicable to the case.87 Instead, the court
assessed the legitimacy of jurisdiction in Ohio based on the
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction branch of the International
Shoe test.88 After discussing the actions taken by the corporation’s
president within the state of Ohio, the Court stated that the
president “carried on in Ohio a continuous and systematic
supervision of the necessarily limited wartime activities of the
company.”89 These continuous and systematic contacts justified
Ohio’s assertion of personal jurisdiction with respect to a claim
that did not arise out of the defendant’s within the forum state.90
82. See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445 (1952)
(“The amount and kind of activities which must be carried on by the foreign
corporation in the state of the forum so as to make it reasonable and just to subject
the corporation to the jurisdiction of the state are to be determined in each case.”).
83. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
84. See id. at 447–49 (explaining that during the occupation of the
Philippines the president of the company “carried on in Ohio a continuous and
systematic supervision of the necessarily limited wartime activities of the
company”).
85. Id. at 438.
86. Id. at 439.
87. See id. at 448 (stating “[t]he company’s mining properties were in the
Philippine Islands” along with their operations before the Japanese occupation).
88. See id. at 445 (“The essence of the issue here, at the constitutional level,
is a like one of general fairness to the corporation. Appropriate tests for that are
discussed in International Shoe . . . .”).
89. Id. at 448.
90. Id. (“While no mining properties in Ohio were owned or operated by the
company, many of its wartime activities were directed from Ohio and were being
given the personal attention of its president in that State at the time he was
served with summons.”).
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After Perkins, both the lower courts and commentators agreed
that, in order to establish corporate-activities-based jurisdiction
over a claim arising outside of the forum state, it was necessary for
the plaintiff to show that the defendant had continuous and
systematic contacts with the forum state.91
The Supreme Court itself described the holding of Perkins in
several cases before it actually decided another case involving
continuous corporate contact jurisdiction.92 For example, in Keeton
v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,93 the court stated that in Perkins,
“jurisdiction was based solely on the fact that the defendant
corporation had been carrying on in the forum ‘a continuous and
systematic, but limited, part of its general business.’”94 Similarly,
in Calder v. Jones,95 the Supreme Court cited to Perkins and
described the case as permitting general jurisdiction where
defendant’s contacts with the forum were “continuous and
systematic.”96
The only other Supreme Court case to deal with
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction prior to the recent decisions
was Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall.97 In that
case, the Court decided that a collection of separate contacts with
the forum state which included the purchase of helicopters, the
training of pilots, the visit of the defendant’s chief executive officer
to negotiate a contract, and the receipt of checks for its services
drawn on a Texas bank were insufficient to constitute the
continuous and systematic contact required for general
91. See Twitchell, supra note 17, at 633–34.
92. See, e.g., Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 781 (1984)
(“Where, as in this case, respondent Hustler Magazine, Inc., has continuously and
deliberately exploited the New Hampshire market, it must reasonably anticipate
being haled into court there in libel action based on the contents of its magazine.”);
Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788–89 (1984) (“The allegedly libelous story
concerned the California activities of a California resident . . . . The article was
drawn from California sources, and the brunt of the harm, in terms of both of
respondent’s emotional distress and the injury to her professional reputation, was
suffered in California.”).
93. 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
94. Id. at 779 (citing Perkins, 342 U.S. at 437).
95. 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
96. Id. at 787 (citing Perkins, 342 U.S. at 437).
97. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
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jurisdiction.98 In Helicopteros, the Court, for the first time referred
to the term general jurisdiction: “When a State exercises personal
jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit not arising out or related to
the defendant’s contacts with the forum, the State has been said to
have be exercising ‘general jurisdiction’ over the defendant.”99 The
description of general jurisdiction, as well as the specific citations
to the law review articles by Professor Brilmayer and Professors
von Mehren and Trautman, suggest some conflation of the
concepts of dispute-blind jurisdiction, that is, general jurisdiction
in the large sense, with the corporate-activities-based jurisdiction,
that is, general jurisdiction in the smaller sense of a branch of
minimum contacts jurisdiction.100 The Court clearly acknowledged,
however, that the exercise of corporate-activities-based
jurisdiction depended on a showing that the defendant had
continuous and systematic contacts with the forum state, and that
was the way the case was interpreted for the next 30 years.101
First, in describing the holding of Perkins, the Court cited to
the portion of the Perkins opinion which concluded that the
defendant “had been carrying on in Ohio a continuous and
systematic, but limited, part of its general business” and the
exercise of general jurisdiction over the Philippine corporation by
an Ohio court was “reasonable and just.”102 Later, in describing the
contacts necessary to establish corporate-activities-based
jurisdiction, the court stated that the defendant’s contacts must
“constitute the kind of continuous and systematic general business
98. See id. at 416–19 (“The Texas Supreme Court focused on the purchases
and the related training trips in finding contacts sufficient to support an assertion
of jurisdiction. We do not agree with that assessment . . . .”).
99. Id. at 415 n.9. (citing Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process
Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction, 1980 SUP. CT. REV. 77, 80–81; von
Mehren & Trautman, supra note 9, at 1136–44).
100. See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 9, at 1136 (“On the other hand,
American practice for the most part is to exercise power to adjudicate any kind of
controversy when jurisdiction is based on relationships, direct or indirect,
between the forum and the person or persons whose legal rights are to be affected.
This we call general jurisdiction.”).
101. See Twitchell, supra note 17, at 641 (describing the issue raised in
Helicopteros as “whether Helicol’s contacts with the forum were ‘continuous and
systematic’—the general jurisdiction question”).
102. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415 (citing Perkins, 342 U.S. at 438, 445
(internal edits omitted)).
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contacts the Court found to exist in Perkins.”103 Then, in describing
the defendant’s in the case at bar, the Court repeatedly discussed
whether the defendant’s contacts were sufficiently “continuous and
systematic.”104
Given the Court’s statements in Perkins and Helicopteros, it is
not surprising that both the commentators and lower courts
concluded both that corporate-activities-based jurisdiction was a
separate jurisdictional category from the traditional basis of
domicile or citizenship and that continuous corporate contact
jurisdiction could be established by showing the defendant’s
continuous and systematic contacts with the forum state.105
For example, one leading Civil Procedure treatise noted that
after International Shoe, the “continuous activity of a defendant
within the forum may be of such nature as to subject the defendant
to jurisdiction even upon causes of action unrelated to the forum
activity . . . .”106 The treatise authors went on to explain that this
kind of corporate-activities-based jurisdiction,
[P]rovides that a court may assert jurisdiction over a defendant
whose continuous activities in the forum are unrelated to the
cause of action sued upon when the defendant’s contacts are
sufficiently substantial and of such a nature as to make the
State’s assertion of jurisdiction reasonable. The Supreme Court
generally has left to the states the discretion to assert or forego
jurisdiction in cases in this category.107

103. Id. at 416.
104. Id. (explaining one visit by the CEO to negotiate a contract is not
“continuous and systematic” and is insufficient to establish jurisdiction).
105. See, e.g., Lakin v. Prudential Secs., Inc., 348 F.3d 704, 706, 708 n.7 (8th
Cir. 2003) (holding that general jurisdiction may be present where the defendant
maintains 1% of its loan portfolio with citizens of the forum state); Mich. Nat’l
Bank v. Quality Dinette, Inc., 888 F.2d 462, 465 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding the
defendant subject to general jurisdiction in Michigan where 3% of its total sales
were in Michigan); Provident Nat’l Bank v. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 819 F.2d
434, 436–38 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that loans to Pennsylvania citizens which
amounted to 0.083% of its total loan portfolio, plus other contacts, was sufficient
to give rise to general jurisdiction in Pennsylvania); see also Brilmayer, infra note
166; Borchers, supra note 28.
106. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 47, at 111.
107. Id. at 124–25.

678

76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 655 (2019)

It was generally understood that, as Professor Twitchell stated
in her influential article on general jurisdiction, the
post-International Shoe corporate-activities-based jurisdiction was
a widely available successor to the old theory of corporate presence,
or “doing business,” a jurisdiction.108 By 1987, when Professor
Twitchell exhaustively surveyed the field, courts in at least 19
different states had judicially upheld corporate-activities-based
jurisdiction.109 Many of these courts rested their findings of
jurisdiction based on the existence of continuous and systematic
contacts between the corporate defendant and the forum state.110
These cases based their assertion of corporate-activities-based
108. See Twitchell, supra note 17, at 622 (“Gradually, however, specific
jurisdiction attained independent status. Judges and commentators began to
embrace the more limited quid pro quo principle emerging from the foreign
corporation cases: states could exercise jurisdiction over a defendant in a
particular case because of what the defendant had done in the forum . . . .”).
109. See id. at 630 (“Between 1975 and 1987, courts in at least nineteen states
and the District of Columbia exercised jurisdiction over nonresident individuals
and corporations under a general jurisdiction theory.”).
110. See, e.g., Pedelahore v. Astropark, Inc. 745 F.2d 346, 348–49 (5th Cir.
1984) (finding “[t]he contacts of Astropark within the State of Louisiana were
patently continuous and systematic”); Lee v. Wallworth Valve Co., 482 F.2d 297,
301 (4th Cir. 1973) (“In light of the plaintiff’s relations to South Carolina, the
interest of that State in the controversy . . . and Walworth’s substantial and
continuing contacts with South Carolina, we conclude that the District Court
quite properly denied the motion to quash the service of process on Walworth.”);
ex parte British Steele Corp., 426 So. 2d 409, 412 (Ala. 1982) (“Our review of the
facts given above leads us to conclude that BSC’s activities are substantial and
continuous so as to allow in personam jurisdiction to be asserted against it in
causes of action which may have arisen outside of Alabama.”); Geelhoed v. Jensen,
352 A.2d 818, 825 (Md. 1976) (“Appellee’s living and working in the State for a
period of two years constituted a course of conduct at least as continuous and
systematic as that of the defendant in Perkins.”); State ex rel. Caine v. Richardson,
600 S.W.2d 82, 84 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (“Beech has engaged in continuous and
systematic activity within the state. We find no unreasonable burden placed upon
Beech in requiring it to defend in this state.”); Litton Indus. Sys., Inc. v. Kennedy
Van Saun Corp., 283 A.2d 551, 555 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1971) (“This
indication of the substantiality of defendant’s admitted business activities in this
State, in the absence of any allegations to the contrary, is sufficient to sustain the
jurisdiction of this court, even assuming that the contract sued on is in fact
unrelated to defendant’s business activities here.”); Garfield v. Homowack Lodge,
Inc., 378 A.2d 351, 354 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977) (“We hold here that the defendant’s
method of soliciting business in Pennsylvania consisted of such substantial and
continuous activities in this Commonwealth as to render it amenable to in
personam jurisdiction.”).
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jurisdiction on a wide range of contacts other than simply the state
of incorporation or a corporation’s principal place of business.111
Although the exact standard for how much contact was required
for corporate-activities-based jurisdiction varied, there was no
doubt that the category was firmly, and in the minds of most,
irrevocably established.112 As Professor Stephen Burbank noted,
“[i]t is probably too late in the day for an assertion of
jurisdiction . . . where the defendant conducts substantial business
systematically and continuously to be held unconstitutional.”113
III. The Missing Theory for Contacts-Based Substantive Due
Process Rules
The Supreme Court has never adequately explained why the
personal jurisdiction rule should require any contacts between a
defendant and the forum state.114 Because the requirement is not
a matter of procedural due process, but rather a substantive due
process principle, the Court bears a greater-than-usual burden to
explain why a state court’s jurisdiction should be limited beyond
that which would be required by procedural due process
principles.115 The failure to justify the contacts requirement has
several negative consequences. First, it taints the legitimacy of the
requirement as a matter of sound constitutional law. If the Court
cannot explain why due process requires any contact between the
defendant and the forum state, how can the Court justify such
111. See cases cited supra note 110 (citing cases in which jurisdiction was
found on the basis of things other than domicile or place of incorporation).
112. See Twitchell, supra note 60, at 172–73 (“This lack of a firm theoretical
underpinning, couples with the practical problems courts encounter in applying
the doctrine today, makes its practice today more the product of circumstance and
compromise than of a principled application of a well-developed theory.”).
113. Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: End of the Century or
Beginning of the Millenium?, 7 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 111, 119 (2000).
114. See cases cited infra note 123 (citing cases demonstrating a discussion of
personal jurisdiction without an explicit reason for the contacts rule).
115. See James Weinstein, The Federal Common Law Origins of Judicial
Jurisdiction: Implications for Modern Doctrine, 90 VA. L. REV. 169, 238 (2004) (“It
is substantive in that territorial limitations on judicial authority vindicate the
individual liberty interest in not being subject to the authority of a sovereign with
which one has no affiliation . . . .”).
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rules?116 Second, the absence of a theoretical foundation for the
requirement impairs the ability of the courts to apply the principle
in difficult factual settings.117 Each of these points will be
addressed below.
A. The Contacts Requirement is a Substantive Due Process
Principle
The Supreme Court has never discussed whether the contacts
requirement is a matter of substantive or procedural due
process.118 Academics who have considered the constitutional
source of the contacts requirement have come to differing
conclusions, with the majority favoring substantive due process,119
116. See infra Part III.B.
117. See infra Part III.C.
118. See Weinstein, supra note 115, at 237–38 (“It is possible . . . that the
personal jurisdiction requirement partakes of aspects of both substantive and
procedural due process.”).
119. See, e.g., KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 566–67 (14th ed. 2001); Danielle Keats Citron, Minimum Contacts in a
Borderless World: Voice over Internet Protocol and the Coming Implosion of
Personal Jurisdiction Theory, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1481, 1506 (2006) (“The
Pennoyer Court, in dictum, tied these principles to the Fourteenth Amendment,
finding that proceedings in court ‘to determine the personal rights and
obligations’ of parties over whom the court lacks jurisdiction do not ‘constitute
due process of law.’”); Scott Fruehwald, Judge Weinstein on Personal Jurisdiction
in Mass Tort Cases: A Critique, 70 TENN. L. REV. 1047, 1087–93 (2003) (“As long
as a defendant has some purposeful contact or connection with a state
(substantive due process) and the defendant can mount a proper defense
(procedural due process), then that state should be able to require an individual
to appear in its courts.”); Scott Fruehwald, The Boundary of Personal
Jurisdiction: The “Effects Test” and the Protection of Crazy Horse’s Name, 38 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 381, 422–23 (2004) (“Because substantive due process limits a
state’s power (sovereignty) to restrict an individual’s liberty, it limits a state’s
ability to assert personal jurisdiction through its long-arm statute over an
individual with whom it has either no connection or a tenuous connection.”);
Stephen Goldstein, Federalism and Substantive Due Process: A Comparative and
Historical Perspective on International Shoe and Its Progeny, 28 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 965, 966 (1995) (“Unfortunately, in its personal jurisdiction jurisprudence,
the Supreme Court has employed, at times, a maximalist substantive due process
approach, apparently without recognizing that such an approach ii no more
appropriate to personal jurisdiction today than it was to progressive economic
regulation in the Lochner era.”); Perdue, supra note 6, at 508–10; Linda
Sandstrom Simard, Hybrid Personal Jurisdiction: It’s Not General Jurisdiction,
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a few others favoring procedural due process,120 while other
scholars throw up their hands and call it “jurisdictional due
process”121 or something beyond either procedural or substantive
due process.122 Not surprisingly, given the silence of the Supreme
or Specific Jurisdiction, but Is It Constitutional?, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 559,
588 (1998) (“In essence, the Court seems to be saying that by requiring the
defendant to have purposeful contacts with the forum state, the minimum
contacts test protects the defendant's individual liberty interest and,
consequently, also protects the delicate balance of sovereign power between sister
states.”); Allen R. Stein, Burnham and the Death of Theory in the Law of Personal
Jurisdiction, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 597, 599 n.13 (1991) (“Professor Redish has also
failed to recognize the need to develop a jurisdictional theory for use as a measure
of due process. He has suggested that personal jurisdiction problems ought to be
resolved through application of "functional" standards developed in the context of
procedural due process cases.”); Mary Twitchell, Burnham and Constitutionally
Permissible Levels of Harm, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 659, 672 (1991) (“As Professor Stein
has correctly argued, the personal jurisdiction question is a question of
substantive, not procedural, due process.”); Weinstein, supra note 115, at 231
n.239 (“Most commentators believe that the personal jurisdiction requirement is
a species of substantive rather than procedural due process.”).
120. See, e.g., 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA ET AL., TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: SUBSTANCE & PROCEDURE § 17.8, at 252 n.10 (3d ed. 1986); Hayward D.
Reynolds, The Concept of Jurisdiction: Conflicting Legal Ideologies and Persistent
Formalist Subversion, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 819, 822 (1991) (“The cases
beginning with Shaffer v. Heitner and Kulko v. Superior Court and ending with
Burnham, which are presented as the inexorable working out of International
Shoe standards via the minimum contacts/fairplay doctrine actually subvert
International Shoe's vision.”); Crawford v. Minutemen Gourmet Foods, Inc., 489
F. Supp. 181, 182 (M.D. Ala. 1980) (finding that “[the court] may exercise personal
jurisdiction . . . without exceeding the limits of procedural due process”); Coe &
Payne Co. v. Wood-Mosaic Corp., 195 S.E.2d 399, 401 (Ga. 1973) (adopting
Illinois’s interpretation of its similarly worded long-arm statute and noting “that
the Long Arm Statute [of Illinois] contemplates that jurisdiction shall be
exercised over non-resident parties to the maximum extent permitted by
procedural due process”), abrogated by Innovative Clinical & Consulting Servs.,
LLC v. First Nat’l Bank of Ames, 620 S.E.2d 352 (Ga. 2005). But see In re G.
Weeks Sec., Inc., 5 B.R. 220, 225 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1980) (discussing personal
jurisdiction under the Fifth Amendment as a matter of substantive due process).
121. See Borchers, supra note 28, at 90 (identifying “the analytical rift”
between “jurisdictional due process” and “due process analysis generally”).
122. See Weinstein, supra note 115, at 237
That personal jurisdiction doctrine cannot be comfortably
conceptualized as procedural due process, but imposes far more
rigorous scrutiny than substantive due process jurisprudence
warrants, supports the thesis that the source of authority for
limitations on state court jurisdiction is sub silentio something other
than the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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Court on the issue of substantive versus procedural due process
with respect to the minimum contacts requirement, many
academics fail to discuss this issue at all.123
Not only has the Court failed to develop any coherent theory
about why the Due Process Clause requires any contacts between
the defendant and the forum state, it has failed to discuss whether
the contacts requirement is a matter of substantive due process or
procedural due process.124 Looking at the Supreme Court’s cases
on personal jurisdiction, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the
contacts requirement is, at the very least, not a matter of
procedural due process. As a result, in the absence of the required
contacts, the forum state does not have the substantive power to
adjudicate a claim against the defendant regardless of how
convenient or procedurally fair it is for the defendant to assert and
123. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980)
(stating that the rules regarding personal jurisdiction are “more than a guarantee
of immunity from inconvenient . . . litigation” (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U.S. 235, 251 (1958))); see also Robert Haskell Abrams, Power, Convenience, and
the Elimination of Personal Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 58 IND. L.J. 1,
21– 22 (1982) (reviewing Supreme Court jurisprudence on due process attacks on
state court jurisdiction without discussing whether it is procedural or substantive
due process); Martin H. Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and Personal
Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 NW. U. L. REV. 1112, 1137 (1981)
(suggesting a new due process analysis for personal jurisdiction without
discussing procedural or substantive due process). But see Kevin M. Clermont,
Restating Territorial Jurisdiction and Venue for State and Federal Courts, 66
CORNELL L. REV. 411, 416 (1981) (arguing that the minimum contacts test is a
guideline for estimating convenience and reasonableness); Harold S. Lewis, Jr.,
The Three Deaths of “State Sovereignty” and the Curse of Abstraction in the
Jurisprudence of Personal Jurisdiction, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699, 711–12
(1983) (same).
124. The Supreme Court has obliquely hinted, although it has not stated
specifically, that the minimum contacts branch of personal jurisdiction is a matter
of substantive due process. For example, in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, the
Court stated that “[t]he Due Process Clause protects an individual’s liberty
interest in not being subject to the binding judgments of a forum with which he
has established no meaningful [internal] ‘contacts, ties, or relations.’” 471 U.S.
462, 471–72 (1985) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319
(1945)). Similarly, in Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie Des Bauxites de
Guinee, the Court stated that the personal jurisdiction requirement “recognizes
and protects an individual liberty interest” and that the need for personal
jurisdiction “must be seen as ultimately a function of the individual liberty
interest preserved by the Due Process Clause.” 456 U.S. 694, 702, 702 n.10 (1982).
The Court has not, however, been more explicit than this in discussing the nature
of the personal jurisdiction requirement and its link with the Due Process Clause.
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defend its own rights in the case.125 This kind of requirement
sounds precisely like a substantive due process limitation on the
power of a state to affect the property rights of a person subject to
their court system.
If the contacts requirements that have been a part of the
Court’s personal jurisdiction rules since Pennoyer were about
procedural fairness, they would be both massively over inclusive
and massively under inclusive as well. The contacts requirement
(whether one uses the traditional bases of jurisdiction or the
minimum contacts test of International Shoe) would not allow
personal jurisdiction over a New York corporation in a case filed in
Newark, New Jersey, if the corporation has no connection with
New Jersey, notwithstanding the fact that it would hardly be
difficult or procedurally unfair for the corporation to cross the
Hudson River to defend the case. Additionally, the contacts
requirements would not prevent an individual who lives in
Calexico, California, on the Mexican border, from having to defend
a lawsuit in Crescent City, California, on the Oregon border,
regardless of how burdensome and inconvenient it would be
litigate in that forum. The contacts requirements, whether the
traditional bases under Pennoyer or the minimum contacts after
International Shoe, are about the absolute power of the state to
impose a binding judgment on a defendant regardless of how
convenient it is for the defendant to represent its interests in the
forum court. Such restrictions on the power of a state sovereign are
matters of substantive and not procedural due process.
Given the controversial nature of all substantive due process
doctrines126 the Court has a particularly strong burden to establish
125. See Stephen E. Gottlieb, In Search of the Link Between Due Process and
Jurisdiction, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 1291, 1303–12 (1983) (discussing the role of
convenience in the jurisprudence); Earl M. Maltz, Reflections on a Landmark:
Shaffer v. Heitner Viewed from a Distance, 1986 BYU L. REV. 1043, 1058–59
(same); Perdue, supra note 6, at 509–10 (“[T]he ‘contacts’ requirement of the
modern approach is intended as something more than some rough test of
convenience.”); Allan R. Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate Federalism in
the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 TEX. L. REV. 689, 708 (1987) (discussing the
intersection of minimum contacts and convenience of trial).
126. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (declaring laws
criminalizing abortion to be unconstitutional as a violation of the Due Process
Clause); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding that laws setting
maximums for work hours violated the Due Process Clause), overruled by
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a theoretical basis for any substantive due process doctrine. The
requirement for contacts between a defendant and the forum state
is the sole remaining nineteenth century doctrine of substantive
due process.127 When the Supreme Court has announced new
applications of substantive due process, such as the right of
privacy, it has at least explained the theoretical foundations for
why the substantive due process rights apply to a person’s liberty
or property interests.128 The Court should explain why due process
requires any substantive connection between the defendant and
the forum state.
B. The Court’s Failed Attempts to Provide Constitutional
Rationale for the Substantive Due Process Contacts Requirement
Notwithstanding the significant need for a coherent theory
explaining the substantive due process contacts requirement, the
Court has a failed to advance a rationale that withstands analysis.
As previously noted, Justice Field did not offer any explanation
why the Due Process Clause required the contacts requirements
that he outlined in Pennoyer v. Neff.129 In International Shoe, the
Court explained that the exercise of specific jurisdiction was
reasonable by suggesting that the benefits enjoyed by a
corporation’s activities within the forum state gave rise to a
reciprocal obligation for the corporation to subject itself to the
personal jurisdiction of the forum’s courts in cases arising out of
their operations within the state:
But to the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of
conducting activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and
protections of the laws of that state. The exercise of that
privilege may give rise to obligation; and, so far as those
obligations arise out of or are connected with the activities
within the state, a procedure which requires the corporation to
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
127. See Perdue, supra note 6, at 480 (describing Pennoyer’s enduring
relevance).
128. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (declaring
unconstitutional a Connecticut law prohibiting the use of contraceptives).
129. See supra notes 25–29 and accompanying text (discussing Pennoyer).
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respond to a suit brought to enforce them can, in most instances,
hardly be said to be undue.130

The Court did not, however, offer a similar explanation with
respect
to
corporate-activities-based
jurisdiction.
More
importantly, the Court never explained why the Due Process
Clause should impose any limits on personal jurisdiction other
than those designed to protect against litigating in a forum that is
so inconvenient that it deprives a defendant of procedural due
process.
In Hanson v. Denckla,131 the Court was invited to conclude
that due process required merely procedural fairness and some
connection between the forum state and the case rather than
between the defendant and the forum state, similar to the
restrictions on choice of law imposed by the Due Process Clause.132
The five-member majority, however, concluded that the limitations
on personal jurisdiction were more than protections against
inconvenient litigation:
Those restrictions are more than a guarantee of immunity from
inconvenient or distant litigation. They are a consequence of
territorial limitations on the power of the respective States.
However minimal the burden of defending in a forum tribunal,
a defendant may not be called upon to do so unless he has had
the “minimum contacts” with this State that are a prerequisite
to its exercise of power over him.133

The Court said no more on why the Due Process Clause
imposes any territorial restrictions on state power.
The Supreme Court made its most ambitious effort to explain
the substantive due process contacts requirement in World-Wide
Volkswagen v. Woodson.134 In that case, Justice White explained
that the due process contacts requirement was a matter of
interstate federalism, in which the sovereignty of individual states

130. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
131. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
132. See id. at 253 (contrasting personal jurisdiction over nonresident
defendants with choice of law jurisprudence).
133. Id. at 251.
134. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
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implies limitations on the sovereignty of other states.135 Justice
White conceded that, since Pennoyer, the procedural burdens on
litigating in a distant state had eased considerably, but he
cautioned:
We have never accepted the proposition that state lines are
irrelevant for jurisdictional purposes, nor could we, and remain
faithful to principles of interstate federalism embodied in the
Constitution. The economic interdependence of the States was
foreseen and desired by the framers. In the Commerce Clause
they provided that the Nation was to be a common market, a
“free trade unit” in which the State’s are debarred from acting
as separable economic entities. But the Framers also intended
that the States retain essential attributes of sovereignty,
including, in particular, the sovereign power to try causes in
their courts. The sovereignty of each State, in turn, implied a
limitation on the sovereignty on all of its sister States—a
limitation express or implicit in both the original scheme of the
Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment.136

These limits on state sovereignty constrain state court
jurisdiction regardless of how convenient the litigation might be
for the defendant:
Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience
from being forced to litigate before the tribunals of another
State; even if the forum State has a strong interest in applying
its law to the controversy; even if the forum State is the most
convenient location for litigation, the Due Process Clause,
acting as an instrument of interstate federalism, may
sometimes act to divest the State of its power to render a valid
judgment.137

After scholars criticized this aspect of the World-Wide
Volkswagen decision on the ground that a matter of interstate
federalism could not be an individual right under the Fourteenth
Amendment that could be waived by defendants,138 the Court
135. Id. at 292.
136. Id. at 293 (internal citations omitted).
137. Id. at 294 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251, 254 (1958)).
138. See, e.g., Graham C. Lilly, Jurisdiction Over Domestic and Alien
Defendants, 69 VA. L. REV. 85, 109 (1983) (exploring the logical “fallacy” of the
Court’s approach); Redish, supra note 123, at 1119–20 (noting the unpersuasive
discussion of federalism in World-Wide Volkswagen).
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quickly reversed course. In the very next decision on personal
jurisdiction, Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites
de Guinee,139 Justice White himself acknowledged that the
minimum contacts requirement “represents a restriction on
judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of
individual liberty.”140 Justice White conceded that the Due Process
Clause is the “only source of the personal jurisdiction requirement”
and the Clause “makes no mention of federalism concerns.”141
Justice White also conceded that, if the contacts requirement were
a matter of interstate federalism it would not have been waivable
by individual defendants.142 Unfortunately, as we will see, this
theory comes back like a bad penny.143
World-Wide Volkswagen contains one additional rationale for
the contacts requirements, although it is no more satisfying than
the previous one. Plaintiffs in that case argued that the defendants
could foresee that the allegedly defective automobile that was the
subject of the case could be driven from New York, its state of
purchase, to Oklahoma, where the accident giving rise to the claim
occurred.144 Because an accident in Oklahoma was reasonably
foreseeable, defendants should be subject to jurisdiction in that
state. Justice White, however, stated, it “is not the mere likelihood
that a product will find its way into the forum State. Rather, it is
that the defendant’s conduct in connection with the forum State
are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into
court there.”145 The requirement of minimum contacts with the
forum state ensures that the defendant has “clear notice that it is
subject to suit there, and can act to alleviate the risk of
139. 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
140. Id. at 702.
141. Id. at 702 n.10.
142. Id.
143. See
infra
Part
III.D
(discussing
the
elimination
of
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction in Bristol-Myers Squibb Company v.
Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017)).
144. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980)
(“It is argued, however, that because an automobile is mobile by its very design
and purpose it was ‘foreseeable’ that the [plaintiffs’] Audi would cause injury in
Oklahoma.”).
145. Id. at 297.
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burdensome litigation by procuring insurance, passing the
expected costs on to customers, or, if the risks are too great,
severing its connection with the State.”146
As we will see, this theory that the due process requirement of
minimum contacts provides essential notice to a defendant is
dubious on a number of grounds.147 First, the assertion that it
allows corporations to procure insurance assumes that corporate
insurance policies are based in any respect on where a corporation
might be subject to personal jurisdiction. That factual assumption
is unsupported by any empirical evidence that any corporate
insurance policies are structured in a way that is connected in any
respect to the existence of personal jurisdiction in particular
states.148 Second, the Court’s assertion that the risks of being
subject to personal jurisdiction in a particular state might cause a
corporation to sever its connection with the state is yet another
assumption that is unsupported by any empirical evidence.149 As a
matter of common sense, corporations are unlikely to forego any
commercial opportunity simply because it might subject them to
personal jurisdiction in particular state. Similar arguments are
often made with respect to the importance of certainty to
substantive law, such as that it makes sense for a corporation to
alter its behavior based on the substantive liability standards
imposed by a particular state. However, there is no basis to assume
that this kind of argument is transferable to questions involving
the existence of personal jurisdiction. Moreover, as we will shortly
see, the due process limitations on a state’s ability to apply its own
substantive law to a particular case are far less strict than the
limitations on personal jurisdiction.150
146. Id.
147. See infra notes 162–171 and accompanying text (discussing flaws in the
Court’s reasoning); infra Part II.D (discussing anomalies between the Court’s
approach to personal jurisdiction in comparison with other due process concepts).
148. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297 (failing to discuss the
procurement of insurance policies).
149. See id. (assuming in passing, without introducing any supporting
evidence, that a corporation would leave the state).
150. See infra notes 186–189 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s
jurisprudence in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985), and
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981)).
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As a practical matter, a standard that focuses on whether a
defendant “should reasonably anticipate being haled into court” 151
in the forum state is utterly meaningless. First, the question is
completely within the Supreme Court’s control; if the Court stated
that the Due Process Clause allowed defendants to be sued in any
state where jurisdiction was not unreasonably burdensome, then
defendants could reasonably anticipate being sued in every state.
Alternatively, if the Court intends us to focus on the word
“reasonably,” the statement of the principle does nothing more
than restate the original question: why should it matter that the
defendant have any contact with the forum state and what kinds
of contacts would be sufficient to permit personal jurisdiction?
In the Court’s recent decision in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd.
v. Nicastro,152 Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion gave some hints
at the structure and underlying principle of the contacts
requirement but never enunciated a clear theory for the
substantive due process requirement. Justice Kennedy stated that
a person “may submit” to a state’s authority in different ways,
including expressly consenting to jurisdiction, the defendant’s
presence in the forum state at the time he is served with process,
or domicile in the state “or, by analogy, incorporation or principal
place of business for corporations.”153
Justice Kennedy argued that “[e]ach of these examples reveals
circumstances, or a course of conduct, from which it is proper to
infer an intention to benefit from and thus an intention to submit
to the laws of the forum State.”154 Justice Kennedy failed to
explain, however, why the Due Process Clause requires a
defendant’s intention to “submit” to the jurisdiction of the forum’s
courts or why these acts are appropriate signs of submission. For
example, it is hard to justify the notion that an individual’s
transient presence for one day in the forum state is enough to
submit to the forum’s jurisdiction, but a corporation’s continuous
operation of physical facilities within the forum state is not.155
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
564 U.S. 873 (2011).
Id. at 880 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 881.
Compare Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 628 (1990)
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Justice Kennedy barely hinted at the foundation for the minimum
contacts requirement.
Two principles are implicit in the foregoing. First, personal
jurisdiction
requires
a
forum-by-forum,
or
sovereign-by-sovereign, analysis. The question is whether a
defendant has followed a course of conduct directed at the
society or the economy existing within the jurisdiction of a given
sovereign, so that the sovereign has the power to subject the
defendant to judgment concerning that conduct. Personal
jurisdiction, of course, restricts “judicial power not as matter of
sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty,” for due
process protects the individual’s right to be subject only to
lawful power. But whether a judicial judgment is lawful
depends on whether the sovereign has authority to render it.156

Although Justice Kennedy explained the need for a “lawful”
judgment in order for a forum to render a binding judgment, his
opinion failed to explain why a defendant’s contacts with the forum
are necessary to make that judgment lawful. On the one hand, one
is tempted to suggest that the repeated use of the words “submit”
and “submission” echo the Court’s now abandoned use of the
doctrine of implied consent in Hess v. Pawloski,157 a reference not
lost on the dissent in McIntyre, which astutely commented that the
idea “that consent is the animating concept” in jurisdiction cases
“draws no support from controlling decisions of this Court. Quite
the contrary, the Court has explained, a forum can exercise
jurisdiction when its contacts with the controversy are sufficient;
invocation of a fictitious consent, the Court has repeatedly said, is
unnecessary and unhelpful.”158
Alternatively, Justice Kennedy’s opinion may suggest that, as
a matter of substantive due process, any sovereign state lacks the
ability to deprive any person of his property through a judicial
proceeding in the absence of some benefit received by the
(upholding personal jurisdiction on the basis of a few short visits to the forum
state), with Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 931
(2011) (denying jurisdiction when tires made by a corporation systematically
entered the forum state).
156. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 884 (internal citation
omitted).
157. 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
158. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd., 564 U.S. at 901 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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defendant from a connection with the forum state that gives rise
to reciprocal obligations to submit to the jurisdiction of the state’s
court. As explained by Justice Kennedy, “[b]ecause the United
States is a distinct sovereign, a defendant may in principle be
subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States but not
of any particular State.”159 In elaborating on that point Justice
Kennedy quoted one of his own decisions in a matter unrelated to
personal jurisdiction: “Ours is ‘a legal system unprecedented in
form and design, establishing two orders of government, each with
its own direct relationship, its own privity, its own set of mutual
rights and obligations to the people who sustain it and are
governed by it.’”160 Because the United States and each individual
state are all separate sovereigns, “a litigant may have the requisite
relationship with the United States Government” to warrant the
exercise of personal jurisdiction, but lack the relationship with
“any individual State.”161
The most telling proof of the hollowness of the substantive due
process contacts requirement is the Court’s inability to come up
with fact patterns that prompt a visceral sense of injustice.
Virtually every time the Court searches for an example of why it
would be terribly unfair for a state to exercise jurisdiction without
adequate contacts between the defendant and the forum state, the
Court cheats by using a factual scenario in which jurisdiction
would be procedurally unfair because of the burden on the
defendant to litigate in a distant forum. For example, in McIntyre,
Justice Kennedy illustrated the unfairness of personal jurisdiction
without the adequate contacts by describing a case in which
owners of a small farm in Florida could be sued throughout the
country, despite never leaving Florida, if they happen to “sell crops
to a large nearby distributor . . . who might then distribute them
to grocers across the country. If foreseeability were the controlling
criterion, the farmer could be sued in Alaska or any number of
other States’ courts without ever leaving town.”162
159. Id. at 884 (plurality opinion).
160. Id. (quoting U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995)
(Kennedy, J., concurring)).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 885.
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The reason that Justice Kennedy’s hypothetical strikes one as
unjust is not the absence of contacts between the defendant and
the forum state but rather the burden on a small farmer in Florida
in litigating a case in a state as far away and difficult to reach as
Alaska. That problem, however, is already addressed in the
fairness component of the Supreme Court’s Due Process analysis,
which requires a court to balance the burden on the defendant
against the interest of the forum state in hearing the case and the
plaintiff’s need to use the forum state’s courts, as well as the
convenience of the interstate system of justice.163 There is no need
for a substantive due process requirement because the procedural
due process requirement is adequate to protect the small farmer
from distant and inconvenient litigation.
It is telling that Justice Breyer fell prey to precisely the same
problem in his concurring opinion in McIntyre. In explaining the
need for the requisite contacts between the defendant and the
forum state, Justice Breyer set forth the following hypothetical:
What might appear fair in the case of a large manufacturer
which specifically seeks, or expects, an equal-size distributor to
sell its product in a distant State might seem unfair in the case
of a small manufacturer (say, an Appalachian potter) who sells
his product (cups and saucers) exclusively to a large distributor,
who sells a single item (a coffee mug) to a buyer from a distant
State (Hawaii).164

Just as with Justice Kennedy’s hypothetical, any injustice
inflicted by personal jurisdiction in Justice Breyer’s fact pattern
would be remedied by the procedural due process balancing test
without any need for a contacts requirement.
In fact, it is pretty hard to work up any sense of injustice with
respect to a hypothetical where there are no contacts with the
forum state but where litigation would be procedurally fair.
Imagine, for example, a case in which a resident of McLean,
Virginia, crosses the Potomac River to have dinner in a restaurant
owned by a corporation in Bethesda, Maryland, and becomes
163. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292–95
(1980) (summarizing the balance between state interests and plaintiff and
defendant burdens and interests).
164. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 891–92 (2011) (Breyer,
J., concurring).
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seriously ill from eating tainted food at the restaurant. Assume
that the corporation owning the restaurant has restaurants in
Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Delaware, but none in Virginia.
Would anyone feel outraged if the Virginia courts were to exercise
jurisdiction over the Maryland corporation? One can imagine
having a bit of concern if the Virginia court were to apply its own
law to the controversy, but, as we have already seen, the due
process restrictions on choice of law are far more lenient than the
restrictions on personal jurisdiction.165
The few commentators who have attempted to develop a
theoretical foundation for a substantive due process contacts
requirement have reached different conclusions on the rationale
for such a rule. The theory with the greatest traction, most
prominently developed by Professor Lea Brilmayer, is that the
minimum contacts requirement flows from a political theory about
the nature of governmental power and legitimacy.166 Professor
Brilmayer suggests that a state’s exercise of power cannot be
legitimate without some relationship between the defendant and
the forum state that creates a form of social contract in which the
state is authorized to act coercively because the defendant
intentionally acted to affiliate itself with the forum.167 Several
other academics have relied on some form of social contract theory
to support a jurisdiction requirement for contacts between the
defendant and the forum state.168 Professor Roger Trangsrud has
165. See supra note 132 and accompanying text (comparing the restrictions
imposed under choice of law against those required for asserting personal
jurisdiction).
166. See Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on
State Court Jurisdiction, 1980 SUP. CT. REV. 77, 86–87 [hereinafter Brilmayer,
How Contacts Count] (comparing limits on state jurisdiction with other
limitations on state sovereignty); Lea Brilmayer, Jurisdictional Due Process and
Political Theory, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 293, 294 (1987) [hereinafter Brilmayer,
Jurisdiction] (linking jurisdictional due process issues with those concerning the
right of a state to assert authority over its citizens); Lea Brilmayer, Shaping and
Sharing in Democratic Theory: Towards a Political Philosophy of Interstate
Equality, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 389, 391 (1987) (framing the law of interstate
relations as a question of political theory).
167. See Brilmayer, Jurisdiction, supra note 166, at 294 (“The link with
political theory lies in the argument that such issues should be analyzed in terms
of a state’s right to exercise coercive power over the individual or dispute.”).
168. See Margaret G. Stewart, A New Litany of Personal Jurisdiction, 60 U.
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made a similar social contract theory argument in support of his
suggestion that jurisdictional rules should be implemented as a
matter of federal common law under the Full Faith Credit Clause
and not the Due Process Clause.169
Other academic commentators have provided different
theoretical rationales for a contacts requirement. Some,
notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s abandonment of the idea,
still cling to a theory of interstate federalism as a foundational
jurisdiction principle.170 Still others have proposed similar
territorial contacts requirements based not on the Due Process
Clause but rather the Dormant Commerce Clause.171

COLO. L. REV. 5, 31–38 (1989) (proposing a distinction between conscious and
intentional affiliation with a forum state); Arthur M. Weisburd, Territorial
Authority and Personal Jurisdiction, 63 WASH. U. L.Q. 377, 378 (1985)
(recognizing that personal jurisdiction disputes also implicate the boundaries and
limits of state sovereignty).
169. See Trangsrud, supra note 23, at 884–85 (discussing the benefits of
grounding jurisdictional law on the theory of sovereign authority as derived from
the consent of the governed).
170. See A. Benjamin Spencer, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Revised Analysis,
73 U. CHI. L. REV. 617, 619 (2007) (arguing for a new approach to jurisdictional
doctrine by “reasserting the primary relevance of state sovereignty and interstate
federalism”); Weinstein, supra note 115, at 198 (arguing for the benefits of
jurisdictional rules that, among other things, promoted interstate federalism by
preventing states from overreaching their authority).
171. See Paul D. Carrington & James A. Martin, Substantive Interests and the
Jurisdiction of State Courts, 66 MICH. L. REV. 227, 234 (1967) (“[C]oncern with
the effects on commerce of too loose a standard of jurisdiction has not abated.”);
John F. Preis, The Dormant Commerce Clause As a Limit on Personal
Jurisdiction, 102 IOWA L. REV. 121, 123 (2016) (“Even though the Due Process
Clause is an essential component of personal jurisdiction law . . . the Dormant
Commerce Clause . . . should have much to say about personal jurisdiction”).
Some older Supreme Court cases cited the Dormant Commerce Clause as a reason
to invalidate expansive assertions of personal jurisdiction. See Mich. Cent. R.R.
v. Mix, 278 U.S. 492, 494–96 (1929) (agreeing with railroad defendant that
asserting jurisdiction would unreasonably obstruct interstate commerce);
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Wells, 265 U.S. 101, 103 (1924) (asserting
jurisdiction over a railway would unreasonably burden interstate commerce);
Davis v. Farmers’ Co-op. Equity Co., 262 U.S. 312, 315–16 (1923) (reasoning that
a statute that required railroads to submit to the state’s jurisdiction as a condition
of maintaining one agent within the state imposed an undue burden on interstate
commerce).
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C. The Consequences of the Court’s Failure to Identify the
Rationale for the Substantive Due Process Contacts Requirement
Given the absence of a theoretical foundation for the
substantive due process contacts requirement, it is not surprising
that the lower courts have also struggled with personal jurisdiction
problems and that even the Supreme Court has difficulty in
providing consistent guidance to the lower courts. One can observe
these problems in cases involving all of the different substantive
due process categories of personal jurisdiction.172 We will take a
look at three of the categories: the traditional basis of service on
an individual in the forum state, specific jurisdiction over an
upstream manufacturer whose product was incorporated into
another product that was eventually sold in the forum state, and
finally, the widely varying results in lower court cases on
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction.
First, in Burnham v. Superior Court,173 the Supreme Court
addressed the continuing viability of jurisdiction based upon
service on an individual within the territory of the forum state.174
Once again, no opinion captured a majority of the Court. Justice
Scalia announced the judgment of the Court, but only three other
justices joined his opinion.175 Justice Scalia’s rationale for
upholding in-state service as a basis for personal jurisdiction
rested on its acceptance shortly after the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment in Pennoyer v. Neff and its continued
acceptance by all fifty states, which made it “one of the continuing
traditions of our legal system that define the due process standard
of ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”176
Justice Scalia did not, however, explain how his rather static
notion of due process allowed for no contraction of the traditional
bases of jurisdiction, but allowed for substantial expansion beyond

172. See infra notes 173–185 and accompanying text (expanding on these
categories).
173. 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
174. See id. at 619 (identifying the issue before the court as jurisdiction based
solely on physical presence).
175. Id. at 607.
176. Id. at 619.
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them, as clearly happened in International Shoe.177 Moreover, by
failing to address the source of the connection between due process
and personal jurisdiction, Justice Scalia failed to consider whether
changes in technology and American society affected the
continuing validity of in-state service of process as a basis for
personal jurisdiction. Just as an example, let’s take one suggested
theory for requiring a connection between the defendant and forum
state: the neo-Lockeian notion that a state has no power to assert
its sovereign authority over an individual unless that individual
has established a relationship with the state that makes such
assertion appropriate.178 Even if that principle never changes, the
ultimate rules that flow from that principle may change over time
as society and technology change. It may be that, in the nineteenth
century, because state-to-state travel was relatively difficult and
required a substantial investment of time and resources, physical
presence in a state established enough of a relationship between a
person and the state to warrant the exercise of personal
jurisdiction. Because modern methods of transportation have
made it so easy to travel from state to state for brief periods of time,
physical presence in a state may no longer establish the same kind
of relationship that it once did, with the result that such presence
no longer satisfies the requirements of due process.
It is not enough for Justice Scalia, as a believer in original
meaning, simply to assert that, if the rule of in-state service was
acceptable in 1877, then it must be acceptable now. That assertion
begs the question of what rule the Due Process Clause established.
One cannot say that the Due Process Clause requires territorial
presence as a basis of personal jurisdiction without some
intervening step, which is the elaboration of some principle of due
process upon which that rule depends. It may be that even an
177. See id. (failing to discuss the significant impact of International Shoe on
the Court’s traditional jurisprudence).
178. See Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law, 98 YALE L.J.
1277, 1304–06 (1989) (connecting the Court’s jurisprudence in International Shoe
with the territorial limits of traditional sovereignty); Lea Brilmayer, Consent,
Contract, and Territory, 74 MINN. L. REV. 1, 6 (1989) (linking the exercise of
jurisdiction to “a prior assumption of state territorial sovereignty”); see also
Brilmayer, How Contacts Count, supra note 166, at 86–87 (arguing that asserting
jurisdiction without a relationship would be either arbitrary or discriminatory).
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originalist like Justice Scalia would find that although the basic
principle established by the Due Process Clause with respect to
personal jurisdiction remains the same, the rules that flow from
that principle might change over time as changes in technology
and society cause the application of the principle to have a different
effect. Because Justice Scalia never identified the underlying
principle upon which personal jurisdiction rules are based,
however, he neglected the most important question to be answered
in Burnham.
Justice Brennan’s opinion for himself and three other
members of the Court is, if anything, even less coherent than
Justice Scalia’s opinion. Justice Brennan concluded that personal
jurisdiction based upon in-state service of process, at least under
the facts presented by Burnham, satisfies the requirements of
International Shoe.179 Justice Brennan argued that by visiting the
forum state, “a transient defendant actually ‘avails’ himself of
significant benefits provided by the State.”180 Justice Brennan
failed to explain, however, how Mr. Burnham’s three-day visit to
the forum state provided sufficient benefits to allow California to
assert what amounted to the equivalent of general jurisdiction over
Mr. Burnham (i.e. jurisdiction over any claim, regardless of
whether it arises out of defendant’s contact with a forum state). As
Justice Scalia aptly noted in his opinion, the benefits received by
Mr. Burnham’s three-day stay in California do not distinguish him
from other persons who have enjoyed similar visits but “who were
fortunate enough not to be served with process while they were
there and thus are not (simply by reason of that savoring) subject
to the general jurisdiction of California’s courts.”181 Although it
should have been obvious to Justice Brennan that his analysis was
flatly inconsistent with the International Shoe rubric, his
analytical mistake was abetted by the Court’s previous failures to
identify the due process foundation for requiring a connection

179. See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 639 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“For these
reasons, as a rule the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant based on
his voluntary presence in the forum will satisfy the requirements of due
process.”).
180. Id. at 637 (internal citation omitted).
181. Id. at 624 (majority opinion).
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between the defendant and the forum state.182 In the absence of
such a clearly enunciated rationale, it was easier for Justice
Brennan to manipulate the language from earlier opinions because
there was no underlying principle against which to test his opinion.
Finally, the absence of guidance from the Supreme Court on
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction led to some widely varying
results in the lower courts. Courts differed substantially on how
much contact was necessary in order to establish that category of
dispute-blind jurisdiction.183 In one case a federal district court
held that Pennsylvania had corporate-activities-based jurisdiction
over Disneyworld in a case arising out of an accident in Florida,
even though Disney had no facilities in Pennsylvania.184 On the
other hand, a federal district court rejected an assertion of
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction over Walmart in Texas,
notwithstanding the fact that Walmart had 264 stores and
thousands of employees in Texas at the time.185 Without a
182. See supra Part II.B (detailing the Court’s failures to discuss the
theoretical foundation for its due process analysis).
183. Compare Lakin v. Prudential Secs., Inc., 348 F.3d 704, 706, 708 n.7 (8th
Cir. 2003) (holding that general jurisdiction may be present when the defendant
maintains one percent of its loan portfolio with citizens of the forum state), Mich.
Nat’l Bank v. Quality Dinette, Inc., 888 F.2d 462, 465 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding the
defendant subject to general jurisdiction in Michigan when three percent of its
total sales were in Michigan), and Provident Nat’l Bank v. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass’n, 819 F.2d 434, 436–38 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that loans to Pennsylvania
citizens which amounted to less than one percent of its total loan portfolio, plus
other contacts, were sufficient to give rise to general jurisdiction in Pennsylvania;
specific jurisdiction not argued), with Nichols v. G.D. Searle & Co., 991 F.2d 1195,
1198–200 (4th Cir. 1993) (rejecting general jurisdiction when two percent of total
sales were in forum; rejecting specific jurisdiction because product liability suit
did not “arise out of the defendant's activities in the forum”), Dalton v. R & W
Marine, Inc., 897 F.2d 1359, 1362 (5th Cir. 1990) (rejecting general jurisdiction
when about thirteen percent of total revenues occurred in the forum; specific
jurisdiction not argued), and Stairmaster Sports/Med. Prods., Inc. v. Pac. Fitness
Corp., 916 F. Supp. 1049, 1052–53 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (rejecting general
jurisdiction when three percent of total sales occurred in forum; rejecting specific
jurisdiction over patent infringement claim when the defendant sent letters into
the forum threatening litigation for infringement in part because the letters had
no substantive bearing on the infringement issue), aff’d, 78 F.3d 602 (Fed. Cir.
1996).
184. See Cresswell v. Walt Disney Prods., 677 F. Supp. 284, 287 (M.D. Pa.
1987) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss).
185. See Follette v. Clairol, Inc., 829 F. Supp. 840, 845, 847–48 (W.D. La.
1993) (denying general jurisdiction in products liability action), aff’d, 998 F.2d
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theoretical rationale for any of the substantive due process
categories of personal jurisdiction, the lower courts were as
befuddled about how to apply the standard as the commentators
were in trying to explain it.
D. The Anomalies Inherent in the Substantive Due Process
Contacts Requirement
The failure of the Court to explain the basis for the
Substantive Due Process contacts requirement is exacerbated by
comparison to other due process concepts. First, it is strikingly odd
that there are fewer due process restrictions on a state’s ability to
apply its own law to a particular defendant than there are with
respect to a state’s power to adjudicate a claim brought against a
defendant. Indeed, the Court has imposed only “modest” due
process restrictions on a state’s application of its own law to a
defendant.186 For example, in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague,187
the Court rejected a due process attack on a state court’s decision
to apply its own law even though the “connection between the
forum and the controversy [was] much too tenuous to support an
assertion of judicial jurisdiction.”188 A state’s application of its own
law imposes the substantive rule by which it will judge a
defendant’s conduct, which has a much more significant impact on
a defendant’s substantive rights than the mere assertion of
personal jurisdiction. Therefore, one would expect that the
substantive due process limitation on application of a state’s own

1014 (5th Cir. 1993); see also Thomas C. Arthur & Richard D. Freer, Be Careful
What You Wish For: Goodyear, Daimler, and the Evisceration of General
Jurisdiction, 64 EMORY L.J. ONLINE 2001, 2004 (2014) (“Not surprisingly, lower
court decisions were all over the map.”).
186. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985)
(characterizing the limits on jurisdiction imposed by the Due Process and Full
Faith and Credit clauses as “modest”).
187. 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
188. Weinstein, supra note 115, at 241; see Phillips Petroleum, 472 U.S. at
320 (affirming the application of Minnesota law despite tenuous contacts between
the state and the litigation).
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law would be significantly more stringent than the substantive due
process limitation on personal jurisdiction.189
Second, given the Due Process Clause’s principal focus on
procedural fairness, one might well ask where procedural due
process concepts fit in to the personal jurisdiction analysis. The
Supreme Court did not even hint at the need for a procedural
fairness analysis until International Shoe,190 and it did not give
any real substance to it until Kulko v. Superior Court,191 in 1978.192
Even then, the procedural fairness analysis seemed to be more of
an afterthought in the Supreme Court’s personal jurisdictional
opinions. Not until Asahi v. Superior Court,193 did the Supreme
Court rest a personal jurisdiction decision on procedural fairness
grounds.194 The Court’s failure to place procedural due process at
the beginning of any personal jurisdictional analysis put undue
stress on the substantive due process contacts requirements and,
at least in part, led to the debacle of the recent
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction cases to which we now turn.
189. See EUGENE F. SCHOLES, ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS § 321, at 151 n.7 (4th
ed. 2004) (“There is much reason to suggest that the test should be stricter for
choice-of-law purposes than for jurisdiction.” (citations omitted)); James Martin,
Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 78 MICH. L. REV. 872, 879–80 (1980)
From the defendant’s perspective, the differing treatment of contacts
in the jurisdiction and choice-of-law cases turns things on their
head . . . Thus from the defendant’s perspective, it seems irrational to
say that due process requires minimum contacts . . . merely to hale
him into the forum’s court while allowing more tenuous contacts to
upset the very outcome of the case.
Indeed, as Professor Silberman has noted, “[t]o believe that a defendant’s contacts
with the forum state should be stronger under the due process clause for
jurisdictional purposes than for choice of law is to believe that an accused is more
concerned with where he will be hanged than whether.” Linda J. Silberman,
Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 33, 88 (1978).
190. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (balancing the
privileges and obligations of a corporation conducting activities in the forum
state).
191. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
192. See id. at 85 (citing “basic considerations of fairness” as a factor).
193. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
194. See id. at 116 (“Considering the international context, the heavy burden
on the alien defendant, and the slight interests of the plaintiff and the forum
State, the exercise of personal jurisdiction . . . would be unreasonable and
unfair.”).
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IV. The Unexpected Disappearance of Corporate-Activities-Based
Jurisdiction
The foregoing description of the Supreme Court’s personal
jurisdiction doctrine lays the foundation for assessing the Court’s
recent decisions on corporate-activities-based jurisdiction. As of
2010, there was no doubt that corporate-activities-based
jurisdiction was a well-established basis of jurisdiction separate
and apart from citizenship or domicile jurisdiction based upon a
corporation’s state of incorporation or principal place of business.
The
Supreme
Court
laid
the
foundation
for
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction in International Shoe as the
modern version of “doing business” jurisdiction, which itself was
simply the corporate equivalent of territorial service on an
individual defendant.195 Given that the Supreme Court had
recently upheld the continued viability of territorial service of
process on individuals,196 there was little reason to suspect that the
Court
would
question
the
continued
viability
of
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction as a valid basis for
all-purpose jurisdiction. The lower courts, both federal and state,
had long permitted jurisdiction over corporations that were neither
incorporated nor headquartered in the forum state. The academic
commentators, including those who favored some restrictions on
the extent of corporate-activities-based jurisdiction, universally
acknowledged that, as long as a corporation had continuous and
systematic contacts with the forum state, the corporation would be
subject to all-purpose jurisdiction within the forum.197
195. See supra notes 51–60 and accompanying text (discussing International
Shoe).
196. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 627 (1990) (upholding
personal jurisdiction on the basis of a few short visits to the forum state).
197. See Brilmayer, How Contacts Count, supra note 166, at 112 (concluding
that jurisdiction is proper when it “involves imposition of burdens on a domiciliary
or regulation of activities or property ownership within the State”); Burbank,
supra note 113, at 119 (“It is probably too late in the day for an assertion of
jurisdiction on this basis in a state where the defendant conducts substantial
business systematically and continuously to be held unconstitutional.”);
Twitchell, supra note 60, at 172–73 (“Courts seem to have articulated a fairly
straightforward standard for doing-business jurisdiction: states have general
jurisdiction over corporations doing continuous and systematic business in the
forum.”).
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Indeed, some of the most visible opponents to broad
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction had reversed course and
acknowledged that it was necessary and appropriate to continue to
recognize corporate-activities-based jurisdiction as a separate
category apart from a defendant’s state of incorporation and
principal place of business.198 Moreover, even Professor Twitchell’s
earlier hard line position on corporate-activities-based jurisdiction
was contingent upon the Supreme Court recognizing an expanded
role for specific jurisdiction.199 Professor Twitchell acknowledged
that she had “advocated cutting back on ‘doing-business’ general
jurisdiction limiting it to the place of incorporation and the
defendant’s principal place of business . . . . [because] courts were
using general jurisdiction theory to reach defendants in cases in
which such dispute-blind jurisdiction was improper.”200
So, what led Professor Twitchell to change her mind on the
scope of corporate-activities-based jurisdiction? She gives several
reasons:
First, it is a traditional practice going back to very early cases.
Second, as long as we use a weak standard, the test is fairly
easy to administer because courts need assess only a single
variable, the continuity and systematic nature—and, less
frequently, the substantiality—of the defendant’s contacts.
Finally, given the variety of business activities that can occur
in a forum and our uncertainties about the constitutional
underpinnings of the doctrine, devising a more definitive
standard is just too hard.201

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Professor Twitchell
argues that corporate-activities-based jurisdiction is necessary in
order “to fill in holes in our jurisdictional scheme. By providing an
additional forum for the plaintiff, we may be engaging in some
indirect economic equalization unattainable through more straight
198. See Twitchell, supra note 60, at 195–96 (acknowledging the benefits of
doing-business jurisdiction).
199. See Twitchell, supra note 17, at 671–80 (arguing “that courts should
avoid any unnecessary restriction of specific jurisdiction by restoring the
‘dispute-specific’ meaning to specific jurisdiction and allowing it the broadest
scope possible consistent with due process”).
200. Twitchell, supra note 60, at 171.
201. Id. at 194–95.
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forward means; occasionally, doing-business jurisdiction may
provide a forum by necessity where multiple plaintiffs are
As
Professor
Borchers
has
noted,
involved.”202
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction is “necessary to cover for a
major deficiency in specific jurisdiction.”203 In other words, the use
of corporate-activities-based jurisdiction makes up for
inadequacies in the Court’s specific jurisdiction case law in a way
that benefits plaintiffs and “generally does little harm” to
defendants.204 Indeed, if the burden on a corporate defendant is too
significant, or the forum state truly has no legitimate interest in
the case, then courts “can use the separate ‘reasonableness’ prong
or forum non conveniens to avoid unjust results.”205
Perhaps most significantly, the best proof of the
well-established
and
entrenched
nature
of
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction is found in the fact that
corporate defendants of any significant size never challenge it.206
In her earlier article, Professor Twitchell had noted that, in the
litigated and reported cases, specific jurisdiction cases greatly
outnumbered
cases
involving
corporate-activities-based
jurisdiction.207 In her later article, however, Professor Twitchell
stated:
202. Id. at 195–96.
203. See Patrick J. Borchers, The Problem with General Jurisdiction, 2001 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 119, 130 (explaining that one of specific jurisdiction’s major
deficiencies is its “inability to provide a single, rational forum”).
204. See Twitchell, supra note 60, at 196 (noting that one reason
doing-business jurisdiction generally does not harm defendants is because most
defendants are domestic and are likely to have to defend somewhere in the United
States).
205. Id.; see also Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 114
(1987) (refusing to hear a third-party claim against a foreign defendant at the
place of injury when the court’s assertion of jurisdiction was unreasonable);
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476–77 (1985) (noting that the
“requirements inherent in the concept of ‘fair play and substantial justice’ may
defeat the reasonableness of jurisdiction even if the defendant has purposefully
engaged in forum activities”).
206. See Twitchell, supra note 60, at 191 n.80 (noting that, of the “thousand
or so reported opinions mentioning ‘general jurisdiction’ or ‘doing-business’
jurisdiction or ‘general personal jurisdiction,’ fewer than twenty opinions a year
actually held that it existed”).
207. See Twitchell, supra note 17, at 630 (“With the emergence of specific
jurisdiction in the twentieth century, the exercise of general jurisdiction has
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It is important to recognize that the published case law does not
reflect the entire picture. General jurisdiction cases often fly
below the radar, and it is difficult to know how frequently
because such cases are not reported in the case law. There are
two reasons for this. First, defendants are unlikely to object to
general jurisdiction in a forum if they operate directly from a
physical office there, since this has always been held to be
sufficient to justify general jurisdiction. Second, because of the
expense and uncertainty of pursuing personal jurisdictional
challenges, some defendants may not object at all, or may
pursue a forum non conveniens challenge instead.208

Indeed, even in cases that reached the Supreme Court because
of challenges to jurisdiction by other smaller defendants or
challenges by a large corporate defendant to issues other than
personal jurisdiction, large corporations repeatedly failed to assert
any objection to the Court’s exercise of corporate-activities-based
jurisdiction.209 For example, in World-Wide Volkswagen, neither
Audi nor Volkswagen of America challenged Oklahoma’s assertion
of personal jurisdiction notwithstanding the objections of the car
dealer and local distributor.210 Similarly, in Phillips Petroleum Co.
v. Shutts,211 the defendant never asserted a challenge to the forum
state’s assertion of corporate-activities-based jurisdiction even
though it asserted an objection to the Court’s jurisdiction over
non-resident members of the plaintiff class in a class action case.212
Defendant had an incentive to assert a due process objection; that
it failed to do so could only be the result of its assumption that such
an objection had no chance of prevailing.213
become rare.”).
208. Twitchell, supra note 60, at 193–94.
209. See id. at 195–96 (arguing that doing business jurisdiction is rarely
challenged by large corporate defendants because “[m]ost defendants are
domestic and will have to defend somewhere in the United States anyway”).
210. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 288–91
(1980) (noting that one reason Audi did not object to the Court’s jurisdiction was
because it may have felt it had no legitimate jurisdictional defense).
211. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
212. See id. at 802–03 (describing petitioner’s two claims as follows: first, that
the Kansas trial court did not possess personal jurisdiction over absent plaintiff
class members, and second, that Kansas law could not be applied to plaintiffs
having no connection with Kansas).
213. See id. at 812–13 (holding that Kansas’s procedure of sending fully
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Regardless of how well-established corporate-activities-based
jurisdiction was at the turn of the century, predicting the future of
any personal jurisdiction doctrine is a dangerous business because
of the absence of clearly defined Supreme Court precedents and
the lack of a judicially recognized theoretical foundation for the
substantive due process limitations on personal jurisdiction.214 The
Supreme Court demonstrated exactly how volatile the doctrine
was, beginning with a case in 2011.
A. The Goodyear Case: The Hint of a New Standard
In Goodyear, the Court addressed personal jurisdiction issues
involved in a lawsuit brought in North Carolina by the parents of
two thirteen-year-old boys who were killed in a bus accident in
France.215 The plaintiffs alleged that the bus accident resulted
from a defective tire manufactured in Turkey by a foreign
subsidiary of the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company (Goodyear
USA).216 The complaint named as defendants Goodyear USA and
three of its subsidiaries organized and separately incorporated in
Turkey, France, and Luxemburg.217 Goodyear USA operates
manufacturing plants in North Carolina but is incorporated and
has its headquarters in the state of Ohio.218 Goodyear USA did not
descriptive notices explaining the right to “opt-out” to each class member satisfied
due process).
214. See Twitchell, supra note 60, at 173 (explaining that the “lack of a firm
theoretical underpinning, coupled with the practical problems courts encounter
in applying the [doing-business jurisdiction] doctrine today, makes its practice
today more the product of circumstance and compromise than of a principled
application of a well-developed theory”).
215. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 918
(2011) (“A bus accident outside Paris that took the lives of two 13-year-old boys
from North Carolina gave rise to the litigation we here consider.”).
216. See id. (“Attributing the accident to a defective tire manufactured in
Turkey at the plant of a foreign subsidiary of The Goodyear Tire and Rubber
Company . . . the boys’ parents commenced an action for damages in a North
Carolina state court . . . .”).
217. See id. (“[T]hey named as defendants Goodyear USA, an Ohio
corporation, and three of its subsidiaries, organized and operating, respectively,
in Turkey, France, and Luxembourg.”).
218. See id. (explaining that Goodyear is an Ohio corporation that “had plants
in North Carolina and regularly engaged in commercial activity there”).
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contest personal jurisdiction in the North Carolina courts, but the
foreign corporate defendants moved to dismiss the case against
them for lack of personal jurisdiction.219 Here is how the Court, in
an opinion by Justice Ginsburg, described the foreign defendants’
contacts with the forum State:
[P]etitioners are not registered to do business in North
Carolina. They have no place of business, employees, or bank
accounts in North Carolina. They do not design, manufacture,
or advertise their products in North Carolina. And they do not
solicit business in North Carolina or themselves sell or ship
tires to North Carolina customers. Even so, a small percentage
of petitioners’ tires (tens of thousands out of tens of millions
manufactured between 2004 and 2007) were distributed in
North Carolina by other Goodyear USA affiliates. These tires
were typically custom ordered to equip specialized vehicles such
as cement mixers, waste haulers, and boat and horse trailers.
Petitioners state, and respondents do not here deny, that the
type of tire involved in the accident, a Goodyear Regional RHS
tire manufactured by Goodyear Turkey, was never distributed
in North Carolina.220

Because the plaintiffs’ claims arose in France and had no
connection with the state of North Carolina, the North Carolina
courts relied on the theory of corporate-activities-based
jurisdiction to justify personal jurisdiction in North Carolina.221 In
addition, in order to establish the continuous and systematic
contacts that plaintiffs acknowledged were necessary for such
jurisdiction, the North Carolina courts relied solely on the sales in
North Carolina of the tires manufactured by the foreign
defendants because the defendants had no physical presence
within that state.222 Indeed, because the foreign defendants
themselves did not sell any of their tires in North Carolina, the
219. See id. (“Goodyear USA’s foreign subsidiaries . . . maintained that North
Carolina lacked adjudicatory authority over them.”).
220. Id.
221. See id. at 921–22 (describing the lower court’s decision to confine its
analysis to “‘general rather than specific jurisdiction,’ which the court recognized
required a ‘higher threshold’ showing: A defendant must have ‘continuous and
systematic contacts’ with the forum”).
222. See id. at 922 (noting the lower courts’ emphasis on the foreign
defendants’ failure to make any attempt to keep their tires from reaching the
North Carolina market).
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lower courts relied on a stream-of-commerce theory to establish a
connection between the defendants and the forum state.223
Justice Ginsburg began her discussion of the relevant legal
standard by noting that cases after International Shoe
distinguished between “general or all-purpose jurisdiction, and
specific or case-linked jurisdiction.”224 This very broad description
of general and specific jurisdiction is the first suggestion that
Justice Ginsburg may be describing these categories, and in
particular general jurisdiction, in the larger sense of any kind of
all-purpose jurisdiction, rather than the more limited sense of
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction.225
Justice Ginsburg then followed with a curious, but later very
important, description of the test for general jurisdiction: “a court
may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or
foreign-country) corporations to hear any and all claims against
them when their affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and
systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum
State.”226 Of course, the key phrase in this description of the law is
not “continuous and systematic,” which was the generally accepted
test at the time, but rather the newly minted phrase “as to render
them essentially at home in the forum State.”227
The “essentially at home” criterion, at least when applied to
corporate-activities-based cases, was entirely unprecedented.228
The only case Justice Ginsburg cited for this proposition was
223. See id. (according to the lower courts, the higher threshold was crossed
“when petitioners placed their tires ‘in the stream of interstate commerce without
any limitation on the extent to which those tires could be sold in North Carolina’”).
224. Id. at 919.
225. See Twitchell, supra note 17, at 610 (describing general jurisdiction as
“dispute-blind” and without regard to the nature of the dispute, and specific
jurisdiction as “dispute-specific” and based only on affiliations between the forum
and the controversy).
226. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919
(2011).
227. See Twitchell, supra note 17, at 623–24 (explaining that the
International Shoe Court used the opportunity to sweep aside the “presence” test
in favor of a new means of determining corporate jurisdiction).
228. See Todd David Peterson, The Timing of Minimum Contacts After
Goodyear and McIntyre, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 202, 236 (2011) (explaining that
prior to Goodyear, “the Supreme Court had given no indication of where to draw
the line between . . . cases at either end of the general jurisdiction spectrum”).
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International Shoe.229 There are two references to “home” on the
cited page of the Court’s International Shoe opinion, but neither of
them suggests that the corporate-activities-based jurisdiction
discussed in that opinion was available only in states where a
corporation was essentially at home.230 The first reference is found
in the one sentence in the opinion that later provided a foundation
for the Court’s procedural due process component to the minimum
contacts tests: “An ‘estimate of the inconveniences’ which would
result to the corporation from a trial away from its ‘home’ or
principal place of business is relevant in this connection.”231 This
sentence does not refer to the contacts, or substantive due process,
part of the test for personal jurisdiction.232 Rather, the context of
the sentence makes it clear that the Court is stating that, in
addition to the contacts requirement, the exercise of personal
jurisdiction by a state must not be so inconvenient to a defendant
as to render it procedurally unfair.233
The second mention of the term “home” is similarly irrelevant
to the requirement for corporate-activities-based jurisdiction:
Conversely it has been generally recognized that the casual
presence of the corporate agent or even his conduct of single or
isolated items of activities in a state [on] the corporation’s
229. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919; see also Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 317 (1945)
‘Presence’ in the state in this sense has never been doubted when the
activities
of
the
corporation
there
have
not
only
been continuous and systematic, but also give rise to the liabilities
sued on, even though no consent to be sued or authorization to an agent
to accept service of process has been given.
230. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Earlier in the same paragraph, Justice Stone discussed the “presence”
requirement as applied to corporations. See id. at 316–17
For the terms ‘present’ or ‘presence’ are used merely to symbolize those
activities of the corporation's agent within the state which courts will
deem to be sufficient to satisfy the demands of due process. Those
demands may be met by such contacts of the corporation with the state
of the forum as make it reasonable, in the context of our federal system
of government, to require the corporation to defend the particular suit
which is brought there.
(citing Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 140–41 (2d Cir. 1930)).
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behalf are not enough to subject it to suit on causes of action
unconnected with the activities there . . . To require the
corporation in such circumstances to defend the suit away from
its home or other jurisdiction where it carries on more
substantial activities has been thought to lay too great and
unreasonable a burden on the corporation to comport with due
process.234

This excerpt not only fails to support Justice Ginsburg’s
addition of the phrase “at home” as an additional qualifier to the
continuous and systematic contacts test,235 it supports precisely
the opposite conclusion. Here, the Court is simply stating that
isolated contacts are not sufficient to require a corporation to
defend away from its “home.”236 Moreover, by adding the phrase
“or other jurisdiction where it carries on more substantial
activities,”237 the Court seems clearly to be suggesting that some
form of dispute-blind all-purpose jurisdiction is available in states
where it carries on “more substantial activities” other than where
a corporation is “at home.”238
Justice Ginsburg then noted that, because the claim arose out
of an accident in France, the North Carolina courts lacked specific
jurisdiction.239 Instead, the state court found that there was
general jurisdiction because the delivery of some of the foreign
defendants’ tires through “the stream of commerce” to North
234. Id. (citations omitted).
235. See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919 (“A court may assert general jurisdiction
over foreign (sister-state or foreign-country) corporations to hear any and all
claims against them when their affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and
systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.” (citing Int’l
Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317)).
236. See id. (noting that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the foreign
defendants had “affiliations with the State [that were] so ‘continuous and
systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum State” (citing Int’l
Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317)).
237. Id.
238. See id. at 928–29 (noting that “continuous and systematic general
business contacts” may be sufficient to establish general jurisdiction (quoting
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984))).
239. See id. at 919 (“Because the episode-in-suit, the bus accident, occurred in
France, and the tire alleged to have caused the accident was manufactured and
sold abroad, North Carolina courts lacked specific jurisdiction to adjudicate the
controversy. The North Carolina Court of Appeals so acknowledged.”).
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Carolina provided the North Carolina courts with general
jurisdiction over the foreign defendants.240 In Justice Ginsburg’s
view, that conclusion was “confusing or blending general and
specific jurisdictional inquiries . . . .”241 A connection as tenuous as
that could not “establish the ‘continuous and systematic’ affiliation
necessary to empower North Carolina courts to entertain claims
unrelated to the forum corporation’s contacts with the State.”242
After describing the jurisdictional facts in detail in order to lay
the foundation for the Court’s opinion, Justice Ginsburg set forth
her understanding of the law. Justice Ginsburg first discussed the
International Shoe opinion and distinguished between assertions
of specific jurisdiction and general jurisdiction.243 In discussing
general jurisdiction, Justice Ginsburg made a critical error: “For
an individual, the paradigm form for the exercise of general
jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile; for a corporation, it is an
equivalent place, one in which the corporation is fairly regarded as
at ‘home.’”244 The problem with this statement, however, is that
plaintiff’s jurisdictional argument rested on general jurisdiction in
the narrow sense of corporate-activities-based jurisdiction,245 while
Justice Ginsburg’s identification of domicile, place of
incorporation, and principal place of business as “paradigm bases
for general jurisdiction” referred to general jurisdiction in its
larger sense of all-purpose jurisdiction.246 Citizenship or domicile
240. See id. (“Some of the tires made abroad by Goodyear’s foreign
subsidiaries, the North Carolina Court of Appeals stressed, had reached North
Carolina through ‘the stream of commerce’; that connection, the Court of Appeals
believed, gave North Carolina courts the handle needed for the exercise of general
jurisdiction over the foreign corporations.”).
241. Id.
242. Id. at 920.
243. See id. at 923–25 (explaining that adjudicatory authority is “specific”
when the suit arises out of or relates to the defendant's contacts with the forum,
and that it is “general” when the continuous corporate operations within a state
justify suit against the corporation on an unrelated cause of action (citing
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 nn.8–9
(1984))).
244. Id. at 924.
245. See id. at 930 (explaining that plaintiff asserted a “single enterprise”
theory and asked the Court to consolidate foreign defendants’ ties to North
Carolina with those of Goodyear USA and other Goodyear entities).
246. According to Justice Ginsburg, for a corporation, the paradigmatic forum
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of corporations and individuals has always been a valid traditional
basis
of
jurisdiction
separate
and
apart
from
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction, which developed from the
separate traditional basis of service on a defendant in the forum
state.247 This distinction is made entirely clear by Justice
Ginsburg’s citation to Professor Lea Brilmayer’s article on general
jurisdiction, which, at the page cited by Justice Ginsburg, clearly
refers to general jurisdiction in the larger sense of all-purpose
jurisdiction, not corporate-activities-based jurisdiction.248
Justice Ginsburg’s mistake is the perfect example of why the
ambiguity of jurisdictional terminology gets the courts into
trouble. The term general jurisdiction can mean two entirely
different things. The plaintiffs in Goodyear were arguing for
general jurisdiction in the sense described by International Shoe,
Perkins,
and
Helicopteros,
as
corporate-activities-based
jurisdiction.249 Justice Ginsburg, on the other hand, is discussing
an entirely different subset of all-purpose jurisdiction,
citizenship/domicile, which, although it may be the paradigmatic
form of all-purpose general jurisdiction, is an entirely separate
for the exercise of general jurisdiction is one in which the corporation is fairly
regarded as “at home.” Id. at 924. Justice Ginsburg cited Lea Brilmayer for
additional, paradigmatic bases for general jurisdiction, including domicile, place
of incorporation, and principal place of business. Id. (citing Lea Brilmayer et al.,
A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REV. 723, 728 (1988)).
247. See Lea Brilmayer, et al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX.
L. REV. 723, 725 (1988) [hereinafter Brilmayer, A General Look] (explaining that
historically, “courts commonly predicated jurisdiction upon the defendant’s
general affiliation with the forum, and not the defendant’s activities in the forum
that were related to the litigation”).
248. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924
(2011) (discussing the paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction over
a corporation (citing Brilmayer, A General Look, supra note 247, at 728)).
249. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416
(1984) (holding that Texas could not exercise general jurisdiction over Helicol
because Helicol’s contacts with Texas were not sufficiently continuous and
systematic); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 438 (1952)
(holding that Ohio could exercise general jurisdiction over a Philippines-based
corporation because the corporation’s president had been carrying on a
continuous and systematic part of its general business in Ohio); Int’l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945) (holding that Washington’s exercise of
general jurisdiction over International Shoe was proper because its activities in
Washington were systematic and continuous).
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category from corporate-activities-based jurisdiction.250 Thus,
although state of incorporation and principal place of business
might be the measure of the traditional basis of citizenship or
domicile jurisdiction, they were never (at least until this case)
deemed to be the test for corporate-activities-based jurisdiction.251
Justice Ginsburg then went on to describe the Court’s specific
jurisdiction cases.252 She concluded with a citation to Professor
Twitchell’s Myth of General Jurisdiction article in which Professor
Twitchell stated that, in the aftermath of International Shoe,
“specific jurisdiction has become the centerpiece of modern
jurisdiction theory, while general jurisdiction plays a reduced
role.”253 In that article, of course, Professor Twitchell focused solely
on litigated cases, which, as previously discussed, tilt strongly
towards specific jurisdiction analyses.254 But, as Professor
Twitchell herself acknowledged, the importance of general
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction cannot be gauged by
reported opinions because most substantial corporate defendants
never challenge the existence of corporate-activities-based
jurisdiction.255 This issue is critically important because, as we
shall see, Justice Ginsburg assumes that plaintiffs have no
significant need for corporate-activities-based jurisdiction, a claim
that is empirically questionable at best.
250. See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 924 (“For an individual, the paradigm forum
for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile; for a
corporation, it is an equivalent place, one in which the corporation is fairly
regarded as at home.”).
251. See Brilmayer, A General Look, supra note 247, at 731–32 (explaining
that, since International Shoe, the traditional basis for jurisdiction had been
“physical power”).
252. See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 924–25 (discussing specific jurisdiction cases
that post-date International Shoe (citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court
of Cal., 480 U.S. 102 (1987))); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462
(1985); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Hanson
v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958)).
253. Id. at 925 (citing Twitchell, supra note 17, at 628).
254. See supra text accompanying notes 247–248 (discussing the general
acknowledgement that it is necessary to recognize corporate-activities-based
jurisdiction as separate from a defendant’s state of incorporation and principal
place of business).
255. See supra text accompanying notes 207–208 (discussing how and why
general jurisdiction cases usually fly under the radar).
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Justice’s Ginsburg’s opinion then turned to plaintiffs’
assertion that corporate-activities-based jurisdiction could be
justified based on a stream-of-commerce theory.256 Justice
Ginsburg noted that the lower courts use of the
“stream-of-commerce analysis elided the essential difference
between
case-specific
and
all-purpose
(general)
jurisdiction . . . . But ties serving to bolster the exercise of specific
jurisdiction do not warrant a determination that, based on those
ties, the forum has general jurisdiction over a defendant.”257 If
anything, Justice Ginsburg understated the problem with
plaintiffs’ argument. The stream-of-commerce theory has never
been accepted by a majority of the Court, even in the context of a
specific jurisdiction case.258 The plaintiffs’ argument is so clearly
beyond any Supreme Court precedent that Justice Ginsburg could
easily have stopped there. Given the weakness of plaintiffs’
argument, it is not surprising that no member of the Court
supported plaintiffs’ case for jurisdiction.
Justice Ginsburg proceeded, however, to a lengthy discussion
of the facts of both Perkins and Helicopteros, which made it clear
that “North Carolina is not a forum in which it would be
permissible to subject petitioners to general jurisdiction.”259 These
contacts fell “far short of the ‘continuous and systematic general
business contacts’ necessary to empower North Carolina to
entertain suit against them on claims unrelated to anything that

256. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 927.
257. Id.
258. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 887 (2011)
(explaining that the stream of commerce metaphor cannot supersede either the
mandate of the Due Process Clause or the limits on judicial authority that it
ensures); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 112
(1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that a defendant’s awareness that the
stream of commerce may sweep a product to the forum state is not an act
purposefully directed toward the forum state); id. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring)
[A]rguing that a defendant’s placement of a product into the stream of
commerce is an act in which the defendant purposefully avails itself of
the forum state because “[a]s long as a participant . . . is aware that
the final product is being marketed in the forum State, the possibility
of a lawsuit there cannot come as a surprise.
259. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 917
(2011).
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connects them to the State.”260 Justice Ginsburg concluded her
analysis by stating: “Measured against Helicopteros and Perkins,
North Carolina is not a forum in which it would be permissible to
subject petitioners to general jurisdiction. Unlike the defendant in
Perkins, whose sole wartime business activity was conducted in
Ohio, petitioners are in no sense at home in North Carolina.”261
This last statement by Justice Ginsburg is profoundly
ambiguous and confusing. On the one hand, one might infer that
the reference to the petitioners being “in no sense at home in North
Carolina” was intended to define the standard for corporateactivities-based jurisdiction and limit such cases to instances
where a defendant is essentially at home in the forum state. On
the other hand, Justice Ginsburg’s subsequent reference to
“continuous and systematic general business contacts” suggested
continuity with Helicopteros and the many lower court cases
involving corporate-activities-based jurisdiction.262
Following Goodyear, the courts and commentators disagreed
on whether the Court had changed the well-accepted tests for
general jurisdiction. Some argued that the Court’s use of the
phrase “essentially at home” implied that the Court was imposing
significant new restrictions on the cases that would qualify for
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction.263 Others, however,
concluded that the Court could not have intended such a

260. Id. at 929 (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466
U.S. 408, 416 (1984)).
261. Id. (emphasis added).
262. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416
(1984) (“The one trip to Houston by Helicol’s chief executive officer for the purpose
of negotiating the transportation-services contract with Consorcio/WSH cannot
be described or regarded as a contact of a ‘continuous and systematic’
nature . . . .”); see, e.g., Pervasive Software, Inc. v. Lexware GmbH & Co., 688 F.3d
214, 231 (5th Cir. 2012) (“Lexware’s attenuated connections to the state fall far
short of the ‘the continuous and systematic general business contacts’ necessary
to make Lexware ‘at home’ in the forum.”).
263. See, e.g., Lou Mulligan, Clarifying Personal Jurisdiction . . . or Not,
PRAWFSBLAWG
(June
28,
2011,
4:05
P.M.),
https://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2011/06/clarifying-personaljurisdiction-or-not.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2019) (“The opinion signals to lower
courts that simply doing a lot [of] continuous business in a state is not sufficient
for general jurisdiction.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).

CATEGORICAL CONFUSION

715

significant restriction and that the test would remain the same as
it had ever since Perkins.264
The strongest argument in favor of giving significant doctrinal
substance to Justice Ginsburg’s use of the phrase “at home” came
not from the opinion in Goodyear, but rather from the Court’s
decision in McIntyre, a specific jurisdiction case decided the same
year as Goodyear.265 In discussing the possible bases of jurisdiction
over the defendant in her dissenting opinion, Justice Ginsburg
stated: “First, all agree, McIntyre UK surely is not subject to
general (all-purpose) jurisdiction in New Jersey courts, for that
foreign-country corporation is hardly ‘at home’ in New Jersey.”266
That sentence certainly suggests that Justice Ginsburg regarded
the test for corporate-activities-based jurisdiction to be whether a
defendant is at home in the forum state. Of course, even if one had
accepted “at home” as the basis for corporate-activities-based
jurisdiction, Justice Ginsburg had not given that phrase much
content or explanation.267
The arguments in favor of a much more limited interpretation
of Goodyear were two-fold. First, there was no support in the
Supreme Court’s prior precedents for the imposition of an “at
home” standard for corporate-activities-based jurisdiction.268 As
previously noted, the two references to “home” in International
Shoe did not relate to the quantum of contacts necessary to permit
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction, but instead related to
fairness considerations involving burden and inconvenience to the
264. See, e.g., Peterson, supra note 228, at 215 (arguing that such a restrictive
interpretation ignores “Justice Ginsburg’s use of the term ‘paradigm,’ meaning
‘an outstandingly clear or typical example or archetype’”); Patrick J. Borchers, J.
McIntyre Machinery, Goodyear, and the Incoherence of the Minimum Contacts
Test, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1245, 1267 (2011) (arguing that the nature of
Goodyear USA’s contacts suggested “that some sort of permanent commercial
presence, often manifested in physical locations, is the hallmark of general
jurisdiction”).
265. J. McIntyre Machinery, 564 U.S. at 899 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
266. Id.
267. See id. (using the phrase “at home” only once, in the following sentence:
“First, all agree, McIntyre UK surely is not subject to general (all-purpose)
jurisdiction in New Jersey courts, for that foreign-country corporation is hardly
‘at home’ in New Jersey”).
268. See supra notes 230–238 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s
two references to “home” in the International Shoe opinion).
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defendant.269 In Perkins, the Court made no mention of the phrase
“at home” nor did it suggest that the test for
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction was restricted to the state of
incorporation and a corporation’s principal place of business,
factors that were relevant to the traditional basis of citizenship,
and not to corporate-activities-based jurisdiction.270 Finally, in
Helicopteros,
if
the
Court
had
thought
that
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction had been limited to where a
corporation was “at home” or solely its state of incorporation or
principal place of business, the Court could have made much
shorter work of the case. Nowhere in that decision did the Court
suggest that corporate-activities-based jurisdiction was available
only where a corporation was “at home.”271
Second, it was hard to believe that Justice Ginsburg would
make such a significant change in the standard for
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction, which would overrule sixty
years of lower court precedent, without discussing that precedent
or even mentioning that such cases existed. Surely Justice
Ginsburg must have been aware of this lower court precedent and,
just as surely, Justice Ginsburg would have been aware that a
significant restriction on corporate-activities-based jurisdiction
would significantly tip the balance in favor of corporate defendants
who
had
long
assumed
they
were
subject
to
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction in virtually every state, to
the detriment of individual plaintiffs who might now be forced to
travel far from their own homes in order to sue well-funded
corporations who could afford to defend effectively in any state.
Even if Justice Ginsburg intended that result, she certainly would
not write an opinion without discussing that issue and the impact
on so many years of well-entrenched precedent. Thus, it is not
surprising that one widely used case book on civil procedure added
a note after the Goodyear decision stating that it was a “wise
choice” for Goodyear USA to have conceded general jurisdiction in
269. See supra notes 230–238 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s
two references to “home” in the International Shoe opinion).
270. The phrase “at home” is never used in the Perkins opinion. See generally
Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
271. The phrase “at home” is never used in the Helicopteros opinion. See
generally Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
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North Carolina “given the extent of their contacts with North
Carolina . . . .”272
Third, it would have been particularly surprising for Justice
Ginsburg to make such a sweeping change in the law of personal
jurisdiction in such an easy case. Goodyear could have been
decided based on the existing understanding of the differences
between corporate-activities-based jurisdiction and specific
jurisdiction. Justice Ginsburg needed to say only that, given the
uncertain validity of the stream-of-commerce theory in the context
of specific jurisdiction, the use by the North Carolina courts of that
theory to justify corporate-activities-based jurisdiction was
unquestionably overreaching.273 One would never have expected a
justice as highly regarded as Justice Ginsburg to make so sweeping
and unnecessary a pronouncement in a case where none of the
parties had briefed the issue, none of the briefs contained any
discussion of the many corporate-activities-based cases in the
lower courts, and none of the other justices joining in the
unanimous decision would be likely to perceive the sweeping
impact of such a decision.
A final reason not to regard Goodyear as a sea change in the
law of corporate-activities-based jurisdiction was that corporate
defendants continued to concede corporate-acts-based jurisdiction.
For example, in the preliminary stages of the Supreme Court’s
next big case on that subject, Daimler AG v. Bauman,274 the Ninth
Circuit upheld an assertion of corporate-activities-based
jurisdiction over Daimler with respect to a law suit challenging the
activities of its wholly owned subsidiary in Argentina based upon
the continuous and systematic contacts with the state of California
by its American subsidiary, Mercedes-Benz USA (MBUSA).275
272. See STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 138 (8th ed. 2012) (discussing
what difference, if any, Goodyear’s failure to challenge personal jurisdiction
would have made in the outcome of the case); see also Borchers, supra note 264,
at 1267 (stating that there was probably corporate-activities-based jurisdiction
over Goodyear USA).
273. See supra note 258 and accompanying text (noting that
stream-of-commerce theory has never been accepted by a majority of the Supreme
Court).
274. 571 U.S. 117 (2014).
275. Id. at 120–21.
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Daimler contested the existence of personal jurisdiction in
California and had an interest in making every argument it could
to defeat such jurisdiction.276 Notwithstanding this clear
incentive to make every possible jurisdictional argument, Daimler
conceded that California would have corporate-activities-based
jurisdiction over MBUSA, even though it was incorporated in
Delaware with its principal place of business in New Jersey.277
Daimler would not have conceded that jurisdiction unless it
believed that Goodyear had limited corporate-activities-based
jurisdiction to MBUSA’s states of incorporation and principal place
of business.
One final indication that Goodyear made no significant change
in corporate-activities-based jurisdiction is contained in an amicus
brief filed in the Daimler case by Professor Lea Brilmayer, the very
scholar on whom Justice Ginsburg had so prominently relied in
Goodyear
and
a
well-known
opponent
of
broad
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction.278 In her brief, the sole
ground on which Professor Brilmayer argued for the reversal of the
Ninth Circuit’s assertion of personal jurisdiction over Daimler was
the argument that the Ninth Circuit improperly attributed the
contacts of MBUSA to Daimler, which was an entirely separate
corporation.279 Brilmayer made no argument based on the
standard for general corporate-activities-based jurisdiction.
Indeed, Brilmayer described the standard for such jurisdiction in
a manner that suggested Goodyear had imposed no changes on
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction whatsoever:
This Court has repeatedly held that the Due Process Clause
requires a holding of “continuous and systematic” contacts
276. See id. at 134–35 (arguing that a subsidiary’s jurisdictional contacts can
be imputed to its parent only when the former is so dominated by the latter as to
be its “alter ego”).
277. Id. at 121.
278. See Brief for Daimler AG as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 1,
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014) (No. 11-965), 2013 WL 3377320
(describing Professor Brilmayer as one of America’s most widely cited scholars
writing on personal jurisdiction).
279. See id. at 8 (“The Ninth Circuit’s test left the actual
defendant unaccounted for. It was not MBUSA, but Daimler, that the plaintiffs
wanted to sue. This deficiency should be fatal, because this Court mandates that
contacts be shown for every defendant over whom jurisdiction is sought.”).
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between the defendant and the forum. The “continuous and
systematic” test for assertion of general jurisdiction is generally
ascribed to Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.
Although formulated six decades ago, the Perkins standard
remains authoritative.280

Nevertheless, when the Supreme Court ultimately decided
Daimler, Justice Ginsburg had a surprise in store for all those who
expected that Goodyear had not made a significant change in the
law.
B. Daimler: The Hint of a New Standard Converted to a Holding,
but with a Possible Exception
The
next
Supreme
Court
case
to
address
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction after Goodyear was Daimler
AG v. Bauman.281 Daimler involved a complaint filed in the
Northern District of California by twenty-two Argentine residents
against the German manufacturer of Mercedes-Benz vehicles.282
The complaint alleged that during Argentina’s “Dirty War,”
Daimler’s Argentine subsidiary “collaborated with state security
forces to kidnap, detain, torture, and kill certain MB Argentina
workers, among them, plaintiffs or persons closely related to
plaintiffs.”283 Plaintiffs asserted that the State of California had
personal jurisdiction over Daimler based on the California contacts
of Daimler’s American subsidiary, Mercedes-Benz USA (MBUSA)
which was separately incorporated in Delaware with its principal
place of business in New Jersey.284
In response to defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction, plaintiffs argued that MBUSA “should be
280. Id. at 11 (discussing the Perkins standard as applied by the Court in
Helicopteros (citing Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S.
915, 929–29 (2011))); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S.
408, 416 (1984) (concluding that Helicol’s contacts with Texas did not constitute
the kind of continuous and systematic general business contacts the Court found
to exist in Perkins).
281. 571 U.S. 117 (2014).
282. Id. at 120–21.
283. Id. at 121.
284. Id.
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treated as Daimler’s agent for jurisdictional purposes.”285 As the
Supreme Court noted, “[a]t times relevant to this suit, MBUSA
was wholly owned by DaimlerChrysler North America Holding
Corporation, a Daimler subsidiary.”286 MBUSA had substantial
contacts with the State of California, including “multiple
California-based facilities, including a regional office in Costa
Mesa, a Vehicle Preparation Center in Carson, and a Classic
Center in Irvine.”287 In addition, MBUSA was “the largest supplier
of luxury vehicles to the California market,” and over ten percent
of MBUSA’s sales occurred in California, which accounted for 2.4
percent of Daimler’s world-wide sales.288
As previously noted, Daimler did not contest plaintiff’s
allegation that California would have corporate-activities-based
jurisdiction over MBUSA.289 Instead, Daimler argued that,
because MBUSA was a separate and distinct corporate entity, the
Court should not attribute MBUSA’s contacts with California to
Daimler.290 The district court agreed that MBUSA’s contacts
should not be attributed to Daimler and dismissed the plaintiff’s
complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction.291 On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit initially affirmed the district court’s judgment.292 On
rehearing, however, the panel reversed course and upheld personal
285. Id. at 123
286. Id. at 123 n.3. Thus, Daimler was twice removed from the separate
corporate entity on whose contacts with California the plaintiffs relied.
287. Id. at 123.
288. Id.
289. See supra note 277 and accompanying text (explaining Daimler’s
concession that California would have corporate-activities-based jurisdiction over
MBUSA, even though it was incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of
business in New Jersey).
290. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 134–35 (2014) (“Daimler
argues, and several Courts of Appeals have held, that a subsidiary’s jurisdictional
contacts can be imputed to its parent only when the former is so dominated by
the latter as to be its alter ego.”).
291. See id. at 124 (granting Daimler’s motion to dismiss because Daimler’s
own affiliations with California were insufficient to support the exercise of
all-purpose jurisdiction and because plaintiffs failed to demonstrate MBUSA
acted as Daimler’s agent).
292. See Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 579 F.3d 1088, 1098 (9th Cir.
2009) (affirming the District Court’s order because the District Court did not have
personal jurisdiction over DaimlerChrysler).
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jurisdiction over Daimler in California based upon the contacts of
its subsidiary MBUSA.293 Daimler petitioned for a rehearing en
banc, but that petition was denied over a dissent written by Judge
O’Scannlain, on behalf of himself and seven other Ninth Circuit
judges.294
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and Justice Ginsburg
wrote the majority opinion on behalf of herself and seven other
members of the Court.295 Justice Ginsburg did not take long to
indicate the direction in which the Court was going. Before even
getting to her recitation of the facts, Justice Ginsburg established
two key points. First, she observed the “absence of any California
connection to the atrocities, perpetrators, or victims” in the case
and noted that plaintiffs were arguing that Daimler could “be sued
on any and all claims against it, wherever in the world the claims
may arise.”296 Then Justice Ginsburg revealed the precise ground
for her concern:
For example, as plaintiffs’ counsel affirmed, under the proffered
jurisdictional theory, if a Daimler-manufactured vehicle
overturned in Poland, injuring a Polish driver and passenger,
the injured parties could maintain a design defect suit in
California. Exercises of personal jurisdiction so exorbitant, we
hold, are barred by due process constraints on the assertion of
adjudicatory authority.297

This statement contains a number of hints about the nature of
Justice Ginsburg’s concerns. First, the hypothetical itself suggests
that her concern was the assertion of jurisdiction over a case that
arose outside of the United States and in which the forum state
has no interest. Such far-reaching assertions of personal
jurisdiction are disfavored under generally accepted international
293. See Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2011)
(holding that DaimlerChrysler was subject to personal jurisdiction in California
through the contacts of its subsidiary MBUSA and that MBUSA was acting as
DaimlerChrysler’s agent).
294. See Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 676 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 2011)
(arguing that the petition for rehearing en banc should have been granted because
the holding was at odds with the dictates of the Supreme Court and is inconsistent
with the law of six other circuits) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting).
295. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 120.
296. Id. at 121.
297. Id. at 121–22 (citations omitted).
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law standards, a fact of which Justice Ginsburg was aware by
virtue of her use of the term “exorbitant” to describe the exercise
of jurisdiction in this case.298 The word “exorbitant” is a term of art
in international comparative law that is used to describe excessive
assertions of personal jurisdiction by a country over defendants
from a foreign country, and Justice Ginsburg had used the term in
just that sense in her own academic writing as a law professor.299
The second early hint was contained in the opinion’s next
paragraph, which notes that the Court in Goodyear “addressed the
distinction between general or all-purpose jurisdiction, and specific
or conduct-linked jurisdiction.”300 Then, Justice Ginsburg made a
surprisingly broad leap:
As to the former, we held that a court may assert jurisdiction
over a foreign corporation “to hear any and all claims against
[it]” only when the corporation’s affiliations with the State in
which suit is brought are so constant and pervasive “as to
render [it] essentially at home in the forum State. Instructed by
Goodyear, we conclude Daimler is not “at home” in California,
and cannot be sued there for injuries plaintiffs attribute to MB
Argentina’s conduct in Argentina.301

In one sentence, Justice Ginsburg converted the seemingly
casual references in Goodyear to where a corporation is “at home”
into a holding that swept vastly further than necessary to resolve
the issues in Daimler, and that virtually eliminated
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction as a separate category of
personal jurisdiction. As will be discussed in detail below,302 the
298. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Civil
Judgments: A Summary Review of the Situation in the United States, 4 INT’L L.
720, 725–26 (1970) (noting that jurisdictional bases appropriate in domestic law
are largely unacceptable in the international sphere).
299. See id. (“Unacceptable or ‘exorbitant’ bases (principally nationality,
domicile or residence of the plaintiff, presence of any assets of a non-resident
defendant, and—the common law contribution to the list—defendant’s transitory
presence) generally are not expected even by the rendition forum to elicit
recognition outside.”).
300. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 122.
301. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
302. See infra note 339 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme
Court’s power to impose restraints on personal jurisdiction over foreign persons
that are not otherwise required by the Due Process Clause).
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Court did not need to utilize the mysterious “at home” standard to
prevent courts from assuming jurisdiction over cases like Justice
Ginsburg’s Polish hypothetical. Instead, by stretching for the
broadest impact, Justice Ginsburg converted an ambiguous
statement in the Goodyear opinion into a binding holding that
would govern future cases.303
After reciting the facts of the case, Justice Ginsburg began her
discussion of the applicable law by stating that Pennoyer had held
“that a tribunal’s jurisdiction over a person reaches no farther than
the geographic bounds of the forum.”304 Curiously, however, the
Pennoyer reference does not really match the statement made by
Justice Ginsburg.305 Justice Ginsburg then explained the
differences between specific and general jurisdiction, with a
citation to International Shoe and the following quotation from
Goodyear: “a court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign
(sister-state or a foreign-country) corporations to hear any and all
claims against them when their affiliations with the State are so
‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home
in the forum State.”306 In Goodyear, that sentence had been
303. See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773,
1776 (2017) (expounding the proposition that “for general jurisdiction, the
‘paradigm forum’ is an ‘individual’s domicile,’ or, for corporations, ‘an equivalent
place, one in which the corporation is fairly regarded as at home’” (citing Goodyear
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011))).
304. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 125 (2014) (citing Pennoyer v.
Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1877)).
305. The exact quotation cited by Justice Ginsburg is “[t]he authority of every
tribunal is necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of the State in which it
is established.” Id. (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1877)). That
statement is not the equivalent of the description made by Justice Ginsburg,
which suggests that states could not exercise jurisdictional authority over any one
who was not found or served with process within the forum state. To the contrary,
the Pennoyer Court recognized that a state could exercise jurisdiction over its
citizens, individual or corporate, even if they were not present within the forum
state. To say that a state’s authority is restricted by its territorial limits is not the
same as saying its jurisdiction over a person reaches no farther than the
geographic bounds of the forum. This distinction is not simply a semantic quibble.
The key problem with Justice Ginsburg’s test for dispute-blind jurisdiction is that
she fails to distinguish between the categories of citizenship or domicile
jurisdiction and presence/doing business jurisdiction, which later became
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction.
306. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 127 (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919).
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followed by a citation to International Shoe, which, as we have
already seen, does not remotely support the inclusion of the
“essentially at home in the forum State” qualification.307 After
repeating that statement in Daimler, Justice Ginsburg included a
citation to Helicopteros which also supplied no support for the
“essentially at home” standard.308 Then, in a footnote, Justice
Ginsburg doubled down on her reference to the Polish automobile
accident hypothetical that involved no person with any connection
to the State of California.309
It is striking that Justice Ginsburg, for the second time in the
opinion, paired the description of the corporate-activities-based
jurisdiction standard as “essentially at home” with the Polish
hypothetical.310 The implicit suggestion is that the new, and
unprecedented, standard was necessary to prevent exorbitant
assertions of jurisdiction over cases like the Polish automobile
accident.311 But the Polish automobile accident, just as was true
307. See supra notes 229–238 and accompanying text (discussing the two
references to “home” in the International Shoe opinion).
308. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 127. The cited portion of Helicopteros reads: “When
a State exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit not arising out
of or related to the defendant’s contacts with the forum, the State has been said
to be exercising ‘general jurisdiction’ over the defendant.” Helicopteros Nacionales
de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.9 (1984) (citations omitted).
309. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 127 n.5
Colloquy at oral argument illustrated the respective provinces of
general and specific jurisdiction over persons. Two hypothetical
scenarios were posed: First, if a California plaintiff, injured in a
California accident involving a Daimler-manufactured vehicle, sued
Daimler in California court alleging that the vehicle was defectively
designed, that court’s adjudicatory authority would be premised on
specific jurisdiction. Second, if a similar accident took place
in Poland and injured Polish plaintiffs sued Daimler in California
court, the question would be one of general jurisdiction.
(citations omitted).
310. Footnote 5, in which Justice Ginsburg makes her second reference to the
Polish hypothetical, is immediately preceded by the following sentence: “As we
have since explained, ‘[a] court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign
(sister-state or foreign-country) corporations to hear any and all claims against
them when their affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as
to render them essentially at home in the forum State.’” Id. at 127 (emphasis
added) (citations omitted).
311. See id. at 121–22 (“Exercises of personal jurisdiction so exorbitant, we
hold, are barred by due process constraints on the assertion of adjudicatory
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with respect to the Daimler case itself, could easily be excluded
from jurisdiction in California by a corporate-activities-based
standard that is vastly less restrictive than the one suggested by
Justice Ginsburg.
To assuage concerns that such a restrictive standard for
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction would disadvantage
American plaintiffs, Justice Ginsburg repeated the assertion in
Goodyear that “specific jurisdiction has become the centerpiece of
modern jurisdiction theory, while general jurisdiction [has played]
a reduced role.”312 Citing von Mehern and Trautman’s seminal
article, Justice Ginsburg claimed that the Court’s “subsequent
decisions have continued to bear out the prediction that ‘specific
jurisdiction will come into sharper relief and form a considerably
more significant part of the scene.’”313 Justice Ginsburg further
emphasized this point by later suggesting:
As is evident from Perkins, Helicopteros, and Goodyear, general
and specific jurisdiction have followed markedly different
trajectories post-International Shoe. Specific jurisdiction has
been cut loose from Pennoyer’s sway, but we have declined to
stretch general jurisdiction beyond limits traditionally
recognized. As the Court has increasingly trained on the
“relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the
litigation,” i.e., specific jurisdiction, general jurisdiction has
come to occupy a less dominant place in the contemporary
scene.314

Once again, Justice Ginsburg failed to mention of the
multitude of general jurisdiction cases decided by the lower courts.
The relative infrequency of general jurisdiction cases in the
Supreme Court is no indication of the importance of corporateactivities-based jurisdiction as an aid for a plaintiff seeking easy
resolution of its claims. Indeed, many regarded the failure of the
Court to grant certiorari in any of the lower court cases involving
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction as an indication that the

authority.”).
312. Id. at 128 (quoting Twitchell, supra note 17, at 628).
313. Id. (citing von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 9, at 1164).
314. Id. at 132–33 (citations omitted).
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Court was willing to give states wide latitude in asserting that type
of all-purpose jurisdiction.315
If Justice Ginsburg intended only to suggest that the Supreme
Court had issued many more decisions concerning specific
jurisdiction than general jurisdiction, the point is unquestionably
true. If, however, Justice Ginsburg meant to suggest that general
jurisdiction was no longer important to plaintiffs, Justice Ginsburg
was plainly incorrect. Corporate defendants never raised
jurisdictional challenges in such cases because they assumed that
courts had general jurisdiction over major corporations in virtually
every state. That group included Daimler itself because it conceded
the existence of general corporate-activities-based jurisdiction over
MBUSA, notwithstanding the fact that MBUSA was not “at home”
in California.316
Justice Ginsburg then addressed the jurisdictional issues that
had been the focus of all the litigation in the lower courts, including
the petition for rehearing en banc before the Ninth Circuit.317
Daimler had argued that the in-state contacts of Daimler’s
MBUSA subsidiary could not be attributed to the separate and
independent Daimler corporate entity.318 As previously noted,
Professor Lea Brilmayer’s amica brief to the Supreme Court
315. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 47, at 106.
316. After discussing the facts of Perkins, Helicopteros, and Goodyear, Justice
Ginsburg reaffirmed her conversion of her hint of a new standard in Goodyear to
the clear holding of the Court. “Because Goodyear’s foreign subsidiaries were ‘in
no sense at home in North Carolina,’ we held, those subsidiaries could not be
required to submit to the general jurisdiction of that State’s courts.” Daimler AG
v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 132 (2014). Then, as if to underscore the point, Justice
Ginsburg repeated in a footnote, “as the Court made plain in Goodyear and
repeats here, general jurisdiction requires affiliations ‘so “continuous and
systematic” as to render [the forum corporation] essentially at home in the forum
State.’” Id. at 133 n.11. Repeating the phrase multiple times, however, does not
obscure the fact that it appeared seemingly from out of nowhere in Goodyear
without any precedent in prior court cases and without any explanation for why
that should be the standard for corporate-activities-based jurisdiction.
317. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 134, 140 (assessing “whether a foreign
corporation may be subjected to a court’s general jurisdiction based on the
contacts of its in-state subsidiary” and analyzing general jurisdiction within the
transnational context of this particular case).
318. See id. at 134–35 (“Daimler argues, and several Courts of Appeals have
held, that a subsidiary’s jurisdictional contacts can be imputed to its parent only
when the former is so dominated by the latter as to its alter ego.”).
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vigorously and persuasively argued that it was improper to pierce
the corporate veil, by attributing the actions of an entirely distinct
corporate entity to the parent corporation.319 Justice Ginsburg,
however, did not accept the narrow ground to resolve this case on
its easy facts. Instead, she reached out to state a much broader
holding concerning the scope of corporate-activities-based
jurisdiction. Although Justice Ginsburg seemingly accepted
Daimler’s arguments on the agency theory, she reached out for the
vastly broader question:
Even if we were to assume that MBUSA is at home in
California, and further to assume MBUSA’s contacts are
imputable to Daimler, there would still be no basis to subject
Daimler to general jurisdiction in California, for Daimler’s slim
contacts with the State hardly render it at home there.320

Justice Ginsburg’s long reach allowed her to address the
question raised by those who believed that the “essentially at
home” imposed a new and more restrictive standard for the
assertion of corporate-activities-based jurisdiction: What does the
phrase essentially at home mean? To answer this question Justice
Ginsburg once again turned to Professor Brilmayer’s article on
general jurisdiction.321 Citing both the state of incorporation and
principal place of business as “paradigm bases for general
jurisdiction,” Justice Ginsburg added,
Those affiliations have the virtue of being unique—that is, each
ordinarily indicates only one place—as well as easily
ascertainable. cf. Hertz Corp. v. Friend322 . . . . These bases
afford plaintiffs recourse to at least one clear and certain forum
in which a corporate defendant may be sued on any and all
claims. 323

This statement raises so many issues that it is hard to know
where to begin. The first problem is Justice Ginsburg’s
assumption, based on her citation to the Hertz case, that principal
319. See Brief, supra note 278.
320. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 136.
321. Id. at 137 (citing Brilmayer, supra note 247, at 728).
322. 559 U.S. 77 (2010).
323. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014) (citing Brilmayer,
supra note 247, at 728).
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place of business would be determined based on the same rules
used in determining subject-matter jurisdiction.324 This
assumption violates the principle that one should not assume that
a term defined in one way for a particular purpose should
necessarily be defined in the same way for an entirely different
purpose.325 Indeed, the purpose for which the Supreme Court
selected corporate headquarters as the definition for diversity
purposes (ease of administration and certainty of application)
might well be different than the purpose in the personal
jurisdiction context and yield different definition. In the latter, the
Court is interpreting the requirements of due process and not a
congressional statute.326 In that context, the appropriate location
might be where a corporation has most of its operations or
employees, which would be closer to identifying the place with the
greatest contacts.
Second, it is incorrect to conclude that the plaintiffs would
have recourse to at least one clear and certain forum, unless
Justice Ginsburg meant to include forums that are not located
within the United States. For example, an American injured in a
rental Mercedes-Benz on a European vacation would be forced to
sue Daimler in Germany and would have no access to any court
within the United States, hardly a comforting thought for an
American plaintiff seeking a convenient forum.
Justice Ginsburg went on to acknowledge:
Goodyear did not hold that a corporation may be subject to
general jurisdiction only in a forum where it is incorporated or
has its principal place of business; it simply typed those places
paradigm all-purpose forums. Plaintiffs would have us look
beyond the exemplar bases Goodyear identified and approve the
exercise of general jurisdiction in every State in which a
corporation “engages in a substantial, continuous, and

324. Id. (citing Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94 (2010)).
325. See Guarantee Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 101–02 (1945) (noting that
statutes of limitations may be procedural for the purposes of state-to-state choice
of law, but substantive for the purposes of federal-to-state choice of law).
326. See 1 JURISDICTION IN CIVIL ACTIONS § 4.02 (2018) (indicating the overlap
between personal jurisdiction and the requirements of due process).
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systematic course of business.” That formulation, we hold, is
unacceptably grasping.327

Even though state of incorporation and principal place of
business might not be the only states in which a corporation is
“essentially at home,” the Court made it clear that it would be a
rare case in which other bases would be allowed: “We do not
foreclose the possibility that in an exceptional case, . . . a
corporation’s operations in a forum other than its formal place of
incorporation or principal place of business may be so substantial
and of such a nature as to render the corporation at home in that
state.”328
Justice Ginsburg concluded this part of the Daimler opinion
by stating:
Here, neither Daimler nor MBUSA is incorporated in California
nor does either entity have its principal place of business there.
If Daimler’s California activities sufficed to allow adjudication
of this Argentina-rooted case in California, the same global
reach would presumably be available in every other State in
which MBUSA’s sales are sizeable. Such exorbitant exercises of
all-purpose jurisdiction would scarcely permit out-of-state
defendants “to structure their primary conduct with some
minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not
render them liable to suit.”329

This conclusion is notable for a number of reasons. First, it
appears to limit all-purpose jurisdiction over corporations to the
states where a corporation is incorporated or has its principal place
of business. Second, the Court repeated its reference to the
international law term of “exorbitant” jurisdiction, a statement
that has significance in the comparative civil procedure field but is
not used in the domestic context.330 Third, the Court did not need
327. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137–38.
328. Id. at 139 n.19.
329. Id. at 139.
330. See Judy M. Cornett & Michael H. Hoffheimer, Good-bye Significant
Contacts: General Personal Jurisdiction After Daimler AG v. Bauman, 76 OHIO
ST. L.J. 101, 121 (“‘[E]xorbitant jurisdiction’ is a term of art in international law
for disfavored forms of jurisdiction, and by the concluding paragraphs of the
opinion, where she marshals considerations of ‘international rapport’ as
additional reasons to reject jurisdiction in the case.”).

730

76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 655 (2019)

a substantive due process rule to prevent jurisdiction over this
case; a procedural due process analysis would have sufficed
because of California’s lack of any interest in the case.
Finally, Justice Ginsburg repeated the well-worn, but
empirically unsupported, statement that corporate defendants
need to know where they could be subject to personal jurisdiction
in order to “structure their primary conduct.”331 Not only is that
statement factually suspect, it also fails to support the rule
proffered by Justice Ginsburg. A corporation would be on just as
clear notice of where it would be subject all-purpose jurisdiction if
the Supreme Court established a rule that such jurisdiction existed
in any state where a corporation had a branch office, or even in any
state where a corporation was registered to do business.332
In the final part of her opinion, Justice Ginsburg focused on
the “transnational context” of the Daimler litigation.333 Justice
Ginsburg expressed concern that “[t]he Ninth Circuit, moreover,
paid little heed to the risks to international comity its expansive
view of general jurisdiction posed.”334 In particular, Justice
Ginsburg was sensitive to the amicus brief filed by the Solicitor
General which expressed concern that “foreign governments’
objections to some domestic courts’ expansive views of general
jurisdiction have in the past impeded negotiations of international
agreements on the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of
judgments.”335 Therefore, considerations of “international rapport
thus reinforce our determination that subjecting Daimler to the
general jurisdiction of courts in California would not accord with
the ‘fair play and substantial justice’ due process demands.”336
Of course, Justice Ginsburg’s concern about international
comity could easily have been accommodated by a far less
restrictive
standard
than
the
elimination
of
all
331. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 139.
332. See infra Part IV.B.
333. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 140 (“Finally, the transnational context of this
dispute bears attention.”).
334. Id. at 141.
335. Id. (citing Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, Daimler Chrysler, AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014) (No. 11-965),
2013 WL 3377321).
336. Id.
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corporate-activities-based jurisdiction in favor of state of
incorporation and principal place of business as the sole bases for
corporate all-purpose jurisdiction.337 Neither international comity
nor the proposed agreement on recognition and enforcement of
judgments required a rule as strict as Justice Ginsburg created.338
The Supreme Court has the power, as a matter of federal common
law, to impose restraints on personal jurisdiction over foreign
persons that are not otherwise required by the Due Process Clause
for jurisdiction over a United States citizen.339 The Supreme Court
does not need to establish a rule that limits jurisdiction in cases
involving American plaintiffs against domestic corporations and
prevents such plaintiffs from suing in the most convenient forum
when that forum would not impose a significant burden on the
defendant.
Interestingly, Justice Ginsburg stated in a footnote that, at
least in cases involving her very limited conception of all-purpose
dispute-blind jurisdiction, there was no need to assess the
procedural fairness of jurisdiction in the forum state. Justice
Ginsburg called the procedural fairness analysis a “second step,”
and she concluded that “[w]hen a corporation is genuinely at home
in the forum State, however, any second-step inquiry would be
superfluous.”340 Justice Ginsburg reached this conclusion even
though none of the parties had briefed this issue, and even though
every circuit court that had addressed the issue had applied the
procedural due process fairness test in the context of
corporate-activities-based cases as well as specific jurisdiction
cases.341
337. See id. at 156 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (stating that there are other
judicial doctrines available to mitigate the majority’s concern with International
Shoe’s modern-day effects on large corporations).
338. See Arthur & Freer, supra note 185, at 2002 (suggesting that the Court’s
limits on general jurisdiction articulated in Daimler are strict, “a radical
limitation on general jurisdiction” and that it “is surprising to see Justice
Ginsburg . . . so willing to limit general jurisdiction”).
339. See, e.g., Trangsrud, supra note 23, at 883–94 (discussing several
instances in which the Court utilized the federal common law to impose
restrictions on personal jurisdiction over foreign persons, including the territorial
rules and consent rules of jurisdiction).
340. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 139 n.20,
341. See id. at 144 n.1 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (noting that the “Courts of
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Justice Sotomayor concurred in the judgment of the case and
agreed that “the Due Process Clause prohibits the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over Daimler in light of the unique
circumstances of this case.”342 Rather than focusing on the contacts
requirements necessary for corporate-activities-based jurisdiction,
however, Justice Sotomayor found no jurisdiction based on the
procedural fairness test that Justice Ginsburg had declared to be
superfluous. 343 Although the courts of appeals had “uniformly held
that the reasonableness prong does in fact apply in the general
jurisdiction context,”344 Justice Sotomayor sardonically noted,
“without the benefit of a single page of briefing on the issue, the
majority casually adds of these cases to the mounting list of
decisions jettisoned as a consequence today’s ruling.”345
Justice Sotomayor persuasively differed with the majority on
the proper interpretation of the Supreme Court’s prior case law on
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction:
I accept at face value the majority’s declaration that general
jurisdiction is not limited to a corporation’s place of
incorporation and principal place of business because “a
corporation’s operation in a forum other than its formal place of
incorporation or principal place of business may be so
substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation at
Appeal have uniformly held that the reasonableness prong does in fact apply in
the general jurisdiction context”).
342. Id. at 142.
343. See id. at 143–44
The Court can and should decide this case on the far simpler ground
that, no matter how extensive Daimler’s contacts with California, that
State’s exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable given that the
case involves foreign plaintiffs suing a foreign defendant based on
foreign conduct, and given that a more appropriate forum is available.
Because I would reverse the judgment below on this ground, I concur
in the judgment only.
344. Id. at 144 n.1; see, e.g., Lukin v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 348 F.3d 704, 713
(3d Cir. 2003); Base Metal Trading, Ltd. v. OISC Novokuznetsky Aluminum
Factory, 283 F.3d 208, 213–14 (4th Cir. 2002); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v.
Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 573 (2d Cir. 1996); Trierweiler v. Croxton &
Trench Holding Corp., 98 F.3d 1523, 1533 (10th Cir. 1996); Amoco Egypt Oil Co.
v. Leonis Navigation Co., 1 F.3d 843, 851 n.2. (9th Cir. 1993); Donatelli v. Nat’l
Hockey League, 893 F.2d 459, 465 (1st Cir. 1990); Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,
818 F.2d 370, 377 (5th Cir. 1987).
345. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 144 n.1 (2014).
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home in the state.” Were that not so, our analysis of the
defendant’s in-state contacts in Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated
Mining Co., . . . Helicopteros Nacionales des Columbia, SA v.
Hall, . . . and Goodyear would have been irrelevant, as none of
the defendants in these cases was sued in its place of
incorporation or principal place of business.346

So, where are we left after the Court’s decision in Daimler?
First, Justice Ginsburg again failed to recognize that Professor
Brilmayer’s discussion of the “paradigm” forums of general
jurisdiction was a reference to the larger meaning of general
jurisdiction as all-purpose jurisdiction, and not to general
jurisdiction in the sense of corporate-activities-based jurisdiction,
which, after International Shoe, was the successor to corporate
presence or doing business in the forum state.347 Second, by
limiting jurisdiction to what is essentially the traditional basis of
citizenship in the forum state, Justice Ginsburg essentially
entirely eliminated the category of corporate-activities-based
jurisdiction as a separate basis of all-purpose, dispute-blind
jurisdiction.348 Third, the elimination of corporate-activities-based
jurisdiction is entirely inconsistent with the Court’s previous
decisions in International Shoe, Perkins, and Helicopteros.349 Each
of these points will be discussed in detail below.
Justice Ginsburg fell prey to the ambiguous meaning of the
term general jurisdiction. Justice Ginsburg cited Professor
Brilmayer’s article on general jurisdiction, in which Professor
Brilmayer noted that “[d]omicile, place of incorporation and
346. Id. at 154 n.9 (internal citations omitted).
347. See id. at 137 (asserting that Goodyear made clear that the paradigm
forums of all-purpose jurisdiction where corporations could be subject to general
jurisdiction were the forum in which the corporation is incorporated or where it
has its principal place of business).
348. See id. at 140 n.20 (reinforcing that where a corporation operates in
many places, it can hardly be deemed at home in one particular state and
asserting that merely because a large quantum of corporate activity takes place
in a state does not mean that that state should have authority over said
corporation).
349. See Arthur & Freer, supra note 185, at 2002 (reviewing the approach in
Goodyear and Daimler in light of International Shoe, Perkins, and Helicopteros
and opining that although “the Court purported to apply the principles of
International Shoe Co. v. Washington and its progeny, including the Court’s two
prior decisions on general jurisdiction, this simply is not so”).
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principal place of business are paradigms of bases for general
jurisdiction.”350 The context in which Professor Brilmayer
discussed state of incorporation and principal place of business as
bases for personal jurisdiction makes it absolutely clear that she is
discussing general jurisdiction in the large sense of an all-purpose
jurisdiction that is dispute-blind and not the kind of
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction that was established by
International Shoe as the successor to jurisdiction based on
corporate presence or doing business in the forum state.351 In fact,
after the section headed “unique affiliations” in which Professor
Brilmayer discussed state of incorporation and principal place of
business as part of the traditional basis of domicile jurisdiction,
Professor Brilmayer began a separate section on jurisdiction based
on a corporation’s “activities.”352 There, she stated that a
“defendant’s activities in the forum can be the basis for either
general or specific jurisdiction.”353 In that section Professor
Brilmayer, speaking of general jurisdiction in the narrow sense of
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction based on the activities of a
defendant in a forum state, wrote that “general jurisdiction
requires proof of continuous and systematic activities.”354
Justice Ginsburg, however, ignored this part of Professor
Brilmayer’s article. Instead, she cited to Professor Twitchell’s 2001
article to the effect that “International Shoe ‘is clearly not saying
that dispute-blind jurisdiction exists whenever ‘continuous and
systematic’ contacts are found.”355 In Professor Twitchell’s article,
however, she italicized the word “whenever” in order to emphasize
the need for “something more substantial for a state’s authority to
adjudicate any and all claims against a defendant.”356 She never
suggested anything remotely as restrictive as Justice Ginsburg’s
350. Brilmayer, supra note 247, at 735.
351. See id. at 733 (“The law treats corporations like legal persons, and the
place of incorporation and the principal place of business are both analogous to
domicile. In some respects, the decision to incorporate in a particular state
provides a more powerful basis for adjudicatory jurisdiction than does domicile.”).
352. Id. at 735.
353. Id.
354. Id. at 735–36.
355. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 138 (citing Twitchell, supra note 60, at 184).
356. Twitchell, supra note 60, at 184.
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“at home” standard. Moreover, Professor Twitchell described
Perkins as holding that a State could exercise jurisdiction over a
forum corporation on a cause of action unrelated to the
corporation’s forum activities if “the corporation had been carrying
on ‘a continuous and systematic, but limited part of its general
business’ in the forum state.”357 Professor Twitchell stated that
forum state activities that are “something more substantial” are
not limited to state of incorporation and principal place of
business.358 As the title of the article itself indicates, Professor
Twitchell was speaking about activities-based jurisdiction flowing
from a corporation’s “doing business” in the forum state, and not
citizenship or domicile-based jurisdiction, which is traditionally
limited to state of incorporation and principal place of business.359
Indeed, although Professor Twitchell had previously advocated
limiting
corporate-activities-based
jurisdiction
(although,
importantly, along with a significant expansion of specific
jurisdiction), Professor Twitchell’s article discusses “a change of
heart I have had concerning general jurisdiction.”360 Thus, even the
most well-known academic critic of corporate-activities-based
jurisdiction considerably softened her opposition and recognized
the benefits of such jurisdiction, in part “to fill in holes in our
jurisdictional scheme.”361
Second, the standard enunciated by Justice Ginsburg
effectively eliminated the previously well-established category of
corporate-activities-based
jurisdiction.362
After
Pennoyer,
357. See Twitchell, supra note 17, at 626.
358. See Twitchell, supra note 60, at 184 (stating that the Court’s language in
International Shoe indicated that something more than systematic and
continuous contacts was required “for a state’s authority to extend to any and all
claims against a defendant”).
359. See id. at 171 (indicating that the article discusses a proposed test for
“modifying the reach of doing-business jurisdiction”).
360. Id.
361. Id. at 195.
362. Compare Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 139 (2014) (stating that
the inquiry is “whether that corporation’s affiliations with the state are so
continuous and systematic as to render it essentially at home in the forum state”),
with Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (articulating that in
order to subject a defendant to in personam jurisdiction, defendant must have
certain minimum contacts with the forum state).
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corporations could be subject to all-purpose jurisdiction based
either upon their citizenship or domicile in the forum (principal
place of business and state of incorporation), or based on their
presence in the forum at the time of service of process.363 This
second category of corporate presence was eventually modified to
be wherever a corporation was doing business and then, in
International Shoe, it became a jurisdiction based on a company’s
corporate-activities-based-contacts with the forum state.364 Justice
Ginsburg’s
test
restricted
the
latter
category
of
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction to the same criteria as
citizenship/domicile jurisdiction, which effectively eliminated the
strand of jurisdiction based on a corporation’s presence/doing
business in the forum state.
Third, the effective elimination of corporate-activities-based
jurisdiction was plainly inconsistent with International Shoe,
Perkins, and Helicopteros. International Shoe clearly approved of
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction, at the very least to the
extent that it was based, on the location of a branch office in the
forum state, which was the case in the previous precedents cited
by the International Shoe Court in support of its description of
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction.365 Justice Ginsburg
dismissed these earlier cases, which were also cited by the
Supreme Court in Perkins, on the ground that the Court’s
“unadorned citations to these cases, both decided in the era
dominated by Pennoyer’s territorial thinking, . . . should not
attract heavy reliance today.”366 The point of these cases, however,
is not that they stand on their own as valid precedents for
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction, but rather that the
363. See generally Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 714–36 (1877) (determining
that a court can exert personal jurisdiction over a party if that party is served
with process while physically present within the state).
364. See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (noting that due process requires only that
a defendant has certain minimum contacts with the forum state in order to
subject him to in personam jurisdiction, and that “maintenance of the suit does
not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice’”).
365. See id. at 318 (“[T]here have been instances in which the continuous
corporate operations within a state were thought so substantial and of such a
nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings
entirely distinct from those activities.”).
366. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 138 n.18 (internal citations omitted).
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International Shoe Court cited them as examples of the kind of
“continuous corporate operations within a state so substantial and
of such a nature as to justify suit . . . on causes of action arising
from dealings entirely distinct from those activities.”367 If the
Supreme Court had thought that International Shoe had ended
doing-business jurisdiction, it would have been easy for the Court
to come right out and say that and limit all-purpose jurisdiction
over corporations to a defendant’s state of incorporation and
principal place of business. The Court did not, however, take that
approach, and instead, clearly recognized that some form of
continuous corporate activity in the forum state could provide a
basis of all-purpose jurisdiction beyond that which was already
allowed by citizenship/domicile jurisdiction.
C. The BNSF Case: The New Standard, But Now with No
Meaningful Exception
In 2017, the Court again addressed personal jurisdiction in
cases where, prior to Goodyear, the lower courts would not have
doubted that the forum state had corporate-activities-based
jurisdiction. In BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell,368 the Court
addressed the railroad’s motions to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction in two cases, one brought by an employee for injuries
suffered on the job and the other by the widow of an employee who
died as the result of exposure to toxic chemicals on the job.369
Neither plaintiff resided in the forum state (Montana), nor did the
events giving rise to the claim take place in that state.370 The
defendant railroad was incorporated in Delaware with its principal
place of business in Texas.371 The Court described the defendant’s
contacts with the forum state as follows:
367. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318.
368. 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017).
369. See id. (consolidating two cases arising under the Federal Employer’s
Liability Act and deciding issues of personal jurisdiction).
370. See id. at 1554 (identifying that one plaintiff resided in North Dakota,
the other in South Dakota, and that the activities giving rise to suit did not occur
in Montana).
371. Id.
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BNSF has 2,061 miles of rail track in Montana (about 6%of its
total track mileage of 32,500), employs some 2100 workers there
(less than 5% of its total workforce of 43,000), generates less
than 10% of its total revenue in the State, and maintains only
one of its 24 automotive facilities in Montana (4%).372

The Court first dealt with the plaintiffs’ contention that the
Federal Employer’s Liability Act (FELA)373 (which makes railroads
liable for damages to their employees for on-the-job injuries)
granted personal jurisdiction over a railroad defendant in any
district “in which the defendant shall be doing business at the time
commencing such action.”374 The Court ruled that the FELA
provision was not intended to grant personal jurisdiction, but
simply to establish where venue was proper and affirm that subject
matter jurisdiction rested concurrently with the federal and state
court systems.375
The Court next assessed plaintiffs’ argument that the state of
Montana had general jurisdiction over the railroad defendant by
virtue of its continuous presence in the forum state. The Court
cited Daimler, Goodyear, and Helicopteros, with respect to the
general distinction between specific and general jurisdiction.376
But with respect to the standard to be applied in general
jurisdiction cases, the Court referred only to Goodyear and Daimler
and limited all-purpose jurisdiction to states where the defendant’s
affiliations with the state are so “continuous and systematic” as to
render them essentially at home in the forum state.377 Once again,
the Court identified the “paradigm” forums in which a corporate
defendant is “at home” as the state of incorporation and principal
place of business.378 Only in an “exceptional case” may a corporate
defendant’s contacts with another state be sufficient to render it at
372. Id.
373. 35 Stat. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51–60 (2012).
374. BNSF Ry., 137 S. Ct. at 1553.
375. See id. at 1556 (relying on the historic regard of such clause as
concerning venue and analyzing jurisdiction as a separate matter).
376. See generally id. (referencing each case to support a discussion of the
distinction between specific and general jurisdiction).
377. See id. at 1558 (citing Daimler, 571 U.S. at 127 (quoting Goodyear, 564
U.S. at 919)).
378. BNSF Ry. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1558 (2017).
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home.379 Because the forum state was neither the defendant
railroad’s state of incorporation nor principal place of business, the
Court had to determine whether the defendant’s contacts made it
an exceptional case.380
The Court discussed this issue by referring to a principle
mentioned only briefly in Daimler:
But, as we observed in Daimler, the general jurisdiction inquiry
does not focus solely on the magnitude of the defendant’s instate contacts. Rather, the inquiry calls for an appraisal of a
corporation’s activities in their entirety; a corporation that
operates in many places can scarcely be deemed to be at home
in all of them.381

After an analysis that was surprisingly truncated, given the
extensive nature of the defendant’s contacts with the forum state,
Justice Ginsburg concluded that “in-state business, we clarified in
Daimler and Goodyear, does not suffice to permit the assertion of
general jurisdiction over claims . . . that are unrelated to any
activity occurring in Montana.”382 The use of the term “clarified”
was somewhat of an understatement, given that the Court was
overruling a doctrine established in three prior Supreme Court
cases along with hundreds of lower court cases.
Justice Sotomayor continued “to disagree with the path the
Court struck in Daimler, which limits general jurisdiction over a
corporate defendant only to those states where it is essentially at
home.”383 Moreover, Justice Sotomayor argued, even accepting the
majority’s standard, the Court should have remanded the case to
the Montana Supreme Court “for it to conduct what should be a
fact-intensive analysis under the proper legal framework.”384
Justice Sotomayor reprised her argument in Daimler that
International Shoe did not warrant the “restrictive ‘at home’ test
set out in Daimler—a test that, as I have explained, has no home
379. Id. (citing Daimler, 571 U.S. at 139 n.19).
380. See id. at 1559 (analyzing BNSF’s contacts and activities within the state
of Montana).
381. Id. at 1559 (internal citations omitted).
382. Id.
383. Id. at 1560 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
384. Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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in our precedents and cerates serious inequities.”385 Indeed, Justice
Sotomayor argued,
The majority’s approach grants a jurisdictional windfall to large
multi-state or multi-national corporations that operate across
many jurisdictions. Under its reasoning, it is virtually
inconceivable that such corporations will ever be subject to
general jurisdiction in any location other than their principal
places of business or of incorporation. Foreign businesses with
principal places of business outside the United States may
never be subject to general jurisdiction in this country even
though they have continuous and systematic contacts within
the United States.386

Justice Sotomayor once again acknowledged the lower court
cases that Justice Ginsburg had repeatedly ignored: “[L]ower
courts had adhered to the continuous-and-systematic standards
for decades before Daimler, and its predecessor Goodyear, wrought
the present sea change.”387
In particular, Justice Sotomayor continued to take issue with
the majority’s attention to the size of defendant’s contacts in the
forum state relative to its contacts with other states. As Justice
Sotomayor noted, neither Perkins nor Helicopteros applied a
comparative analysis that analyzed defendant’s contacts with the
forum state against its contacts with other states.388

385. Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
386. Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
387. Id. at 1560 n.1 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted);
see generally, e.g., Judy M. Cornett & Michael H. Hoffheimer, Goodbye Significant
Contacts: General Personal Jurisdiction after Daimler AG v. Bauman, 76 OHIO
ST. L.J. 101 (2015) (examining the state of the law related to personal jurisdiction
and arguing that the Court has limited traditional power of states to too great an
extent); John T. Parry, Rethinking Personal Jurisdiction After Bauman and
Walden, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 607, 616 (2015) (discussing how the Court has
approached analysis of contacts with the state for general jurisdiction); Donald L.
Doernberg, Resoling International Shoe, 2 TEX. A&M L. Rev. 247, 278,(2014)
(asserting that while the Court tried to limit general jurisdiction, it rather opened
the door to more jurisdiction related litigation); Meir Feder, Goodyear, “Home,”
and the Uncertain Future of Doing Business Jurisdiction, 73 S.C. L. REV. 671, 672
(2012) (noting that the stated essentially at home standard articulated in
Goodyear “casts doubt on a large body of lower court case law”).
388. See BNSF Ry. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1561 (2017) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting) (stating that no comparative analysis was applied).
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Finally, Justice Sotomayor cut to the core meaning of Justice
Ginsburg’s analysis in the case:
The majority does even Daimler itself a disservice, paying only
lip service to the question the Court purported to reserve
there—the possibility of an “exceptional case” in which general
jurisdiction would be proper in a forum State that is neither a
corporation defendant’s place of incorporation nor its principal
place of business. Its opinion here could be understood to limit the
exception to the exact facts of Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated
Mining Co. . . . . That reading is so narrow as to read the exception
out of existence entirely; certainly a defendant with significant
contacts with more than one State falls outside its
ambit. . . . Despite having reserved the possibility of an
“exceptional case” in Daimler, the majority here has rejected that
possibility out of hand.389
That summary seems to have captured the essence of the
BNSF case. The Court proceeded from the hint of a new and more
restrictive standard in Goodyear to a clear enunciation of that
more restrictive standard in Daimler but with the possibility of
exceptions to that standard, to BNSF, in which the Court limited
the possibility of an exception to the facts of Perkins, which makes
it all but impossible to establish all-purpose dispute-blind
jurisdiction over any corporation outside of the state where it is
incorporated or has its principal place of business. Few, other than
von Mehren and Trautman, had advocated for such a strict
standard, and even those who had advocated for a somewhat
stricter standard for corporate-activities-based jurisdiction before
Goodyear had conditioned such support upon a much broader
interpretation of specific jurisdiction.390 The Supreme Court,
however, dashed any hopes for such expansion of specific
jurisdiction less than a month after the BNSF decision was issued.

389. Id. at 1561–62 (internal citations omitted).
390. See von Mehren & Trautaman, supra note 9 (proposing a new system of
terminology to address jurisdictional issues).
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D. Bristol-Myers Squibb: Corporate-Activities-Based Jurisdiction
Eliminated, with No Expansion of Specific Jurisdiction
In Bristol-Myers Squibb Company v. Superior Court,391 the
Supreme Court reviewed a California Supreme Court decision
denying the corporate defendant’s motion to dismiss, on personal
jurisdiction grounds, products liability suits against the defendant
in connection with its sale of the blood thinning drug, Plavix.392
Five hundred and ninety-two residents of states outside of
California had joined eighty-six California residents in eight
separate suits in California Superior Court.393 Defendant BMS
moved to dismiss the nonresidents’ claims on the ground that
California did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant
with respect to those claims.394
The trial court initially denied defendant’s motion on the
ground that the California courts had general jurisdiction over the
defendant because it “engages in extensive activities in
California.”395 The California intermediate appellate court denied
defendant’s writ of mandamus, but after the Supreme Court’s
decision in Daimler, the California Supreme Court ordered the
intermediate appellate court “to vacate its order denying the
mandate.”396 At that point, the intermediate appellate court held
that there was no general jurisdiction after the Supreme Court’s
Daimler decision but that the California courts had specific
jurisdiction over all of the claims.397
The California Supreme Court upheld jurisdiction based upon
a “sliding scale approach to specific jurisdiction” that blended the
391. 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017).
392. Id. at 1777–78.
393. See id. at 1778 (describing how plaintiffs gathered and asserted a variety
of state-law claims in California Superior Court based on alleged injuries from
the drug produced by Bristol-Myers Squibb).
394. See id. (“Asserting lack of personal jurisdiction, BMS moved to quash
service of summons on the nonresidents’ claims . . . .”).
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. See id. (“Under Daimler, it held, general jurisdiction was clearly lacking,
but it went on to find that the California courts had specific jurisdiction over the
nonresidents’ claims against [Bristol-Myers Squibb].”).
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minimum contacts categories.398 Using a flexible approach
advocated by commentators who favored broader specific
jurisdiction, the California Supreme Court ruled that “the more
wide-ranging the defendant’s forum contacts the more readily is
shown a connection between the forum contacts and the claim.”399
Because BMS had extensive contacts with the forum state, specific
jurisdiction was permissible even though the connection between
the non-residents’ claims in California was more attenuated than
might otherwise be required for specific jurisdiction.400
Interestingly, the California court did not even address the
question of whether there was general jurisdiction over BMS in
California. Prior to Goodyear, it is doubtful that a corporation as
large as BMS would have even challenged the assertion of
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction in California. The company
maintained five of its research and laboratory facilities in
California with a total 160 employees.401 In addition, BMS
employed “250 sales representatives in California and
maintain[ed] a small state-government advocacy office in
Sacramento.”402 Between 2006 and 2012 it sold almost 187 million
Plavix pills in the state of California and took in more than
$900,000,000 from those sales, which amounted to “a little over one
percent of the company’s nation-wide sales revenue.”403 This was
precisely the kind of continuous and systematic contacts with the
forum state that, prior to Goodyear, lower courts typically found
more than adequate for the assertion of general jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Alito,
acknowledged that the “primary concern” in determining whether
there is personal jurisdiction is “the burden on the defendant,” and
398. Id.
399. Id.
400. See id. at 1779 (“[T]he majority concluded that ‘BMS’s extensive contacts
with California’ permitted the exercise of specific jurisdiction ‘based on a less
direct connection between BMS’s forum activities and plaintiffs’ claims than
might otherwise be required.’”).
401. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1778
(2017) (describing the facilities that Bristol-Myers Squibb maintained in
California).
402. Id.
403. Id.
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that assessing the burden “obviously requires a court to consider
the practical problems resulting from litigating in the
forum . . . .”404 In addition, however, the limitations on personal
jurisdiction also “encompasses the more abstract matter of
submitting to the coercive power of a State that may have little
legitimate interest in the claims in question.”405 The contacts
requirements are, as the Court stated in Hanson v. Denckla, “a
consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the
respective states.”406
The question remained, however, why should the territorial
boundaries of states require any particular contacts between the
defendant and the forum state rather than simply some minimum
level of state interest in the particular controversy? To answer that
question, the majority opinion surprisingly returned to the
discredited and repudiated language of World-Wide Volkswagen:
The states retain many essential attributes of sovereignty,
including, in particular, the sovereign power to try causes in
their courts. The sovereignty of each state . . . . implies a
limitation on the sovereignty of all its sister states. And at times
this federalism interest may be decisive. As we explained in
World-Wide Volkswagen, “[e]ven if the defendant would suffer
minimal or no inconvenience from being forced to litigate before
the tribunals of another state; even if the forum State has a
strong interest in applying its law to the controversy, even if the
forum State is the most convenient location for litigation, the
Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate
federalism, may sometimes act to divest the State of its power
to render a valid judgment.”407

That statement, however, was wrong when the Court made it
in World-Wide Volkswagen, and the Court correctly repudiated it
in the Insurance Company of Ireland case.408 Recall that, in that
case, Justice White acknowledged that the minimum contacts
requirement “is a restriction on judicial power not as a matter of
404. Id. at 1780.
405. Id.
406. Id. (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958)).
407. Id. at 1780–81 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286, 294 (1980)) (internal citations omitted) (alterations in original).
408. Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites De Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702
n.10 (1982).

CATEGORICAL CONFUSION

745

sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty.”409 Justice White
had to back down on his earlier statements in the World-Wide
Volkswagen case because the Due Process Clause is the “only
source of the personal jurisdiction requirement” and “the clause
makes no mention of federalism concerns.”410 As Justice White
further noted, this conclusion was further reinforced by the fact
that personal jurisdiction may be waived by individual defendants,
which would not be allowed if the requirement involved issues of
structural federalism beyond the rights of individual
defendants.411
The Court’s ill-advised return to the discredited theory of
World-Wide Volkswagen suggests that the Court at least
recognizes there is some need to provide a theoretical justification
for the contacts-based limitations on state court jurisdiction. The
fact that the Court would return to the discredited theory of
interstate federalism suggests how difficult it is to come up with a
theoretical reason to justify these substantive due process
restrictions that have been a part of the Court’s personal
jurisdiction doctrine ever since Pennoyer. Clearly the Court
recognizes that some theoretical grounding is necessary: it simply
flounders, however, when it comes to linking the test to any theory
of individual due process rights. As discussed below, it may be that
interstate federalism is the best theoretical foundation for rules
regarding personal jurisdiction within the United States, but, if
that is so, the proper source for such restrictions is not the Due
Process Clause but rather federal common law rules created under
the authority of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
With respect to the requirements for specific jurisdiction, the
Court refused to budge from the rigid requirement that there must
be “an affiliation between the forum and the underlying
controversy, principally, [an] activity or an occurrence that takes
place in the forum State and is therefore subject to the state’s
regulation.”412 Therefore, “specific jurisdiction is confined to
409. Id. at 702.
410. Id. at 702 n.10.
411. Id.
412. Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1780 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)).
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adjudication of issues deriving from, or connected with, the very
controversy that establishes jurisdiction.”413 “When there is no
such connection, specific jurisdiction is lacking regardless of the
extent of a defendant’s unconnected activities in the State.”414
Thus, the Court tolerated no departure from a strict
categorical analysis of contacts jurisdiction as compensation for
the new restrictive standard for all-purpose dispute-blind
jurisdiction. Specific jurisdiction requires that each plaintiff have
a claim that arises out of the defendant’s contact with the forum
state, without regard to any other contacts that the defendant
might have with the forum. California’s proposed “sliding scale
approach” could not satisfy the Supreme Court’s strict
guidelines.415 The Court stood fast on prior cases, which “provide
no support for this approach, which resembles a loose and spurious
form of general jurisdiction. For specific jurisdiction, a defendant’s
general connections with the forum are not enough.”416
Most distressingly for potential plaintiffs, the Court ruled that
even BMS’s contract with a California company (McKesson) to
distribute Plavix nationally did not provide a sufficient basis for
specific jurisdiction.417 That conclusion is particularly problematic
because the Court in McIntyre held that a foreign corporation’s use
of an Ohio distributor to sell its machines in the United States did
not allow specific jurisdiction over a product liability claim in New
Jersey, where the machine was ultimately sold and where the
machine injured the plaintiff.418 Commentators after McIntyre
speculated that, even though there was no general jurisdiction over
the defendant in the United States and even though there was no
specific jurisdiction over the defendant in New Jersey, there might
be specific jurisdiction in Ohio where the distributor was located.
The decision in BMS at least hints that jurisdiction in the state of

413. Id. (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S.
915, 919 (2011)).
414. Id. at 1781.
415. Id.
416. Id.
417. Id. at 1783.
418. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 887 (2011).
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the distributor would be unavailing even if a plaintiff could not sue
the manufacturer in the state in which the plaintiff was injured.
Justice Sotomayor once again dissented in the case. First,
Justice Sotomayor accepted the plaintiff’s concession that there
was no general jurisdiction over the defendant even though she
continued to “believe the restrictions the Court imposed on general
jurisdiction in Daimler were ill advised.”419 She also found that
there was “nothing unfair about subjecting a massive corporation
to suit in a State for a nationwide course of conduct that injures
both forum residents and non-residents alike.”420 Justice
Sotomayor pointed to the specific jurisdiction requirement that a
plaintiff’s claim must “‘arise out of or relate to’ the defendant’s
forum conduct.”421 Justice Sotomayor argued that a claim relates
to a defendant’s forum conduct if it has a connection with that
conduct and that, in the BMS case, the out-of-state plaintiffs’
claims “concern conduct materially identical to acts the company
took in California: its marketing and distribution of Plavix, which
it undertook on a nationwide basis in all 50 states.”422
Most importantly for our discussion here, Justice Sotomayor
worried about how the Court’s decision would affect the practical
ability of plaintiffs to seek efficient redress for their claims. “Such
a rule hands one more tool to corporate defendants determined to
prevent the aggregation of individual claims, and forces injured
plaintiffs to bear the burden of bringing suit in what will often be
far flung jurisdictions.”423 In addition, she noted, some cases find
no domestic forum at all, notwithstanding the majority opinion’s
assertion that plaintiffs would be protected by the ability to sue in
at least the jurisdiction where a corporation was incorporated or
had its principal place of business. Justice Sotomayor worried that
“a defendant not headquartered or incorporated in the United
States . . . is not ‘at home’ in any state . . . . Especially in a world
in which defendants are subject to general jurisdiction in only a
419. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1785 n.2 (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
420. Id. at 1784 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
421. Id. at 1786 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984)).
422. Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
423. Id. at 1789 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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handful of States, the effect of today’s opinion will be to
curtail—and in some cases eliminate—plaintiff’s ability to hold
corporations fully accountable for their nationwide conduct.”424
The significance of Bristol-Meyers Squibb is two-fold. First,
major national corporations, whose continuous and systematic
contacts with virtually every state in the United States would
previously
have
resulted
in
unquestioned
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction in those states, now may be
sued only in their principal place of business or the state in which
they are incorporated. The Court protected these corporations
notwithstanding the absence of any explanation from the Court as
to why it violates the due process rights of such a large corporation
to be sued in a state with which it has continuous and systematic
connections. Second, the Court not only has virtually eliminated
continuous-corporate-activities jurisdiction—it has also failed to
ameliorate the contraction by allowing more generous assertions
of specific jurisdiction. As previously noted, the principal advocates
for a narrower reading of corporate-activities-based jurisdiction
(who, in any event, did not propose restricting it as much the Court
now has) conditioned their recommendation on the understanding
that the Court would fill the gap by expanding the scope of specific
jurisdiction.425 As a result, the Court has made life considerably
more difficult for individual plaintiffs and considerably easier for
corporate defendants.
V. The Theoretical and Practical Problems with the Court’s
Current Personal Jurisdiction Standards
After the Supreme Court’s recent personal jurisdiction cases,
we are left with an even bigger theoretical, doctrinal, and practical
mess. First, the Court has enunciated no theoretical basis for
implying a substantive due process standard that requires
contacts of any sort between the defendant and the forum state,
and even if we can hypothesize some theoretical foundation, it
would not require the elimination of jurisdiction based on a
424. Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
425. See Brilmayer, How Contacts Count, supra note 166, at 112–13;
Twitchell, supra note 60, at 212–13.
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corporation’s corporate-activities-based with the forum state.
Second,
the
Court’s
recent
evisceration
of
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction is an unwarranted and
doctrinally unsound departure from prior Supreme Court
precedent.
Third,
the
Court’s
elimination
of
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction, coupled with the addition of
significant new constraints on specific jurisdiction, create many
practical problems for individual plaintiffs, while at the same time
giving a huge tactical advantage to corporate defendants. Finally,
given these problems caused by the Court’s recent cases, one must
ask why the Court would take this approach and why, of all the
Justice’s, Justice Ginsburg would lead the Court in that direction.
A. The Court’s Current Substantive Due Process Contacts
Requirements Are Theoretically Threadbare
Before the Court imposes significant new substantive due
process limitations on personal jurisdiction, it should satisfy the
high burden necessary to support substantive constraints on state
authority pursuant to a clause that speaks clearly only to
procedure. The contacts requirements that originated in Pennoyer
are the sole remaining relic of the Supreme Court’s 19th century
substantive due process cases. Based upon this heritage alone, the
contacts requirement is suspect. As Erwin Chermerinsky has
noted, “the very idea of substantive due process has been
contested. The argument is that due process denotes procedures
and that it is incorrect to use the due process clause as the place
for protecting substantive rights.”426 Indeed, the points made by
Chief Justice Hughes in overruling Lochner and the concept of
economic substantive due process might just as well apply to
jurisdictional substantive due process: “The Constitution does not
speak of freedom of contract. It speaks of liberty and prohibits the
deprivation of liberty without due process of law . . . . [R]egulation
which is reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in the
interest of the community is due process.”427
426. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
559 (4th ed. 2011).
427. W. Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937).
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The considerable constraints on the procedural fairness of a
state court’s adjudication are more than sufficient to protect the
rights of defendants. In general, procedural due process in the
context of civil litigation requires a balancing of the state’s interest
in allowing for speedy and expeditious resolution of legal disputes
against the impact on a defendant’s ability to present and argue
his case before being deprived of his property.428 In the context of
a state’s assertion of personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the
Supreme Court has established a multi-part analysis that requires
a court to balance the burden on a defendant of litigating a case in
the forum state against the interest of the forum in adjudicating
the claim at issue, the need of the plaintiff for that particular
forum, the convenience of the interest of the interstate system of
justice in resolving the dispute in a convenient and expeditious
fashion, and any potential impact on substantive law.429
It is easy to justify this procedural due process standard,
which is more than adequate to prevent jurisdictional
overreaching by state courts. For example, the Daimler case could
have reached the same result based simply upon this procedural
due process standard. In that case the burden on even a large
corporation like Daimler was significant because it would have
been forced to defend in California state court a claim dealing with
facts and witnesses from Argentina. This significant burden was
counterbalanced by no interest in the case on the part of the state
of California or its court system. Similarly, plaintiffs had no
compelling need to utilize the California courts, other than simply
to obtain a more beneficial substantive legal standard than would
have been available to them elsewhere. Finally, the witnesses and
evidence could not be conveniently marshaled in a California trial
court. The Daimler case would have been as easy to dismiss on
procedural due process grounds as was the Asahi case, in which
428. See, e.g., Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950)
(discussing notice as a requirement of due process and establishing a standard
that notice must be reasonably calculated to apprise the defendant of a proceeding
in which he might be deprived of a property interest).
429. See generally World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286
(1980); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1965); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480
U.S. 102 (1987).
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the Court utilized a similar procedural due process analysis to
deny California jurisdiction over a claim that had little connection
to the forum state and in which California had no significant
interest.430
Once a defendant is protected by this robust procedural due
process standard, there is little reason to see why a defendant
would need any substantive due process contacts standard to
prevent unjust state action. It is difficult to conjure any theoretical
foundation for the claim that the due process rights of a
corporation as large as BMS are violated if it must defend in
California state court the claims of out-of-state defendants
alongside those of in-state defendants.
The Supreme Court’s recent decisions are striking proof of the
theoretical barrenness of the contacts requirement. On the rare
occasion that the court attempts to offer some theoretical
explanation, it repeatedly turns to concepts of interstate
federalism that would be at home in an analysis under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, but which have no place in the analysis
of a constitutional provision that is an individual right waivable by
the
defendant.
The
academic
critics
of
expansive
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction (none of whom advocated for
a standard as strict as Justice Ginsburg’s) seem to assume that the
burden is on a state to show why such a form of all-purpose
dispute-blind jurisdiction is acceptable. Although such a question
might be appropriate in considering what forms of jurisdiction to
authorize as a legislative and policy matter, in the context of
substantive due process restrictions on state power, it flips the
appropriate burden on its head to assume that some form of
substantive due process contact standard is necessary unless a
state can articulate a persuasive theory about why such
jurisdiction is reasonable.431 The critics never state, however, why
the Due Process Clause requires states to establish a basis for
requiring any particular types of contact between a defendant and
the forum state. This is not to say, however, that the Due Process
Clause requires no theoretical foundation at all for a state’s
430. See Asahi Metal Indus., 480 U.S. at 113–16.
431. See, e.g., Twitchell, supra note 60, at 172–76; Brilmayer, supra note 247,
at 726–27.
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assertion of jurisdictional power. Instead, it is to state simply that
the justification is contained in the procedural due process test,
which requires the state to establish a sufficient interest in the
subject matter of the litigation to warrant the burden of subjecting
the defendant to the jurisdiction of the forum state’s courts.
The preeminence of substantive due process factors stems
from Justice Field’s bald assertion, that due process required
particular types of contacts with the forum state in order to permit
the assertion of personal jurisdiction, which placed the sole focus
of jurisdictional decision-making on contacts rather than on
procedural fairness. That focus did not begin to include procedural
considerations until after International Shoe,432 and it wasn’t until
Kulko v. Superior Court433 that the Supreme Court laid out the
procedural due process requirements in any detail. Thus, it is not
surprising that Justice Field led everyone to focus on the
substantive due process context requirement rather than
procedural fairness. If we flip that preference for the contacts
requirement over the procedural fairness requirement, the
theoretical justification for a state’s assertion of jurisdictional
power rests on whatever interest is sufficient to satisfy the
procedural due process test. Then the question is why any
additional contacts requirement is necessary in order to justify a
state’s assertion of its right to hear a particular case.
Moreover, even if one accepts the notion that there needs to be
some contacts requirement in order to satisfy the Due Process
Clause, the contacts part of the due process analysis should not
come first. Many of the substantive due process concerns posited
by jurisdictional theorists disappear if one assumes that a state
would have to satisfy the procedural due process test before
proceeding to analyze the contacts requirement. The only reason
that courts and commentators analyze the contacts requirement
first is because of the historical accident (one might say mistake)
that the Pennoyer Court created a jurisdictional test based on
contacts alone and not procedural fairness. Because the Court
432. Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 317 (“An estimate of the inconveniences which
would result to the corporation from a trial away from its home or principal place
of business is relevant in this connection.”).
433. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
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added procedural fairness as a separate requirement, decades
after the Pennoyer opinion, the courts and commentators continue
to treat that aspect of personal jurisdiction as an afterthought. If,
however, one begins with the procedural due process test as a
threshold, many of the theoretical questions about all-purpose
jurisdiction disappear.
Take a look at Professor Twitchell’s statement of the problem
as an example:
The principle of doing-business jurisdiction seems simple on the
surface: the defendant business has such strong ties with the
state that it may be sued there on any cause of action. What is
particularly troubling about the doctrine is the notion that a
forum can hear any claim asserted against a defendant having
regular and consistent commercial activities in the forum, no
matter how removed the facts of the claim are from those
activities. Why do we give a forum this power?434

The question raised by Professor Twitchell is only a problem if
we begin with a contacts analysis and assume no procedural due
process analysis is a part of the test. If one begins with the
procedural due process analysis, then it is clear that, even under a
doing-business form of all-purpose, dispute-blind jurisdiction, a
forum will not be able to hear any claim asserted against a
defendant. If the state has no legitimate interest in the litigation,
then the burden on the defendant of litigating away from its
principal place of business will not be justified. Therefore, any
substantive due process theory about whether “doing-business” is
sufficient should consider only those forums where the litigation
would be fair as a matter of procedural due process. This
eliminates the concern, frequently expressed by proponents of a
more rigid substantive due process contacts standard, that
expansive doing-business jurisdiction permits plaintiffs to forum
shop in every state without regard to the issue of whether the state
has a legitimate interest in the case.
The reason that the procedural due process case so rarely
determines the outcome of modern personal jurisdiction litigation
is not that the theory is unable to do the hard work of filtering
cases where a state has no legitimate interests in adjudicating a
434.

Twitchell, supra note 60, at 173 (emphasis added).
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claim, but rather that the substantive due process contacts
requirement is always addressed first and is so restrictive that the
procedural due process analysis is almost always an
afterthought.435 If the personal jurisdiction analysis were flipped,
and the procedural due process test were seriously addressed first,
the substantive due process contacts requirements would have
relatively less work to do in the personal jurisdiction analysis.
Academic advocates of a restrictive (though not nearly as
restrictive
as
Justice
Ginsburg’s)
approach
to
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction fail to justify the need for
significant due process restrictions. For example, Lea Brilmayer’s
“insider” analysis posits that general doing-business jurisdiction is
warranted only when a corporation “is enough of an ‘insider’ that
he may safely be relegated to the state’s political processes.”436
Professor Brilmayer expanded on this theory in a later article:
To the extent that defending in one’s domicile is convenient,
litigating where one carries on continuous and systematic
activities is also likely to be convenient. Similarly, allowing suit
where the defendant is so engaged serves the plaintiff’s
convenience by providing a more definite forum; indeed, a test
that focuses on continuous and systematic activities eliminates
the uncertainty of proving which of several places is the
defendant’s principal place of business. More importantly, the
reciprocal benefits rationale obtains when the defendant carries
out substantial activities which implicate the police powers and
public facilities of the state.437

The “benefits” rationale makes sense, even standing on its own
without the additional theoretical notion that it is important for a
corporation to be an “insider.” Whether a corporation has enough
contacts with a state to be considered an “insider” seems relevant
to the question of whether a state is warranted in applying its own
substantive law to that corporation. A corporation would clearly
care about the substantive standards that govern its actions and
would have an incentive to lobby the legislature on such an issue.
435. The Asahi case is the only Supreme Court case in which personal
jurisdiction has been denied solely on the basis of the absence of procedural
fairness. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co., 280 U.S. at 113–16.
436. Brilmayer, How Contacts Count, supra note 166, at 87.
437. Brilmayer, supra note 247, at 741.
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It seems much less clear, however, how insider status affects the
question of personal jurisdiction. It is not at all clear that an
insider would have either influence or an advantage over a
non-insider with respect to its ability to litigate contested cases
effectively. As a practical matter, choice-of-law questions involving
the applicability of substantive legal standards are far more likely
to have an impact on corporate defendants than jurisdictional
questions, but as noted earlier, the substantive due process
constraints on choice of law are far less than the constraints on
personal jurisdiction.
Professor Twitchell has criticized the reciprocal benefits
rationale on the ground that, although it works well for specific
jurisdiction because of the proportionality of the risks of litigation
and benefit to the defendant, there is “no equivalent
proportionality for an activities-based general jurisdiction.
Regular and continuous activity in the forum may benefit the
defendant in many regards, but this alone does not justify the
burden of unlimited jurisdictional exposure in that forum.”438 Once
again, however, this assertion makes sense only if one applies the
substantive due process contacts test first, without regard to the
procedural due process analysis. If one applies the procedural due
process analysis first, then the potential imposition on a corporate
defendant is much less because the state would only be able to
assert jurisdiction in cases where it had enough of an interest to
outweigh the burden on the defendant. The ongoing continuous
benefit of operating within the forum state is more than enough to
justify this more limited expectation.
Other academic commentators have somewhat stricter
theoretical grounds for doing-business jurisdiction. For example,
Allan Stein has argued that the proper standard for doing-business
jurisdiction is whether the defendant has “adopted” the state as its
sovereign.439 This would warrant a standard requiring “pervasive
and systematic contacts” to determine whether the defendant has
indeed “adopted the forum as its sovereign. Has it, for most other
purposes, treated the forum as its home, notwithstanding its
438. Twitchell, supra note 60, at 175–76.
439. See Allan Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate Federalism in the Law
of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 TEX. L. REV. 689, 758 (1987).
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domicile elsewhere?”440 In a similar vein, Sarah Cebik has
suggested that the theoretical question is whether a state has an
interest in the defendant that would be recognized by other states
if they all agreed on a standard for general jurisdiction:
If [a state] claims to have an interest in the defendant . . . that
interest must somehow be related to its function as the
determiner of rights and duties. Thus, “interest” in the
defendant [that is sufficient for corporate-activities-based
jurisdiction] is legitimate if the state would have a reason to be
concerned about the rights and duties of the defendant under
any circumstances . . . . The point at which a state will be
concerned with the rights and duties of a defendant under any
and all circumstances is not immediately obvious.441

These theoretical arguments seem much too close to concerns
about the rights of one state versus another state rather than the
individual rights that are guaranteed by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. These concerns about how one
state would regard the jurisdictional claims of another state seem
much more relevant to questions involving the Full Faith and
Credit Clause rather than the Due Process Clause. Such questions
might be relevant with respect to the formulation of a common law
standard for enforcement of judgments or a national venue rule,
which could be established by Congress pursuant to its authority
under the Full Faith Credit Clause. They seem out of place,
however, in a discussion about a defendant’s due process rights,
particularly if one assumes that a court could not allow a state to
exercise corporate-activities-based jurisdiction in the absence of an
interest that justifies the imposition of the burden on the corporate
defendant.

440. Id.
441. Sarah Cebik, “A Riddle Wrapped in a Mystery Inside an Enigma”:
General Personal Jurisdiction and Notions of Sovereignty, 1998 ANN. SURV. AM.
L. 1, 33 (1998).
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B. How the Categorical Ambiguity of the Term “General
Jurisdiction” Led to the Demise of Corporate-Activities-Based
Jurisdiction
Any discussion of how the Court created a doctrine of
all-purpose dispute-blind jurisdiction that essentially eliminates
the
formerly
well-established
category
of
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction must begin with a
discussion of the law review article in which the terms general and
specific jurisdiction originated.442 Professors von Mehren and
Trautman approached the question of personal jurisdiction as
comparative law scholars. Their article was “an expanded version
of a paper entitled ‘Determination Of The Competent Court In
Private International Law: The American Approach,’ prepared for
the Seventh International Congress of Comparative Law, to be
held under the auspices of the International Academy of
Comparative Law at Uppsala, Sweden in August 1966.”443 The
authors analyzed the issues of personal jurisdiction using the
generally accepted comparative law term, “adjudicatory
jurisdiction.”444 The article analyzed jurisdictional questions not
just in terms of constitutional due process limitations, but also in
terms of the policy considerations that should underlie assertions
of jurisdiction.445 It is important to understand the authors’
comparative law perspective in order to appreciate the goals they
were trying to accomplish. Their goal in writing the paper was to
explain why the terms that traditionally had categorized personal
jurisdiction (like in personam, in rem and quasi in rem) served no
purpose in the modern analytical context.446 After criticizing the
use of these traditional terms, von Mehren and Trautman stated:
A further difficulty with current terminology is its failure to
distinguish between the kinds of controversies appropriately
adjudicated on the basis of a particular ground of jurisdiction.
In American thinking, affiliations between the forum and the
442.
443.
444.
445.
446.

See generally von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 9.
Id. at 1121 n.d1.
See id. at 1125.
Id. at 1121.
See id. at 1135–36.
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underlying controversy normally support the power to
adjudicate with respect to issues deriving from, or connected
with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction to
adjudicate. This we call specific jurisdiction. On the other hand,
American practice for the most part is to exercise power to
adjudicate any kind of controversy when jurisdiction is based on
relationships, direct or indirect between the forum and the
person or persons whose legal rights are to be affected. This we
call general jurisdiction.447

In using the term general jurisdiction, von Mehren and
Trautman were referring to that term in the larger sense of all
dispute-blind jurisdiction and not to corporate doing-business
jurisdiction,
which,
after
International
Shoe,
became
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction (and which was confusingly
termed general jurisdiction by most cases and commentators).
This point is reinforced by von Mehren and Trautman’s
subsequent discussion of the different categories of general
jurisdiction, which included domicile, presence, and consent.448 In
discussing the special problems in applying these categories to
corporations, the authors first noted that the easiest form of
general jurisdiction to justify in the corporate context was the
corporate equivalent of domicile:
From the beginning in American practice, general adjudicatory
jurisdiction over corporations and other legal persons could be
exercised by the community with which the legal person had its
closest and most continuing and factual connections. The
community that chartered the corporation and in which it has
its head office occupies a position somewhat analogous to that
of the community of a natural person’s domicile and habitual
residence.449

Under von Mehren’s and Trautman’s analysis, the term
general jurisdiction described the large category that included all
exercises of dispute-blind jurisdiction. The classic or “paradigm”
form of this larger concept of general jurisdiction was the corporate
equivalent of citizenship, i.e., a corporation’s state of incorporation
and principal place of business.
447.
448.
449.

Id. at 1136.
Id. at 1137.
Id. at 1141.
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Von Mehren and Trautman, however, also recognized a
separate category of all-purpose dispute-blind general jurisdiction,
which they described as “jurisdiction only with respect to activities
connected with the forum community.”450 The authors recognized
that there were decisions, including International Shoe, in which
the “Supreme Court seems to have permitted the exercise of
jurisdiction with respect to activities largely though perhaps not
totally unconnected with the forum community.”451 The authors
also recognized that the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws,
relying on the Supreme Court’s Perkins decision, concluded that a
state could exercise judicial jurisdiction over a corporation that
does business within its borders as to causes of action unrelated to
that business if the corporation’s activities in the state are
sufficiently continuous and substantial to make the exercise of
such jurisdiction reasonable. Thus, general jurisdiction may be
based upon a corporation’s “doing business” in the forum state the
separate category based upon state of incorporation principal place
of business.452
Significantly, however, von Mehren and Trautman were not
happy about that result. They strongly preferred and advocated for
jurisdictional rules that depended more on specific jurisdiction
than on any form of general jurisdiction. They expressed their hope
this way:
Against the background of increasingly refined thinking about
specific jurisdiction to adjudicate and despite the Ohio court’s
language on remand, the Perkins case should be regarded as a
decision on its exceptional facts, not as a significant
reaffirmation of obsolescing notions of general jurisdiction.453

Von Mehren and Trautman clearly preferred a jurisdictional
future in which the doing-business and “presence-based” forms of
general jurisdiction would diminish in significance or disappear,
but also where the scope of specific jurisdiction would be greatly
expanded. Thus, the authors stated:
450. Id. at 1142.
451. Id. at 1143.
452. Id. at 1144 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT
Reporter’s Note (Tent. Draft no. 3, 1956)).
453. von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 9, at 1144.
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The landscape that we have surveyed will gradually change; in
particular, specific jurisdiction will come into sharper relief and
form a considerably more significant part of the scene. At the
same time, the contours of present forms of specific jurisdiction
will be modified substantially and entirely new forms may
emerge. And if such a development does occur, there should be
repercussions elsewhere; some of the principal bases of
jurisdiction of the past may become exceptional and occasional
devices. Thus, limited general jurisdiction should erode and
perhaps ultimately disappear, as should such doubtful bases of
general jurisdiction as the defendant’s presence.454

Thus, while von Mehren and Trautman hoped that
doing-business jurisdiction, as a form of jurisdiction based on
defendant’s presence in the forum state, would diminish, they also
had very ambitious expectations for the expansion of specific
jurisdiction.
When the plaintiff’s activities are highly localized in New York,
and when litigation convenience so requires, we believe that the
plaintiff should be able to call the defendant to New York even
though the defendant has engaged in no activity in New York
and had not anticipated that his multi-state activity might
produce consequences in New York. It is enough in assessing
the relative fairness to plaintiff and defendant that the plaintiff
whose affairs are essentially local has been injured by the
activity of a defendant who has involved himself in multi-state
activity.455

Needless to say, specific jurisdiction not only has failed to
move in the direction hoped by Professors von Mehren and
Trautman, it has retreated in the opposite direction.
When Lea Brilmayer took her “general look at general
jurisdiction,” she followed largely in the footsteps of Professors von
Mehren and Trautman. Like her predecessors, Professor
Brilmayer discussed general jurisdiction in the broad sense of all
dispute-blind personal jurisdiction.456 Also like her predecessors,
Brilmayer found all-purpose jurisdiction based on a corporation’s
state of incorporation and principal place of business to be the
corporate equivalent of the domicile subcategory of general
454.
455.
456.

Id. at 1164.
Id. at 1172.
See Brilmayer, supra note 247, at 721.
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jurisdiction in the larger sense.457 So, when Professor Brilmayer
wrote that the state of incorporation and principal place of
business were the “paradigm bases for general jurisdiction,” she
was not referring to the kind of general jurisdiction being discussed
in cases like Helicopteros, which is a separate subcategory of the
larger category of all-purpose jurisdiction based on a corporation’s
continuous and substantial contacts with the forum state.458
Unlike Justice Ginsburg, however, Professor Brilmayer
recognized that a separate category of general all-purpose
dispute-blind jurisdiction existed based on the activities of a
corporation within the forum state.459 Such activities-based
general jurisdiction “requires proof of continuous and systematic
activities.”460 For that point, Professor Brilmayer cited
“Helicopteros, holding that continuous and systematic activities
between the defendant and forum were necessary to establish
jurisdiction over a claim unrelated to those activities.”461
Significantly, Professor Brilmayer concluded that courts “should
not treat defendants as less amenable to suit merely because they
carry on more substantial business in other states . . . The amount
of activity elsewhere seems virtually irrelevant to any of the
convenience or fairness policies underlying the imposition of
general jurisdiction over a defendant . . . . [F]or purposes of
general jurisdiction, the relevant issue is the absolute amount of
activity, not the activity relative to what the defendant does
outside the state.”462
Justice Ginsburg, however, misapplied the description of the
paradigm forms of the larger meaning of general jurisdiction as
all-purpose dispute-blind jurisdiction to cases involving an entirely
distinct subset of the larger category of dispute-blind general
jurisdiction. By eventually limiting the subcategory of
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction to cases involving the
separate category of citizenship or domicile jurisdiction, Justice
457.
458.
459.
460.
461.
462.

Id. at 733.
Id. at 735.
Id.
Id. at 735–36.
Id. at 736 n.70.
Id. at 742–43.
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Ginsburg
effectively
eliminated
corporate-activities-based
jurisdiction as a separate subset of the larger general jurisdiction,
erasing the type of jurisdiction clearly discussed by the Supreme
Court in Helicopteros and utilized by scores of lower court decisions
over the course of 70 years.
C. The Practical Problems Created by the Elimination of
Corporate-Activities-Based Jurisdiction
There
is
little
doubt
that
the
elimination
of
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction is a significant hindrance to
plaintiffs and a huge boon to corporate defendants. Any plaintiff
who is injured outside of his or her home state is now unable to sue
in that home state even if the defendant has massive operations
there, as long as the operations do not include the corporate
headquarters. It is cold comfort to a California plaintiff to say that
he or she may travel across the country to sue a corporate
defendant in New York, where its headquarters are located or
Delaware, where it is incorporated. Moreover, it is clearly in a
corporate defendant’s interest to force a plaintiff to travel from the
plaintiff’s home state. The greater the plaintiff’s burden and
expense, the lower will be the settlement value of the case. A
rational plaintiff will always accept a lower settlement if the
burden to litigate is higher in a distant state. This advantage for
corporate defendants is not merely theoretical. Many corporate
defendants are taking advantage of BNSF to get cases dismissed
on jurisdictional grounds. As one review of lower-court cases after
BNSF concluded: “The practical implications of BNSF Railway are
difficult to overstate. . . . [D]ozens of courts across the country have
relied on BNSF Railway to dismiss lawsuits under factual
circumstances that, in the past, would almost certainly have
sufficed for the exercise of general jurisdiction.”463
463. Andrew E. Shipley & Matthew F. Ferraro, Not at Home: Reining in
General Personal Jurisdiction After BNSF Railway v. Tyrrell, MONDAQ,
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/686252/trials+appeals+compensation/No
t+At+Home+Reining+In+General+Personal+Jurisdiction+After+BNSF+Railway
+Co+V+Tyrrell (last updated Mar. 26, 2018) (last visited Apr. 16, 2019) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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A review of a few of the cases will illustrate this point. In
Grabowski v. Northrop Grumman Systems Corp.,464 a federal
district court in Maryland dismissed a case against a major defense
contract that employed over 11,000 persons in the state and
headquartered on of its three business units there.465 The district
court ruled that the jurisdictional analysis after BNSF did not
“focus solely on the magnitude of the defendant’s in-state contacts”
but rather required the court to assess the defendant’s “activities
in their entirety, nationwide and world.”466 Because the defendant
employed 65,000 persons worldwide and had 467 offices
throughout the world, “Maintaining a sector headquarters with
11,000 employees is not ‘so substantial and of such a nature’ as to
render Northrop Grumman at home in Maryland.”467
In Plumbers’ Local Union No. 690 Health Plan v. Apotex
Corp.,468 plaintiff health insurance plan sued companies selling
generic prescription drugs.469 The court rejected plaintiff’s
assertion of corporate-activities-based jurisdiction even though it
found that defendants had “continuous and systematic contacts
with Pennsylvania” by virtue of significant sales in the state.470
These contacts did not create “an exceptional case in
which . . . operations in Pennsylvania are so substantial and
important as to render them at home on Pennsylvania.”471
In Guaranteed Rate, Inc. v. Conn,472 plaintiff GRI sued the
defendant on a claim of conspiracy to breach fiduciary duties.473
The plaintiff argued that the defendant was subject to
continuous-corporate-activities jurisdiction because it was
registered to do business in Illinois, held an Illinois residential
464. Grabowski v. Northrop Grumman Sys. Corp., No. GLR-16-3492, 2017
WL 3190647 (D. Md. June 30, 2017).
465. Id. at *3.
466. Id.
467. Id. (quoting BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1558 (2017)).
468. Plumbers’ Local Union No. 690 Health Plan v. Apotex Corp., No. 16-665,
2017 WL 3129147 (E.D. Pa. July 24, 2017).
469. Id. at *1.
470. Id. at *4.
471. Id.
472. Guaranteed Rate, Inc. v. Conn, 264 F. Supp. 3d 909 (N.D. Ill. 2017).
473. Id. at 912.
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mortgage license, originated over $215 million in loans in Illinois
during 2016, operated thirteen branch offices in Illinois, and
employed dozens of Illinois residents in those branch offices.474
Echoing the words of Justice Ginsburg in Daimler, the court held
that plaintiff’s argument was “unacceptably grasping.”475 The
court stated, “[i]f the maintenance of 2,000 miles of railroad track
and employment of more than 2,000 workers in the forum state
cannot establish general jurisdiction as the Supreme Court held in
BNSF Railway, then the business allegedly conducted by [the
defendant] in Illinois in this case cannot either.”476
In Buckles v. Continental Resources, Inc.,477 the Montana
Supreme Court dismissed a case brought by the in-state estate of
a worker who had died in a North Dakota oilfield accident.478 The
decedent worked for a defendant that was authorized to do
business in Montana, maintained two field offices in the state, and
owned and operated hundreds of oil and gas wells and motor
vehicles in the state.479 The court found that because the defendant
was incorporated and had its principal place of business in
Oklahoma, the contacts with the forum were insufficient to render
the defendant “at home” in Montana.480
These cases, and numerous others make it clear that corporate
defendants will aggressively pursue motions to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction in cases in which, prior to the Court’s recent
case law, defendants could not have hoped to succeed on such a
motion.481 Those motions give corporate defendants a decided
tactical edge by forcing plaintiffs away from their home states into

474. Id. at 915–16.
475. Id. at 916 (quoting Daimler v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 138 (2014)).
476. Id.
477. 402 P.3d 1213 (Mont. 2017).
478. See id. at 1221 (reversing and remanding to the district court to
determine whether there is specific jurisdiction).
479. See id. at 1215 (listing the defendant’s various business contacts with
Montana).
480. See id. (explaining Continental was not “at home” in Montana for the
purposes of general jurisdiction).
481. See Shipley & Ferrarro, supra note 463, at 1295 (explaining how BNSF
Railway Co. v. Tyrell changed the personal jurisdiction jurisprudence).
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less convenient forums.482 Moreover, in these cases it is hard to
imagine why asking a corporate defendant to litigate in the
plaintiff’s chosen forum deprives the defendant of its Fourteenth
Amendment due process rights, particularly given that the
transitory presence of an individual defendant in the forum state
can give rise to all-purpose jurisdiction over claims that arose
outside the forum state.483 In each of the cases discussed above, the
forum state had an interest in the case and defendant had
sufficient continuous and systematic contacts with the forum state
to warrant personal jurisdiction, even though the claims arose in a
different state.484
D. Final Questions Raised by the Elimination of
Corporate-Activities-Based Jurisdiction
The obliteration of so many cases without even an
acknowledgement of the damage to such a substantial body of
precedent raises two interesting questions. First, how could
Justice Ginsburg have accomplished such doctrinal destruction
without significant opposition from other members of the Court?
Second, why would Justice Ginsburg wish to eliminate an entire
category of all-purpose dispute-blind jurisdiction, an action that
could only favor corporate defendants?
1. How Did the Elimination of Corporate-Activities-Based
Jurisdiction Occur So Easily?
A number of factors coalesced to enable the elimination of
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction. First, both Goodyear and
Daimler were such easy cases that, when the justices met to vote
482. See id. at 1293 (discussing how lower courts have begun to follow “the
Supreme Court’s narrowed view of general jurisdiction”).
483. See id. (explaining how “corporate defendants now have an effective
shield against forum-shopping plaintiffs who seek to enmesh corporate
defendants in jurisdictions with no connection to the subject matter of the
litigation”).
484. See Buckles, 402 P.3d at 1215 (discussing the extensive contacts the
defendant had with Montana).
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on the resolution of the cases, no justice disagreed that the forum
state lacked personal jurisdiction, nor should they have
disagreed.485 In Goodyear, the plaintiff’s theory of jurisdiction was
so far-fetched, that neither the parties nor the Court was focused
on the massive number of corporate-activities-based jurisdiction
cases based on much more significant contacts with the forum
state.486 In Daimler, the sole focus of the arguments before the
Court was whether MBUSA’s actions could be attributed to
Daimler.487 Indeed, that question was the only issue certified by
the Court when it granted certiorari in the case.488 As a result,
none of the briefs focused on the substantial case law allowing
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction.489
In addition, the elimination of corporate-activities-based
jurisdiction was not clearly and forthrightly announced with an
explanation about why so many decades of case law were being
eliminated. In Goodyear, the suggestion (mistaken though it may
have been) was only that the two places where a corporation was
“at home” were the paradigm forms of corporate-activities-based
jurisdiction.490 In Daimler, that paradigm form became the rule
rather than just the example, but with the possible exception that
there could be cases where corporate activities would still suffice
to create all-purpose dispute-blind jurisdiction.491 Only when the
485. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 927,
929 (2011) (declining to exercise jurisdiction over a foreign defendant); Daimler
v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 121–22 (2014) (same).
486. See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 920 (“A connection so limited between the
forum and foreign corporation, we hold, is an inadequate basis for the exercise of
general jurisdiction.”).
487. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 125 (stating Daimler is not at home in
California and cannot be sued there for injuries attributed to MBUSA’s conduct).
488. See id. at 121 (“The question presented is whether the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment precludes the District Court from
exercising jurisdiction over Daimler in this case . . . .”).
489. See id. (“[W]e conclude Daimler is not ‘at home’ in California, and cannot
be sued there for injuries plaintiffs attribute to MB Argentina’s conduct in
Argentina.”).
490. See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 923–24 (explaining the current jurisprudence
of specific and general jurisdiction).
491. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 140 (“Neither Daimler nor MBUSA is
incorporated in California, nor does either entity have its principal place of
business there.”).
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Court rendered its opinion in BNSF did it become clear that the
exception was essentially limited to the facts of the Perkins case
and would be extended no further.492
2. Why Would Justice Ginsburg Reshape Personal Jurisdiction
Doctrine in a Manner that So Clearly Favors Corporate
Defendants?
There
is
little
doubt
that
the
elimination
of
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction is a massive gift to corporate
defendants.493 Corporations that once assumed they had no other
choice than to accept a plaintiff’s choice of forum now routinely file
motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and force
plaintiffs to litigate in a less convenient forum.494 The less
convenient the forum is for plaintiff and the greater expense
incurred in prosecuting a case, the lower the settlement value for
a defendant.495 It is not unreasonable to be surprised that the
Justice who is generally regarded as the most liberal on the
Supreme Court should be responsible for that turn of events.
Although only Justice Ginsburg could definitively answer that
question, I will offer a tentative hypothesis to explain the result.
Although Justice Ginsburg was best known as an academic for her
work on gender equality,496 she began her academic life as a
comparative civil procedure scholar. Her first legal job after a
492. See BSNF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1559 (2017) (declining to
exercise personal jurisdiction over a railroad in Montana when the railroad only
did some business in the state).
493. See Twitchell, supra note 17, at 635 (discussing general jurisdiction).
494. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 903 (2011)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“I would hold McIntyre UK answerable in New Jersey
for the harm Nicastro suffered at his workplace in that State using McIntyre UK’s
shearing machine.”).
495. See Shipley & Ferrarro, supra note 463, at 1293 (explaining that BNSF
Railway curtailed a plaintiff’s ability to sue corporate defendants in foreign
states).
496. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Equal Rights Amendment Is the Way, 1
HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 19, 21 (1978) (arguing that the Equal Rights Amendment will
only prohibit the government from discriminating on the basis of sex); Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Sex Equality and the Constitution, 52 TUL. L. REV. 451, 451 (1978)
(discussing the history of sex equality and the Constitution).
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judicial clerkship was as Associate Director of the Columbia
University Project on International Procedure.497 Professor
Ginsburg’s first book was on Civil Procedure in Sweden,498 and she
wrote one of her first law review articles on recognition and
enforcement of foreign civil judgments.499 In that article, she noted,
Commentators, both here and abroad, have contrasted
jurisdictional bases appropriate for international recognition
purposes with bases found in domestic law, but unacceptable in
the international sphere. Unacceptable or “exorbitant”
bases, . . . [including the] defendant’s transitory presence[,]
generally are not expected even by the rendition forum to elicit
recognition outside.500

Not surprisingly, Professor Ginsburg cited von Mehren’s and
Trautman’s article Jurisdiction to Adjudicate501 throughout her
article.502 It is not hard to understand why Justice Ginsburg would
retain the skepticism that Professor Ginsburg, as a comparative
civil procedure scholar, had with respect to forms of
activities-based jurisdiction that were not internationally
recognized.503 Professors von Mehren and Trautman were teaching
at Harvard Law School when Justice Ginsburg was a student, and
Professor Ginsburg’s first year civil procedure professor was
Benjamin Kaplan, a man, Justice Ginsburg later noted, “whose
teaching and writing continue to inspire me.”504 Professor Kaplan
himself had written on comparative civil procedure issues with
Professor von Mehren.505 Given the views of Professor Ginsburg’s
497. See generally RUTH BADER GINSBURG & ANDERS BRUZELIUS, CIVIL
PROCEDURE IN SWEDEN (1965).
498. See id. (detailing each part of civil litigation procedure in Sweden).
499. See Ginsburg, supra note 298, at 720 (discussing the effectiveness of
judgements of foreign nation).
500. Id. at 725–26.
501. See von Maheren & Trautman, supra note 9, at 1121 (discussing issues
with adjudicatory jurisdiction).
502. See generally Ginsburg, supra note 298.
503. See id. at 725–26 (explaining the differences between accepted domestic
and international basis for jurisdiction).
504. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Changing Complexion of Harvard Law
School, 27 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 303, 306 (2004).
505. See Benjamin Kaplan, Arthur T. von Mehren & Rudolph Schefer, Phases
of German Civil Procedure II, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1443, 1442 (1958) (discussing
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mentors and her own work in comparative civil procedure at such
an early stage of her career, it is understandable that, even in her
later role as Justice of the Supreme Court, she was skeptical of
forms of activities-based jurisdiction that were greatly disfavored
in the international nation-to-nation context of jurisdiction and
recognition of judgments, even though corporate-activities-based
jurisdiction was so well established in the United States.506
There are, however, a number of problems with Justice
Ginsburg’s comparativist perspective, even beyond the lack of
doctrinal consistency with the decades-long history of
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction in the United States. First,
even if one accepts the proposition that, at the international level,
the country’s rules for international jurisdiction and enforcement
of judgments should be harmonized with those of its trading
partners, that does not mean that the same rules should be
utilized, as a matter of due process, to govern state-to-state
recognition of judgments in the domestic setting, where the Full
Faith and Credit Clause provides an enforcement mechanism that
does not exists at the international level.507 The Court could easily
adopt more generous jurisdictional rules under the Due Process
Clause for state-to-state jurisdictional issues and then, if it wishes,
apply a stricter jurisdictional standard as a matter of federal
common law under the authority of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause with respect to international defendants.508
Moreover, applying the restrictive international standard to
American corporate defendants in the domestic state-to-state
jurisdictional context leaves a major gap in the jurisdictions that
are available to American plaintiffs.509 The comparative law
German civil procedure in the country’s higher courts).
506. See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 9, at 1144 (discussing
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction).
507. See Trangsrud, supra note 23, at 887 (“The Full Faith and Credit Clause
directs that states shall give effect to the judgments of other states; it gives
Congress power to define what effect a state must give to the judgment of a sister
state.”).
508. See id. (“If Congress later passed legislation allowing states to adjudicate
the rights of noncitizens, then the rights of noncitizens could be adjudicated in
state court.”).
509. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 903 (2011)
(declining to exercise jurisdiction in New Jersey over a foreign company when the
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scholars admired by Justice Ginsburg all advocated for much
broader standards of specific jurisdiction to make up for the loss of
available
forums
resulting
from
a
more
restrictive
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction.510 Justice Ginsburg may
herself favor broader specific jurisdiction standards, but she has
not brought along a majority of her colleagues on the Court to that
jurisdictional perspective.511
This jurisdictional gap is a perfect example of the second kind
of categories problem in the Court’s personal jurisdiction
jurisprudence. By considering only one category of personal
jurisdiction in isolation from all the others, the Court has created
an incoherent personal jurisdiction doctrine that is theoretically
inconsistent from category to category and leaves damaging gaps
in the jurisdictions available to plaintiffs.512
VI. Where Do We Go from Here?
Advocating for significant changes in Supreme Court case law
is always somewhat of an exercise in wishful thinking.
Nevertheless, one can hope that adding additional voice to the
chorus of those calling for a rationalization of personal jurisdiction
doctrine will hasten the day when the Supreme Court begins to
address the many problems that continue to plague the field of
personal jurisdiction. I offer three specific suggestions below.513

company’s product caused an injury in the state).
510. See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 9, at 1144–47 (discussing
specific jurisdiction).
511. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd., 564 U.S. at 903 (Ginsburg J. dissenting)
(arguing that McIntyre should be subject to specific jurisdiction in the place where
its products caused injury).
512. See Shipley & Ferraro, supra note 463, at 1293 (discussing how the
Supreme Court recently restricted where corporate defendants can be hauled into
court).
513. Supra Part V.A–C.
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A. The Court Should Place Procedural Due Process
Considerations First and then Explain the Theoretical Foundation
for Whatever Substantive Due Process Requirements the Court
Believes to Be Necessary After That
The secondary status of the procedural due process analysis in
questions of personal jurisdiction is the result of a historical quirk
that the Supreme Court can now remedy.514 In considering the
power of a state court to deprive a defendant of his property, the
first question should always be whether the state’s interest in
hearing the case outweighs the burden on the defendant of
litigating in the forum. As the Court has recognized, the state’s
interests may involve many factors, including an interest in the
subject matter of the plaintiff’s claim because it arose within the
state, the desire to provide an in-state forum in which a plaintiff
may conveniently resolve a claim, and the convenience of litigating
in the forum because of the availability of witnesses or other forms
of evidence.515 Because these issues are closest to the core meaning
of the Due Process Clause and are the least controversial bases to
limit the power of a state court system, this analysis should be the
first and the primary restriction on a state’s ability to hear a
particular case. If the Court still concludes that, after application
of a rigorous procedural due process analysis, some doctrine of
substantive due process requires that a forum have, in addition,
certain contacts with the defendant in order to warrant the
exercise of judicial power, the Court should explain the theoretical
basis for such a substantive due process requirement and then
limit the scope of the requirement to the least restrictive element
necessary to accomplish the theoretical goal.

514. The Court did not decide a personal jurisdiction case based upon a
procedural due process analysis until 1987. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v.
Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
515. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 482–83 (1985)
(discussing Florida’s interest in holding the defendant answerable in the state
based on contacts he established in the state).
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B. The Court Should Correct the Mistake It Made in the
Categorization of Dispute-Blind Jurisdiction

First, the Court should acknowledge that a corporation’s state
of incorporation and principal place of business are the paradigm
forms of the larger category of all-purpose jurisdiction and not
exemplars of corporate-activities-based jurisdiction. Second, the
Court should recognize that corporate-activities-based jurisdiction
is a category created by International Shoe that is distinct from the
citizenship category, which encompasses a defendant’s state of
incorporation and principal place of business. International Shoe,
Perkins, and Helicopteros all anticipated that some level of
continuous corporate activity (less than incorporation and
corporate headquarters) would be sufficient to establish
all-purpose dispute-blind jurisdiction.516
The Court should establish clear standards for when plaintiffs
may assert corporate-activities-based jurisdiction. At the very
least, a corporation that has a branch office with employees in the
forum state should be subject to this type of jurisdiction.
International Shoe explicitly approved of cases asserting
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction with respect to those types
of contacts with a forum state, and there is no reason now to regard
them as jurisdictionally insufficient.517 Indeed, in cases where the
state’s assertion of jurisdictional authority is procedurally
reasonable, meaning the state’s interest in the litigation outweighs
any burden on the defendant, a corporation’s registering to do
business within the forum state should be a significant enough
contact to warrant corporate-activities-based jurisdiction.518 Such
registration establishes that the corporation is receiving an
ongoing benefit from the state that warrants the reciprocal burden
516. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945) (“[T]here have
been instances in which the continuous corporate operations within a state were
thought so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes
of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities.”).
517. See id. at 313 (explaining the various activities that the salesmen
employed by appellant undertook in the forum state).
518. See Jack B. Harrison, Registration, Fairness, and General Jurisdiction,
95 NEB. L. REV. 477, 480–81 (2016) (arguing corporate registration in a state,
appointing someone as an agent to receive service of process, and actually
conducting business in the state should be enough to warrant jurisdiction).

CATEGORICAL CONFUSION

773

to respond to the state’s judicial process, at least in cases where
the state has a sufficient interest to make jurisdiction
reasonable.519 Moreover, to the extent that the Court remains
concerned about whether a corporation has adequate notice that it
is subject to personal jurisdiction in a particular state, both the
branch office and corporate registration requirements would
provide clear and definitive notice to potential corporate
defendants, as long as the Supreme Court clearly enunciated a
contacts standard based on those requirements.
Along the same lines, the Court should also recognize that the
category of jurisdiction based upon a defendant’s consent should be
analyzed separate and apart from the corporation’s state of
incorporation and principal place of business, which are the
foundation for a state’s assertion of the traditional basis of
citizenship jurisdiction over a corporation.520 If a state wishes to
require the consent of a corporation to jurisdiction in its court
system as the quid pro quo for allowing the corporation to register
to do business within the state, that should be sufficient to
conclude that the corporation has consented to jurisdiction and
that no other due process analysis is necessary.521 In the aftermath
of the Court’s elimination of corporate-activities-based jurisdiction,
a number of commentators have suggested that states could revive
broad-based dispute-blind jurisdiction by requiring corporations
who register to do business in the state to consent to the
jurisdiction of the state’s courts.522 Others have opposed this tactic
by suggesting that it is inconsistent with the Court’s requirements

519. See id. at 513 (explaining how the purpose of designating an agent “is to
make a nonresident suable in local courts”).
520. See Daimler v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014) (“Goodyear did not hold
that a corporation may be subject to general jurisdiction only in a forum where it
is incorporated or has its principal place of business; it simply types those places
paradigm all-purpose forums.”).
521. See Harrison, supra note 518, at 480–81 (arguing that “a corporation that
registers to do business in a state, appoints an agent for service of process, and
actually conducts business in the state” should be deemed to consent to general
jurisdiction in that state).
522. See id. at 513 (“At least four other courts of appeals have upheld the
constitutionality of construing state registration statutes to provide jurisdiction
to courts in that state over corporations that comply with the statutes . . . .”).
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for “general jurisdiction.”523 Courts have similarly differed on
whether jurisdiction based on consent must satisfy the Daimler “at
home” test.524 Applying the “at home” test to the separate
traditional basis of consent conflates the categories of consent and
citizenship, which further confuses the due process analysis. If the
Court wishes to impose additional constraints on consent, it should
do so based on the specific considerations that relate to waiver of
constitutional rights and not on the requirements of other
categories of personal jurisdiction.
C. The Court Should Solve Its Other Personal Jurisdiction
Categories Problem by Insuring that the Theoretical Foundations
and Doctrinal Rules of Each Category Are Consistent with Those
of the Others
Even if one accepts that different categories of personal
jurisdiction are a necessary part of the judicial landscape, the
Court should do its best to harmonize the various categories into
one coherent doctrine. By beginning the analysis of every personal
jurisdiction question with the issue whether the assertion of state
power is procedurally fair, the Court will lay a decent foundation
for doctrinal harmonization and coherence. After establishing such
procedural due process requirements, the Court can attend to any
additional substantive due process requirements in a manner that
creates consistent and theoretically sound substantive due process
rules for each jurisdictional basis. Categories of jurisdiction are
fine, as long as the requirements for each category are clearly
understood, consistently named, and theoretically coherent. By
addressing the need for theoretical and doctrinal coherence, the
Court can mend the dysfunctional results illustrated by the
hypotheticals at the beginning of this article and create a more
equitable and easily administered system of personal jurisdiction.
523. See Kevin D. Benish, Note, Pennoyer’s Ghost: Consent, Registration
Statutes, and General Jurisdiction after Daimler AG v. Bauman, 90 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1609, 1610 (2015) (arguing Daimler eliminated longstanding bases of
personal jurisdiction).
524. See id. at 1611–12 (discussing a table of cases illustrating a circuit split
on the issue).

